[lit-ideas] Re: The Causal Theory of Perception
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2014 17:15:23 +0000 (GMT)
Perhaps I should have continued to consider the issues or
started elsewhere, but here are some remarks bearing on the so-called “causal
theory of perception”.
The ‘external world’ [of “objects”] has a causal role in
creating the ‘internal world’ of our experience, but the specifics of this role
are largely determined by the perceptual apparatus that governs our ‘internal
world’ – that is, largely determined by how that perceptual apparatus is primed
to detect and process the ‘external world’ [Kant’s point; but as to “largely
determined” see last paragraph]. The ‘external world’ does not set the
‘detection-levels’
or the ‘processing-form’ of the perceptual apparatus except via the mechanism
of ‘natural selection’ [Kant’s point when understood in the light of Darwinism:
for example, the link between light-waves and perceived colours is always
contingently dependent on the perceptual apparatus involved and not a necessary,
intrinsic function of light-waves themselves].
But in ‘natural selection’, selection-from-without by the
‘external world’ is on an ‘internal world’ that is never ‘instructed’ by the
‘external world’ [‘instructed’ in the
Lamarckian or inductive sense]: the ‘internal world’ of experience is the
product of ‘blind’ variation-from-within [leading to ‘selective retention’
within a ‘nested hierarchy’, as per D.T. Campbell in his “Evolutionary
Epistemology”].
At the same time, a perceptual apparatus that emerged by
blind variation ‘from within’, but for which there was nothing ‘in reality’
that it could detect, would not likely evolve because it could provide no
useful information: so our perceptual apparatus (and that of all creatures)
works on decoding material that exists in reality – like lightwaves, heatwaves,
soundwaves, electro-magnetic waves. Imagine a kind of conceivable x-wave that
does not actually exist in
reality but which could conceivably be detected by a conceivable perceptual
apparatus: in Darwinian terms, it is a virtual impossibility that any such
conceivable x-detecting apparatus would
evolve because there is nothing ‘in reality’ to give it adaptive purchase.
Conversely, every kind and level of perceptual apparatus may be guessed to owe
something – causally – to there being something ‘in reality’ which makes the
apparatus useful or adaptive.
When a rabbit sees a fox, that fox indeed plays a causal
role in what the rabbit sees, for it is central to the adaptive usefulness of
vision that it is causally affected by significant features of the ‘external
world’ [like a predator]: but the specifics of rabbit-vision are largely
explained in terms of ‘natural selection’, and in that explanation the fox of
immediate
rabbit-perception plays no causal role.
Strange to say, but it is not the fox so much as the ancestors of that fox (as
they have operated as a ‘selection pressure’ on the ancestors of the rabbit)
that may (partially) explain why and how the rabbit sees the fox as he does –
the causal role of the fox of immediate perception is minimal in comparison (a
mere trigger on an already highly developed and primed visual detection system).
Likewise, the specifics of my ‘internal world’ of visual experience when I ‘see
a lamp’ or ‘see a post box’ has much less causally to do with the lamp or post
box respectively (both of which are only very recent additions to life in
evolutionary terms, and neither of which has operated in evolution as
significant ‘selection pressures’) than with the vast hidden reservoir of
evolutionary changes to the eye as an adaptive organ set to detect and process
and decode ‘data’ from the ‘external world’ – changes that we may best (albeit
only partially) explain in terms of ‘natural selection’.
Of course, there is a problem with phrases like “much less
causally to do with”, or with saying it is the perceptual apparatus that
“largely determines” how reality is perceived (rather than saying reality
“largely determines” the perceptual apparatus and how it perceives). For how
could we test, measure or otherwise decide which of the myriad causal factors
are most important causally? The above account admits that only because various
kinds of wave are a (physical) reality do we have perceptual apparatus designed
to detect and process those waves into useful adaptive information: if we
combine that admission with the view that evolutionary ‘selection pressures’
test perceptual accuracy, then can we not combine these two aspects of reality
[physical waves and ‘natural selection’] so that our perceptual apparatus is
“largely
caused” by these aspects of the ‘external world’? In this way, however
indirectly, might we arrive at the view that the ‘internal world’ “reflects”
the ‘external world’? Perhaps. But when we say “reflects” here, we need to
remember how indirect and fallible this adaptive process is: the perceptual
apparatus of those creatures that have survived Darwinian ‘winnowing’
(including humans) may have proved itself only relatively useful or adaptive as
against creatures more benighted. And we can easily imagine the extinction of
extant
creatures (including humans) if either their perceptual apparatus were worse or
their selection pressures were more severe. At a deeper level, while science
may help inform our critical guesses as to how accurately our perceptual
apparatus “reflects” reality, neither science nor philosophy provides any
definitive Archimedean vantage-point from which this can be assessed so as to
foreclose the possibility that “reality” is something very other to how we
perceive or guess it to be (notably, advances in physics reveal the physical
world generally to be quite other to how it appears in perception – e.g.
‘solid’ matter is mostly ‘empty’
space seeded with tiny, invisible particles; ‘empty’ space is filled with
forces, radiation and ‘dark matter’).
Dnl
On Tuesday, 28 January 2014, 14:23, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Of course, government by representation raises issues of accountability and
questions as to how much modern democracy can be said to be a rule of the
people, or even a rule of the majority, rather than a rule of an occasionally
replaceable political oligarchy. Thus, Mill has certainly been influential in
various ways, not all of which are unequivocally positive.
O.K.
On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 1:09 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Well, it's difficult to measure impact on life, but certainly the concept of
government by representation (not invented by Mill, probably, but developed by
him) is important to the political discourse of modern democracies, and perhaps
also to their functioning. One major difference between Athenian democracy and
modern democracies is supposed to be that Athenian democracy did not appear to
have the concept of government by representation, everything depended on direct
participation of citizens who frequently needed to be physically present at the
assemblies etc. Government by representation enables democracies to function
when their territorial size and population numbers, as well as other factors,
no longer permit direct participation of all citizens in the political process.
Of course, Mill also provided influential arguments in support of the freedom
of speech and press (on utilitarian grounds), and of toleration. (Religious
toleration had been
previously defended by Locke, but Mill broadened the concept.)
O.K.
On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 11:26 AM, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Marlena wrote:
"I wonder if any of you might be so gracious as to enlighten me as to
whether or not Mill and Bentham really have had an impact on either
"philosophical" or "regular" or everyday life?"
Mill's 'On Liberty' is a must read for anyone studying political
philosophy or political theory. In it, Mill provides a critical limit
on democracy, in order to guard against, in his words, the tyranny of
the majority. Here is this limit, in his own words:
"The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the
individual in the way of compulsion and
control, whether the
means
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral
coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or
reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any
evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which
it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some
one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
This essay was also influential in forming the conviction among
liberal theorists that one virtue of democracy was that it could
foster an on-going conversation between citizens, which would lead to
humanity's continued improvement
in both knowledge and character.
Hence, freedom of speech and public debate, as well as the principle
of toleration, are considered by many as not only useful, but a moral
imperative. Again, Mill in his own words:
"The beliefs which we have most warrant for have no safeguard to rest
on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them
unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the
attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have
done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we
have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching
us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better
truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving
it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach
to truth as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of
certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of
attaining it."
I don't know how to measure the influence of Mill, or any other
philosopher, or person, for that matter. I leave that to those who
make up lists. Rorty wrote that he didn't want to stop religious
people from quoting, in public debate, from their authoritative texts
because he wanted to ensure that he would be able to quote from Mill.
Whatever one thinks of Rorty, I would at least agree that it is still
worthwhile to quote from Mill.
Shivering on the steppes,
Phil Enns
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
