[lit-ideas] Re: Religion & Public Reason
- From: Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2010 03:57:05 +0700
Eric wrote:
"Consider my previous post, which expresses the view that the niqab is
not a token of mainstream religious belief among Muslims, but an
emblem of Wahabbi propaganda."
I agree that the niqab is not part of mainstream Islam. I teach at an
Islamic university and female students are not allowed to wear the
niqab. They have to wear the hijab, but the niqab is forbidden. In
my three years in Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim
population in the world, I have seen maybe a dozen women wearing the
niqab.
Eric:
"it is hard to create a non-Muslim thought experiment with which to
test this fairness principle."
My interest lies in how democratic states might best respond to Muslim
women who choose to wear the niqab. The mere fact that a majority of
people strongly object to this practice does not make a law
proscribing the practice legitimate. This would be the tyranny of the
majority, which most liberal democracies guard against through a
constitution and rule of law. One might cite security issues but
these issues properly concern the religious beliefs of people who
support the wearing of the niqab rather than the niqab itself. So,
most countries would not consider a ban on trench coats even though
these coats have been used in the course of committing numerous
crimes. The niqab is not itself a security threat in the same way
that a trench coat is not. Instead, for many people, the niqab is so
closely associated with Islamic extremism that banning the niqab
becomes a proxy for banning Islamic extremism. This becomes clear
when people who favour the ban tend to focus on the kinds of people
who would engage in this practice, rather than the thing itself. The
issue, then, is not the niqab itself, but rather the kinds of
religious beliefs that may lead to adopting the niqab and using it for
terrorist purposes.
It is at this point that I would raise the question of whether liberal
democracies should punish people on the basis of there being the mere
possibility that their beliefs may lead to acts of terror? Here we
approach something like the Cheney doctrine, or the 1% doctrine, which
can be paraphrased as 'If there is a 1% chance that radical Muslims
will use the wearing of the niqab to engage in acts of terror, then
the government should treat it as a certainty in terms of its
response. It's not about analysis, but about the government's
response.' In other words, if it is even remotely possible that
Muslim extremists could use the niqab as part of a terror attack, then
governments should act as though it were a certainty and ban the
wearing of the niqab. The problem with this approach, though, is that
it undermines the rule of law. The rule of law requires analysis,
requires a process of evaluating evidence and reaching a threshold of
being convinced. The Cheney doctrine ultimately undermines liberal
democracy since it establishes the right of government to act without
accountability, that is, without analysis. However, if we are focused
on security, I think the better approach lies in the pragmatic
argument that a response without analysis is far less effective. The
process of evaluation and argumentation is an effective method for
approaching the truth. Therefore, a response that lacks such analysis
is far less likely to be successful. The Iraq war being an
unfortunately good example of this. Returning to the issue of this
thread, is the ban on the niqab actually an effective tool for
establishing security? In terms of reducing the threat of specific
terrorist attacks, is France safer if it bans the niqab? I think the
answer is fairly clear: no it is not. If this is accurate, then the
answer must be that it is not legitimate for liberal democracies to
use the rationale of security to punish Muslims for wearing the niqab.
As I said earlier, my interest lies primarily in the question of how
liberal democracies should respond to religious beliefs. My argument
is that the most effective government would be one that virtually
ignores religious beliefs but rather focuses on the rule of law. This
focus on the rule of law not only maximizes freedom and fairness for
all, but also maximizes the security and safety of all. This may
sound counter-intuitive to those who demand action, but the basis of
the rule of law, with its emphasis on argumentation and the evaluation
of reasons and facts, is a more reliable guide to the truth. Since
governments in liberal democracies have no legitimate reason to
involve themselves in deciding what religious practices people should
or should not engage in, and the concern for security should be based
on the analysis of facts and evidence of threats rather than the mere
need for response, it seems to me that there are no legitimate grounds
for a liberal democratic state to ban the practice of wearing the
niqab.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Indonesia
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