Let's assume arguendo that I see a hand. Do I also see that it is a
material object ? I wouldn't think that it is a claim that can be verified
or falsified simply by looking.
O.K.
On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 6:28 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
wrote:
Malcolm's claim, assuming he actually made it, seems mistaken to me. And I
can't
think of why Witters would not concur with me.
If I say: "I know that all metals expand when heated" - a claim W would
accept
as a knowledge-claim since it is open to verification/falsification - I am
saying nothing regarding whether an inquiry into this matter is underway.
Understood as an empirical claim, its justification rests in *previous*
verifications and corroborations of that claim. So the claim is
inductively
confirmed (if you believe in induction). That my claim is fallible is of
course
not denied.
This really does not look like the kind of mistake Normie would make.
My 2 loonies worth,
Walter O
MUN
Quoting dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx:
In a message dated 5/23/2015 5:01:58 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,world
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "The problem of relating our internal
to anMoore's
external world is best located within the field of the 'theory of
knowledge'. Though Moore's commonsense realism is on the right side,
approachrealism
is weak because Moore is a weak theorist of knowledge - for example, his
"Mooreian fact" has nothing much to offer to reconcile commonsense
with the mistaken "commonsense theory of knowledge"".in
For the record, in a previous note I suggested that Moore and Witters
(both Cantabrigian) were making the common mistake about 'know' (that an
Oxonian
would never make) but, as I re-read comments as that by McEvoy above, I
should note that it's Witters and NORMAN MALCOLM (in his interpretation
"Defending common sense" of what Moore is up to) who make the mistake,never
hand.
Moore!
So Moore almost qualifies as an Oxonian! (Hence the well-known Oxonian
adage, "Some like Witters, but Moore's MY man").
For Witters and Malcom are accusing Moore of "misusing" the verb "know"
when Moore says:
i. I know that this was one human hand and that this is another human
"know"
It's less clear with Witters, but Malcolm seems to be claiming that a
condition for the correct or appropriate exemplification of the verb
isunder
the "implication" (a term that Malcolm might use) that an inquiry is
way, even if we may want to distinguish between verbs (or other parts ofMoore
speech) and their correponding 'conceptual analyses'. (I think it's
whoand
somewhere says that one has to distinguish between knowing, say, what
'know' is, and knowing what the conceptual analysis of 'know' is).
And what Malcolm may mean by 'implication' may well be an implicature,
a conversational one at that!
Cheers,
Speranza
References:
Malcolm, N. "Defending common sense".
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