In a message dated 5/23/2015 5:01:58 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "The problem of relating our internal world
to an
external world is best located within the field of the 'theory of
knowledge'. Though Moore's commonsense realism is on the right side, Moore's
approach
is weak because Moore is a weak theorist of knowledge - for example, his
"Mooreian fact" has nothing much to offer to reconcile commonsense realism
with the mistaken "commonsense theory of knowledge"".
For the record, in a previous note I suggested that Moore and Witters
(both Cantabrigian) were making the common mistake about 'know' (that an
Oxonian
would never make) but, as I re-read comments as that by McEvoy above, I
should note that it's Witters and NORMAN MALCOLM (in his interpretation in
"Defending common sense" of what Moore is up to) who make the mistake, never
Moore!
So Moore almost qualifies as an Oxonian! (Hence the well-known Oxonian
adage, "Some like Witters, but Moore's MY man").
For Witters and Malcom are accusing Moore of "misusing" the verb "know"
when Moore says:
i. I know that this was one human hand and that this is another human hand.
It's less clear with Witters, but Malcolm seems to be claiming that a
condition for the correct or appropriate exemplification of the verb "know" is
the "implication" (a term that Malcolm might use) that an inquiry is under
way, even if we may want to distinguish between verbs (or other parts of
speech) and their correponding 'conceptual analyses'. (I think it's Moore who
somewhere says that one has to distinguish between knowing, say, what
'know' is, and knowing what the conceptual analysis of 'know' is).
And what Malcolm may mean by 'implication' may well be an implicature, and
a conversational one at that!
Cheers,
Speranza
References:
Malcolm, N. "Defending common sense".
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