"But essentially O.K. is correct in his comment: where philosophers are
disputing whether something 'seen' is a "material object" (in an external
world)"
I don't think Moore needs to use the verb 'see' at all.
...
Moore, fortunately, was uninfluenced by the Vienna Circle. He may have read
Mill's chapters on Inductive Logic in his System of Logic, but that may be
that.
*Indeed it seems that Moore wants to avoid the use of 'see,' but how does
he know that he has a hand then ? He must have some way of knowing it. What
kind of intuition is supposed to be at work here, if it is not one based on
empirical perception, and why is this intuition supposed to be particularly
trustworthy ? If I looked at the end of my arm and I didn't see a hand
there, I think that I would be rather inclined to doubt, even
commonsensically, that I have one.
O.K.
On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 12:49 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
We are discussing Norman Malcolm's rewrite of Moore's dialogue with
PHILOSOPHER, and the identification of what has been called a
"PHILOSOPHER'S
PARADOX" (sic in the singular)
PHILOSOPHER: There are no material things.
MOORE: You are certainly wrong, for here's one hand and here's another;
and so there are at least two material things.
In a message dated 5/23/2015 3:43:50 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx quotes from Omar K.: "Do I also see that it is
a material
object ? I wouldn't think that it is a claim that can be verified or
falsified simply by looking." and comments: "This simple question and
comment
raise a complex host of issues: in particular, we cannot simply take the
question as being logically univocal for all purposes - for the logical
character of question changes depending on the methods and arguments
being used to
assess it. We can, for example, contrast the question as it might be asked
by a scientist and asked by a philosopher.
But essentially O.K. is correct in his comment: where philosophers are
disputing whether something 'seen' is a "material object" (in an external
world) or, alternatively, whether "the object" is merely the experience of
'what is seen' within the internal world of experience, their dispute is
beyond
what might be "verified or falsified" by observation itself. It is a
dispute about the underlying character of "observation"/experience itself
- and
nothing in the character of observation/experience can decide disputes as
to its underlying philosophical character. The character of
observation/experience is consistent with alternative views as to its
underlying
philosophical character e.g. the way I see the laptop before me is
consistent with
'the laptop I see' being merely an object within my internal world and
consistent with there also being a laptop in the external world."
Well, for the record, note that in Malcolm's rewrite, we have 'material
thing', and I think one can claim:
i. A thing is not an object.
Also:
To quote from Moore:
ii. Knowing what a thing is is different from knowing the analysis of the
thing.
But if we retranslate the argument to 'thing'. Indeed, we may add the
further premise:
PHILOSOPHER: There are no material things.
MOORE: You are certainly wrong, for here's one hand and here's another;
and so there are at least two material things.
MOORE's proof of an external world.
Premises:
iii.
1. Here's one hand
2. And here's another
3. A hand is a material thing.
----------------
4. Therefore, the are at least two material things.
Why does the distinction between 'object' and 'thing' matter? In
philosophical vocabulary, the 'thing' refers to what the Romans called
'realia',
from 'res', thing. "Obiectum' was more of a technical coinage from some
convoluted Greek theory of perception -- as opposed to "subiectum" in
latter
epistemology.
As for the adjective, it remains the same: 'material', and of course, this
is a philosophical term, the Roman translation of Greek 'hyle', that
Aristotle was obsessed with.
"This simple question and comment raise a complex host of issues: in
particular, we cannot simply take the question as being logically univocal
for
all purposes - for the logical character of question changes depending on
the
methods and arguments being used to assess it. We can, for example,
contrast the question as it might be asked by a scientist and asked by a
philosopher."
Exactly. Seeing that Moore is criticising the "Philosopher" (sic in
singular and unspecifed form to refer to your common garden "Idealist" or
"Sceptic"), we should make an attempt to understand it _philosophically_.
What
'matter' is for a scientist may be another matter.
"But essentially O.K. is correct in his comment: where philosophers are
disputing whether something 'seen' is a "material object" (in an external
world)"
I don't think Moore needs to use the verb 'see' at all.
"or, alternatively, whether "the object""
or thing.
"is merely the experience of 'what is seen' within the internal world of
experience, their dispute is beyond what might be "verified or falsified"
by
observation itself."
