Well, the early Wittgenstein appears to suggest that most philosophical problems are created by misuse of language, and could be dismissed if only we had some kind of language police to ensure that the language is used properly. I am not convinced that, for example, the issue of the nature of perception is created by misuse of language; in fact it is relevant to empirical sciences in various ways. An ophthalmologist presumably doesn't think that the problems of her profession are created by misuse of language, and neither do her patients. And presumably an ophthalmologist doesn't seek to dismiss these problems by correcting the misuse of language, but to solve them by understanding the processes. However, some of the issues may in fact involve semantic conceptualization; for example, limited color vision cannot really be diagnosed by a physical examination, but rather by showing various colors to the patient and asking him to identify them verbally. A semantic analysis of color names and how they are used might help here. Thus, linguistic analysis has its uses, but it is not everything, and it should not presume either to definitely resolve philosophical problems or to summarily dismiss them. O.K. On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 2:01 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: It is patent nonsense to say language goes on a holiday. Animals and plants and language and buses and shops never go on a holiday. Only humans go on a holiday. (And the suggestion that language goes on a holiday is itself language on a holiday - or not, as it cannot go on one [especially if a passport is needed]). More seriously: to the extent that "objects" in the 'external world' and their causal affects on the 'internal world' of experience are all independent of language, then the fact of the matter, as to whether such "objects" have such affects, is language-independent. We can thus add it to the list Popper presented at the Moral Sciences Club to Wittgenstein of problems that cannot be dissolved merely by analysis of language or which are constituted merely by misuse of language. Is anyone seriously going to suggest questions of fact, like whether humans evolved from creatures that existed millions of years ago, arise only because of misuse of language? Or can be dissolved as problems that disappear when we no longer misuse language? Why should we think that it is not a question of fact whether there is an 'internal world' of experience distinct from an 'external world' of "objects"? And why should we think such a question of fact arises merely from misuse of language or can be dissolved so that it disappears when we no longer misuse language? In addition to these general remarks, we might add that to make out a case in terms of the quotations from Wittgenstein it is not enough to issue these quotations as if we are quoting from the Gospel and that is that: to make a case out we need to work through specific examples that illustrate the application of the quotations, and Chris' post does not offer anything specific to illustrate any specific misuse of language by anybody in this thread. Donal London On Tuesday, 4 February 2014, 11:55, "cblists@xxxxxxxx" <cblists@xxxxxxxx> wrote: An exercise for the reader - choose the quotation from Wittgenstein most appropriate to recent discussion on this list. 1. "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday." 2. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language." 3. "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy." Chris Bruce, off to Bremen on Thursday, but currently packing at home, in Kiel, Germany -------------------------------------------------------------------- To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html