[lit-ideas] Re: The Causal Theory of Perception
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:01:29 -0500 (EST)
My last post today.
In a message dated 1/31/2014 10:45:20 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
Well, the presence of the fox might be necessary for the rabbit's
perception of the fox but it is hardly sufficient since after all the rabbit
could
be blind. In Aristotelian terms, I suppose that the fox would be the
efficient cause of the rabbit's perception, while the material and formal
causes
would be sought in the rabbit's perception apparatus. I wouldn't expect the
full explanation to be mono-causal. And I wouldn't expect the rabbit-fox
interaction to trigger implicatures, either. ;)
I like the idea of 'mono-causal'.
McEvoy was noting that
"[his] remarks were bearing on a "causal theory of perception" not in
support of Grice's argumentation" which he goes on to say that he finds
"misconceived and 'thin'".
For the record, while there is no special section in the Wikipedia entry on
Grice on the 'causal theory of perception' (his second important paper,
after 'Meaning'), nor in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry, I do find at
http://consc.net/mindpapers/3.10a
a sort of an updated view.
"The Causal Theory of Perception"
-- a sort of reference guide.
The authors write:
"See also: 3.1a Sense-Datum Theories, 3.1e Naive and Direct Realism,
3.10b Direct and Indirect Perception, 3.10c The Objects of Perception, 3.10d
The
Perceptual Relation, Misc"
and provide a couple of alphabetical references that I will comment on
below.
Cheers,
Speranza
------
Aldrich, Virgil C. (1932). Taking the causal theory of perception
seriously. Journal of Philosophy
29
Interesting in that it predates Grice 1961!
Aranyosi, I. Review of Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of
Shadows. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86
Aranyosi, I. The reappearing act. "In a recent article, Sorensen
proposed a very interesting puzzle involving shadows – The Disappearing Act
puzzle
(2006). It was left unsolved there. Nevertheless, in his latest book he
has added a new thought in guise of a solution to it. In what follows I will
argue that Sorensen’s solution has some shortcomings, and will offer an
alternative to it."
Bradie, M
The causal theory of perception. Synthese 33
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R.
Perception and causation. Journal of Philosophy 92
Campbell, S. Causal analyses of seeing.
Erkenntnis 56
Child W
Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford University Press.
"Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between
two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the
mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by
considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they
say
and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible."
"Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we
should accept both. He shows how we can have a causal understanding of the
mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally
interacting entities and he defends this view against influential
objections."
"Child offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's
contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of
Dennett,
Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the
nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual
experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental
properties."
Child, W, Vision and causation: Reply to Hyman. Philosophical Quarterly 44
Child, W, Vision and experience: The causal theory and the disjunctive
conception. Philosophical Quarterly 42
Coates, P, Deviant causal chains and hallucinations: A problem for the
anti-causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50
"The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question
of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object
of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical,
or hallucinatory.
Coates, P Perception and metaphysical skepticism.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72
"Much recent discussion about the nature of perception has focused on the
dispute between the Causal Theory of Perception and the rival Disjunctive
View. There are different versions of the Causal Theory (the abbreviation I
shall use), but the point upon which they agree is that perception involves
a conscious experience which is logically distinct from the particular
physical object perceived."
"On the opposed Disjunctive View, the perceptual experience is held to be
inseparable from the object perceived; what is directly present to conscious
experience is, literally, part of the physical environment."
"One prima facie difficulty the Causal Theory appears to face is the
problem of deviant causal chains, of providing sufficient conditions for
perception; I shall not address this difficulty directly, though some of my
concluding remarks will bear on it."
Coates's main aim in this paper is to show that, despite the deviant causal
chains problem, the Causal Theory is to be preferred to the rival
Disjunctive View."
Ayer, A. J. & Cohen, L. J. (Symposium) The causal theory of perception.
Aristotelian Society 127 -- citing, briefly, Grice.
Davis, S. (ed.)
Causal Theories Of Mind:
Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference.
NY: De Gruyter.
A reprint of Grice, "Causal theory of perception".
Davies, M. K.
Function in perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61
Dilworth, J. A reflexive, dispositional approach to perception.
Southern Journal of Philosophy 43
Abstract:
"Dilworth investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as
theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint."
"An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of
pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from
unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy
a
series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and
discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive
dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very same worldly
perceived
objects or properties that caused them--will be defended as one legitimate
such naturalistic theory
Dilworth, J
Naturalized perception without information. Journal Of Mind And Behavior
25
"The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are
provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of
reflexive causality."
"On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X
just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed
back upon X itself."