Moore, fortunately, was uninfluenced by the Vienna Circle. He may have read
Mill's chapters on Inductive Logic in his System of Logic, but that may be
that.
"It is a dispute about the underlying character of "observation"/experience
itself - and nothing in the character of observation/experience can decide
disputes as to its underlying philosophical character. The character of
observation/experience is consistent with alternative views as to its
underlying philosophical character e.g. the way I see the laptop before
me is
consistent with 'the laptop I see' being merely an object within my
internal
world and consistent with there also being a laptop in the external
world."
I'm not sure why 'external world' has to be taken so seriously. In
Malcolm's rewrite, it does not even occur.
PHILOSOPHER: There are no material things.
MOORE: You are certainly wrong, for here's one hand and here's another;
and so there are at least two material things.
Norman Malcolm (possibly influenced by Witters) dedicated a lot of his time
to re-reading Moore. It is later when Malcolm redirects his attention to
what's behind that dialogue, he finds that Moore specifies that one
condition for a proof (that there are at least two material things, as
opposed to
the grand conclusion in the British Academy essay _title_ where 'external
world' occurs, just to tease the audience) is that the reasoner knows for
certain that the premise P holds.
iv. I know for certain that here's a hand.
And it's the early "Defending common sense" by Norman Malcolm that specific
essay where he suggests that we restrict 'know' to cases where an inquiry
is under way.
So, we don't need to involve ourselves with 'see', or 'object'. I take
Moore's act as being 'deictic' in nature. A blind Moore could still prove
there
are at least two material things, by uttering 'here's one hand and here's
another", and he not concern himself with 'object'.
It is often said that 'thing' belongs to the ONTOLOGICAL vocabulary. A
'thing' is a substance for Aristotle, say. "Object", rather, belongs to the
epistemological vocabulary.
Now, "material" notably belongs to the ONTOLOGICAL vocabulary, and belongs
with 'thing', rather than 'object'.
(Phenomenalists know that, I think).
It's different with Kant, who speaks of "Ding" (Thing), to which he adds,
"an sich", in itself. But surely Moore is not explicitly disproving that
there are no things in itself.
If "matter" seems like a philosophical abstraction, we should just stick
with 'material'.
It wasn't a word you'd be hearing at the Roman Forum every day. The
Short/Lewis Latin dictionary gives a short entry:
mātĕrĭālis, e, adj. materia,
I of or belonging to matter, material (post-classical): influxio, Macrobio.
Sonno di Scipione 1, 12, 7; 10; Ambros. de Virg. 3, 1, 1. — Hence, adv.:
m
ā-tĕrĭālĭter, "according to the occasion" (post-classical): in pectore
viri iracundia materialiter regnans. Sidonius, Epistula 8, 11.
(Interestingly, Sidonius is the one who coined 'implicatura' in another of
his Epistulae).
Since Short/Lewis care to note that 'materialis' comes from 'materia', if
we have a look at it we can see what lies behind the item etymologically:
Short and Lewis write: "from the from same root with "mater", q. v., stuff,
matter, materials of which any thing is composed; so the wood of a tree,
vine, etc., timber for building (opp. lignum, wood for fuel); nutritive
matter or substance for food (classical Latin).
Short and Lewis note that 'materia' has a LITERAL usage:
Of food: imbecillissimam materiam esse omnem caulem oleris, Cels. 2, 18, 39
sqq.; cf. of the means of subsistence: consumere omnem materiam, Ov. M. 8,
876; matter, in gen.: materies aliqua mala erat, Aug. Conf. 7, 5, 2.
And they add:
"In abstract, matter, the material universe."
What Moore's Philosopher is thinking when he says "There are no material
things" is "Philosopher's Paradox", roughly, an utterance which "a layman
might be expected to find at first absurd, shocking and repugnant".
So I guess Moore's implicature is that the negation of a "Philosopher's
Paradox" is an utterance which a layman might be expected to find at first
A. NOT ABSURD.
B. NOT SHOCKING.
C. NOT REPUGNANT.
Now find the layman!
Cheers,
Speranza
REFERENCES
Malcolm, N. Defending common sense.
Malcolm, N. Moore and ordinary language.
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html