[lit-ideas] Re: Religion & Public Reason
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2010 03:13:48 -0700 (PDT)
Before turning to Phil's analogy, a resume:-
1) There is the question of whether niqab-wearing is a genuine religious
practice or a cultural add-on, and a sexist one to boot. It has been argued by
those well-versed in the faith that niqab-wearing, in a society that does not
favour this culturally, is against the faith: for the faith is not one of
violent proselytising but preaches working respectfully within the constraints
of 'whatever-is-Rome'.
2) Be that as it may, banning niqab-wearing in public is a restriction on
individual freedom to wear clothing of choice and also a restriction on freedom
of religious expression, at least insofar as we understand "religious" to be a
matter of individual conscience and interpretation (within limits) and not a
term to be defined by the state's interpretation (even if backed by others of
the relevant faith).
3) As usual, freedoms clash: the freedom to wear a niqab in public clashes with
my freedom not to be subject to the sight of niquab-wearers, which I might
place somewhere along a scale of my right not to have to encounter people in
public who wear balaclavas, face masks, hoodies or who let their jeans fall
down their bottom so giving me a clear view (in the supermarket queue) of their
none-too-hygienic-looking underpants. Given the arguable links with violent
fundamentalist Islam, the niqab may also be seen on par with the swastika,
being something of a symbol or "proxy" (as Phil aptly says) for
'Islamo-fascism'. This parity crucially depends on the affect on the
'reasonable' observer, and this does not entirely depend on the actual strength
of the 'proxy' connection (one does not escape a swastika ban by saying one is
wearing it ironically or for its pre-Nazi symbolism or because one just likes
it).
4) This still leaves the key practical question: would it be better to ban or
not to ban? Phil rightly points out that most, if not all, of the points made
(such as at 1-3 above) fall short of a rational, evidence-based analysis.
5) It might be suggested that resolving that key practical question is
difficult to do in an entirely rational, evidence-based way - the components
most amenable to potential rational analysis (e.g. would a ban be
counterproductive or have unintended negative consequences) are hard to test in
advance of a ban. However, the security gains from niqab-banning would seem
slight - explosives can be easily strapped-on under billowing robes or
concealed in knapsacks. What clearly goes beyond evidence-based analysis is the
weight/value we attach to the various components - religion, religious freedom,
freedom of expression, and to freedom from all these in forms that are seen as
"proxy" for an illiberal and hostile outlook on the host society. It is
question-begging and naive to think the liberal side is clearly the one that
favours the "freedoms" first listed and not one that wants restrictions on
freedoms that reflect an illiberal and hostile outlook on a
liberal society: most do not regard society as failing in liberal principles
because it bans public displays of nakedness, and here the display involves
neglegible security threat (and if anything too much liberalness and lack of
hostility).
6) Most liberals (in the British sense) would want Islam generally, and
certainly within liberal Western societies, to adopt a liberal form that sought
to fit in within that society rather than take a stance apart and perhaps even
violently hostile. The question niqab-wearing raises is, in part, is this kind
of 'fitting in' to be left to persuasion or to be legislated for? This is a
difficult one: but certainly Muslim societies are not averse going beyond
persuasion when dealing with Westerners who do not cover-up or who behave in
other ways acceptable in their societies but not in the host society. And we
seem to broadly accept their right to do so.
7) The underlying conflict between the values of a liberal democratic society
and those of a fundamentalist theocratic society surfaces, for us, in terms of
individual freedoms. Insofar as some fundamentalist Muslims do not want to 'fit
in' with the host society, and that is a private matter, the law should not
interfere; but in the public arena the question is an open one, and the
argument that if they do not want to comply they can go to a country where
their practices are the norm (indeed, will be enforced) seems valid here.
Turning to Phil's analogy:-
> As I claimed before, the rhetoric surrounding the push for a ban is not
>focused on the niqab as a delivery system for an explosive vest, but rather it
>is focused on the religious extremism for which the niqab is the proxy.
<snip>
>If, as I am suggesting, the rhetoric that surrounds discussions of the threat
>of the niqab takes the niqab as a proxy for Islamic extremism or even Islam
>itself, and that this extremism is understood as a threat to Western
>civilization, then my analogy holds. This construed threat of Islamic
>extremism is to scale, or perhaps even greater, with the threat of a loose
>nuke.>
The weakness of the analogy is reflected in the looseness of the conclusion,
which does not follow even if we accept what is stated before it.
Consider the loose equation: niqab-wearing _reflects_ "Islamic extremism" and
Islamic extremism is "a threat to Western civilization". This, if true, would
not put niqab-wearing on a par with "a loose nuke" as a threat - on the
contrary the niqab is effectively conceded to be a threat only because it
somehow represents a slippery slope, via Islamic extremism, to violent actions.
Nor would it put Islamic extremism on a par with the threat of loose nuke:
again the threat of Islamic extremism is that it is on a slippery slope to the
threat of a loose nuke or other act of violence. Put another way: it may be
right in self-defence to shoot first when faced with an armed and threatening
man but not when faced with an unarmed man who threatens to get a gun or who
parades in a holster.
Phil's analogy does not really analyse, with "facts and evidence", whether
niqab-banning would likely be productive or counter-productive _from a liberal
POV_. A ban might be productive, for example, by prompting the Muslim community
within liberal societies to adopt a much stronger and clearer stance in
opposition to the minority of fundamentalist extremists in its midst. Though as
a security issue niqab-wearing may be mostly a red herring, the issue might
bring into useful focus the extent to which the religion requires believers to
peacefully 'fit in' rather than seek a path of violent confrontation. It might
stimulate a battle for hearts and minds through discussion that might save many
lives in the long run. This battle can hardly be avoided without abandoning the
field to the enemy.
Phil concludes:
> And to summarize my argument, I think this approach both undermines liberal
>democratic practices and reduces the effectiveness of the response to actual
>security threats.
This is much less a summary of an argument based on facts/evidence than a
statement of a conclusion that is not warranted by "the analogy" offered.
Likewise the following are somewhat pat conclusions and assertions rather than
arguments based on close analysis of facts and evidence:-
>Instead, the most effective approach is for liberal democratic governments to
>avoid interfering in religious matters but rather focus on the rule of law.
>In this way, liberal democratic governments ensure the right to religious
>freedom while also ensuring the legal and security structures that make the
>practice of such freedoms possible.
No doubt many will view the French outcome with interest.
Donal
Ldn
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