"This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining
both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms,
making no use of informational concepts. However, such a reflexive,
naturalistic causal theory must compete with well entrenched, supposedly
equally
naturalistic theories of perception that are based on some concept of
information, so Dilworth also includes some basic logical, naturalistic and
explanatory criticisms of such informational views."
Dilworth, J
Perceptual causality problems reflexively resolved. Acta Analytica 20
"Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining
deviant causal chains."
"They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception
involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended
cases of perception, and so on."
"But Dilworth shows how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which
objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions
toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled
perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases."
"A critical discussion of D. K. Lewis's perceptual descriptivist views is
also provided, including a defense of the logical possibility of systematic
misperception or perceptual error for a perceiver, in spite of its
empirical improbability."
Dilworth, J
The reflexive theory of perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33
Dore, C
Ayer on the causal theory of perception. Mind 73
Frost, T
In defense of the causal representative theory of perception. Dialogue 32
Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception, part I. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 121:121-152, repr. in Warnock, "The philosophy
of perception", Oxford readings in philosophy.
Grice, H. P. (1988). The causal theory of perception. In Jonathan Dancy
(ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Grice, H. P. -- A retrospective with G. J. Warnock, The Grice Papers.
Grice, H. P. "Visa", in The Grice Papers.
Hyman, J
Reply to vision. Philosophical Quarterly 44
Hyman, J
The causal theory of perception. Philosophical Quarterly 42
Hyman, J
Vision, causation and occlusion. Philosophical Quarterly 44
Kim, J
Perception and reference without causality. Journal of Philosophy 74
Le Catt, B
Censored vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60
Lewis, DK
Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 58
Lowe, E. J.
Experience and its objects. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience.
Cambridge University Press.
Lowe, E. J.
Perception: A causal representative theory. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New
Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield:
Avebury.
Maxwell, G
Scientific methodology and the causal theory of perception. In Herbert
Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars & Keith Lehrer (eds.), New Readings in Philosophical
Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
McLaughlin, B
Lewis on what distinguishes perception from hallucination. In Kathleen
Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
Mclaughlin, B
Perception, causation, and supervenience. Midwest Studies in Philosophy
9:569-592.
Newman, M. H. A. (1928). Russell's causal theory of perception. Mind 5
--- pre-dating Grice 1961.
Newman argues against Russell's structuralism: any collection can be
arranged to have a given structure, under some relation, so if physics tells us
only about structure, it tells us at most the cardinality of the world.
Noe, A
Causation and perception: The puzzle unravelled.
Analysis 63
Oakes, R
How to rescue the traditional causal theory of perception.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38
Pappas, G
Causation and perception in Reid. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
50
Pears, D. F. (1976). The causal conditions of perception. Synthese 33
-- Interesting in that Pears collaborated profusely with Grice on the
philosophy of action (intending, deciding, and predicting)
Pendlebury, M
Content and causation in perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 54
Pickering, F.
A refutation of an objection to the causal theory of perception. Analysis
34
Price, C
Function, perception and normal causal chains. Philosophical Studies 89
Robinson, H
The objects of perceptual experience--II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 151:151-166.
Rogers, G.
The veil of perception. Mind 84
Shope, R
Non-deviant causal chains. Journal of Philosophical Research 16
Smith, P
On The Objects of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 91
Snowdon, P. (Oxford) Causation and perception.
Snowdon, P.
Strawson on the concept of perception. In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson.
Chicago: Open Court.
Strawson, P. F.
Reply to Paul Snowdon. In The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson. Chicago: Open
Court.
Szubka, T
The causal theory of perception and direct realism. In Pragmatism and
Realism. New York: Routledge.
Teichman, J
Perception and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71
Tye, M
A causal analysis of seeing
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1971). Perception. Anchor Books. Proceedings of the
Royal Institute of Philosophy.
Vision, G.Animadversions on the causal theory of perception.
Philosophical Quarterly 44
Vision, G.
Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception. Oxford
University Press.
Vision argues for a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with
direct realism and makes no use of a now discredited subjectivism
Warnock, G. J. The philosophy of perception. Oxford readings in philosophy.
Warnock G. J. and H. P. Grice, Retrospective on the philosophy of
perception. The Grice Papers.
Watling, J. (1950). The causal theory of perception. Mind 59
-- predating Grice
White, A. R. (1961). The causal theory of perception, part II. Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 153:153-168. A reply to Grice. Repr. in
Warnock.
Whiteley, C. H. (1940). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 40
predating Grice 1961
Wilkie, Sean (1996). The causal theory of veridical hallucinations.
Philosophy 71
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