In a message dated 5/22/2015 11:56:11 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: "I can't think of many situations in which 'here is
a
hand' would be used as an ontological claim, in ordinary language. (Outside
of the philosophy department at Cambridge.)"
Perhaps his implicature was that there is no external world OUTSIDE the
philosophy department at Cambridge?
Oddly, it was at Cambridge that this Oxonian philosopher I liked delievered
his "Causal Theory of Perception" -- Cambridge happened to be the meeting
place of the Aristotelian Society that day. And this philosopher I like was
very much into distinguishing between 'appropriateness' conditions, which
are a matter of 'pragmatic inference' or 'import' and SENSE proper. Witters
wasn't! So it is one thing to say:
i. Here is a hand.
and another to sort of engage in a dialogue with "Philosopher" (sceptical
or idealist):
ii. Philosopher: There are no material things.
MOORE: You are certainly wrong, for here's one hand and here's another;
and so there are at least two material things.
And yet another to claim
iii. I know for certain that here's one hand.
(for this is one of the necessary conditions for the conceptual analysis
of 'valid proof' according to Moore).
So, to criticise Moore, as Witters does, because he is MISUSING 'know for
certain' (perhaps because Witters would NEVER say 'know for certain') seems
MORE inappropriate than Moore indulging into an idiom that WITTERS (and his
followers) found 'inappropriate'.
Cheers,
Speranza
References
Malcolm, N. "Moore and ordinary language", in Schilpp, "The library of
living philosophers".
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