In a message dated 5/26/2015 3:09:17 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"generally philosophers are led into forms of idealism [of the type Moore
is criticising] because they have adopted a subjectivist epistemology (e.g.
knowledge as JTB, or traditional empiricism)"
For the record I notice that Grice was preoccupied with Moore's problem
with 'know' in two further instances.
In 1961, when introducing 'implicature', he gives examples where the
concept may be useful. He writes, plainly:
"When Moore said he KNEW that the objects
before him were human hands he was
MISUSING the word 'know'."
In 1967, in the first William James lecture, after mentioning Malcolm's
point about an alleged implication that the use of 'know' is only appropriate
when an 'inquiry is under way', there is a caveat. For others, to use
Grice's words:
"To say "I know" is to give one's word, to give a guarantee". (Grice
implicates this is a mere implicature).
This may all do with the Mooreian paradox at hand, but I'll try to have a
look at Popper's "Realism" essay, which, we are told, does NOT use the word
'implicature'!
My expansion on "I'm now sitting down" was meant to illlustrate the
seriousness with which Moore undertook the mere casual remark by Russell to the
effect that there could be no sincere doubt by Russell, as he was sitting
down, that he was sitting down. (And because it may be a less ontologically
loade, if less infamous, example than the 'hands' one).
Cheers,
Speranza
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