[lit-ideas] Re: Giving Reasons and Morality
- From: Walter Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2006 13:01:07 -0230 (NDT)
Continuation of Reples:
Lawrence H:
B would argue that whether you lied out of the motive of inclination or
from benevolence for your wife, the (im)permissibility of your action
depends on reasons. As reasons for moral rightness, they are epistemically
required to acord with the necessary presuppositions of reason-giving
(i.e., autonomy, universality, equality, etc.) This is also the case
regarding your motive of keeping things pleasant.
The identification of the circumstances under which we are, are not,
obligated to give (all) reasons is a substantial moral issue. Here, to, B
claims that for our answer to be morally relevant, it must acord with the
epistemic presuppositions of the practice of justification or
argumentation.
Re par 4:
Upper management may have been offended because the expression of a
feeling doesn't count epistemically as a legitimate reason in moral,
interpersonal contexts.
Re par. 6:
A and B would not disagree with anything you say here.
==================================================================
Phil:
On Mon, 4 Sep 2006, Phil Enns wrote:
> Put differently, beliefs are
> meaningful insofar as they are held by particular people. Terms like
> 'Leftists' can function much like pseudonyms in that they are constantly
> in danger of not being accurate reflections of what actual individuals
> really believe. If the majority of 'Leftists' would not be the authors
> of a particular belief, there is no authority to the claim that
> 'Leftists' hold such a belief.
>
> The other way of addressing the problem is the one I mentioned earlier.
> Amago and Spratt can post to this list all sorts of claims but there can
> be no certainty that these claims are the beliefs of the individuals
> behind the pseudonym. In this way, these pseudonyms may contribute what
> has the form of a reason but can't be a reason. Reasons are reasons
> because someone believes they are reasons to do such and such or to
> refrain from doing this or that. If there is no author for the
> statement 'I believe that ...' then there is no authority for the claims
> to be reasons. Reasons and claims regarding morality have their force
> through lives lived, and if we are confronted not with a lived life but
> a portrayed life, then we only have the form of reasons, lacking
> authority and ultimately meaningfulness.
>
> I have met Walter and he can hold me accountable for all the things I
> have posted to this list, but does anyone believe that there are
> individuals who we can hold accountable, in the same manner, for the
> things posted by Amago and Spratt? Whatever is contributed to the list
> by these pseudonyms cannot have the authority of being beliefs and so
> can never have the authority of being reasons for moral activity. Moral
> reasons depend on moral actors who authorize them. Where there is only
> the form of an actor, there is only the pretence of moral reasoning.
I'm not sure what "meaningful" means in the claim that "beliefs are
meaningful insofar as they are held by particular people." (There's a
distinction between doxastic and propositional beliefs that may be
relevant here, but that's not the direction I want to take this claim.)
Moral reasoning (and its institutional embodiment within constitutional
democracies) concerns the obligations we have to each other as free and
equal persons in a just society. B argues that our moral obligations
derive from the epistemic obligations all (not just "I") must respect as
rationally autonomous agents. Whether I or my tribe believe I should treat
you in certain ways, it remains the case that such substantive moral
beliefs must appeal to reasons and their epistemic requirements. I don't
think it's accurate to say that "I believe" that to give a reason is to
make a universally valid claim, open to assessment by all individuals as
equals and respectful of the autonomy of the recipients of my
reason-giving. It may be accurate as a report on what a particular person
believes. But epistemic presuppositions/requirements of reason-giving are
operative within justifiable moral deliberation and judgement not because
particular people believe it's good or right that such requirements hold.
Kant's claim that moral-practical reason proceeds independent of the
particularities of individuals' beliefs and circumstances is relevant
here. Recent revisions and interpretations of that claim within the
work of Rawls, Habermas and other figures in the "deliberative
democracy" tradition conseuqnelty allow greater intelligibility to the
idea of the "form" of reasons, and the "form of an agent." I'm
not sure if I'm actually responding to claims you have made in
your post regarding Jack Spratt because I've tried to direct your coments
to the giving reasons question. I hope I haven't distorted anything you
said or meant. And I agree that pseudonyms given by anonymous
interlocutors on this List is just bad form and not in keeping with the
nature of a genuine community of inquiry. Our cafe abides by
ethical values (usually) and not only moral norms. Lawrence's recent
comments on this are very relevant and helpful. We already know far too
little about each other. (Not that that's stopped some from believing and
asserting things about others on epistemically irrelevant or weak
warrant.)
Off to celebrate Labour Day.
Walter C. Okshevsky
Memorial U
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
