WO: Why would the transcendental point of view - be it moral or epistemic - necessarily deprecate conceptions of cultural virtue and authenticity? Surely, "the good will," as articulated by Kant in his *Groundwerk*, is emblematic of true virtue. And yet Kant is the paradigm transcendentalist when it comes to morality. Does Eric aver that Kant is somehow confused here? If so, on what grounds is that claim made?
Because "the transcendental point of view" is in the hands (and minds) of human beings. Human beings have layerings of motives -- some explicit, some undiscovered, some adventitious -- that interfere with the "purity" of an attempt at ideal judgment. The very term "transcendental" reeks of the sly power grab, the looming, the looking down upon, the lording it over ... whether in moral judgment or in a swami's meditation.
For example, why did Kant rely on the categories from a Prussian logic textbook for his categories in _The Critique of Pure Reason_? Isn't this the sort of crack in a teacup that leads to the land of the dead? Was this an intrinsic illusion of Kant (i.e., that the categories had been settled by good Prussian thinking) or was it something purely "adventitious" (i.e., that he was careless or influenced by some extraneous circumstance)? Maybe a biographer has explained the odd choice?
For some reason, I'm reminded of Yoda in the Star Wars flicks. When the action is subdued, he engages his quasi-Pennsylvania Dutch syntax ("Help you I will") but in the thick of battle, Yoda always reverts to standard syntax ("Fire over there.") Yoda is no fool. He reserves his transcendentalist moments for times when enormous clunking death machines are not looming. The adventitious is always upon us.
Eric ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
