[lit-ideas] Re: Giving Reasons and Morality
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2006 14:07:54 -0700
Walt,
Perhaps because I was not involved in the earlier threads, I do not
understand your dilemma with any precision, nevertheless after a second
reading I was reminded of an argument my wife and I used to have: We would
be invited to a social event and I would decline because Susan wasn't
feeling well. Susan would later reproach me by saying that the real reason
I didn't want to go was because I didn't feel like it. She thereby implied
that what I was saying was immoral.
I countered by saying that what I said was true, Susan did have a health
problem and wasn't feeling well. It was also true that I didn't feel like
going. So it wasn't accurate to say that I was avoiding the real reason.
It would be accurate if there were only one reason and I had not given it,
but that was clearly not the case. I had two reasons for not wanting to go
to the social event, Susan's health and my not feeling like going.
I subsequently considered whether I was obligated to give all the reasons
for a given choice and decided I was not for two reasons: 1) the person I
was presenting my response two wasn't likely to be interested in multiple
reasons or a very long discussion about whether we were going to attend..
The reason most likely to keep the situation pleasant seemed the best one to
use, and so I used it.
2) From the standpoint of feasibility, I could never be sure that I had
access to all the reasons or that I was going to be able explain them with
completeness and accuracy. For example what is meant by "not feeling like"
doing something? I retired early, to some extent, because I "didn't feel
like going to staff meetings." I was grumpy in those days and didn't bother
to explain myself beyond that, but I'll now say that the meetings were a
long way off, perhaps a walk of half a mile, and I wore boots that were good
for riding my motorcycle but not good for walking. I tended to have a lot
of headaches that meetings I wasn't concerned with (which these were) seemed
to exacerbate. And I didn't do well sitting in one place -- that is, my
back tended to stiffen up. All of which detracted from my ability to do my
main job which was evaluate engineering changes presented to a board I sat
on in afternoon meetings very near where my desk was. But all I ever said
was "I don't feel like" going; which was accurate from my point of view but
seemed to offend my upper management.
Was I morally obligated to attempt to give "all my reasons"? I considered
that at the time, but I had previously asked for a special pass so I could
ride my motorcycle up near where the meetings were and the pass was denied
because no one had ever been given such a pass for a motorcycle. I also
told them the meetings never concerned anything I was doing because I was
doing a unique sort of work. They said they wanted me there because it was
good to keep in touch. They were management and simply "wanted me there."
My "not feeling like" being there seemed suitable to that; and that is what
I said. They didn't have the recourse of firing me because the meetings I
attended were very important and a customer (Air Force) requirement; plus,
no one else had the experience to do what I was doing. Also, I had long
since entered the period when I wanted to retire; so all they could do in a
worst-case scenario was force me into early retirement which wouldn't have
made me unhappy.
Perhaps that was too long a discussion of these matters, but I tend to think
that 1) there is rarely just one reason for our decisions, and 2) we may not
have all our reasons for a given decision clearly in mind. I recall for
example thinking that the Staff Meetings I mentioned were very poorly run
and extremely boring. I believed I could run a better quicker meeting. I
didn't previously mention that, but perhaps it entered into the equation in
some way.
I have no idea whether I have taken this discussion in the direction you
wanted to go, but I did read your note, and this did occur to me as being
related (or possibly related) so there it is.
Lawrence
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of wokshevs@xxxxxx
Sent: Saturday, September 02, 2006 1:07 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: wokshevs@xxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Giving Reasons and Morality
I beg the indulgence of those who still await a (probably long over-due)
reply
to their posts on threads in which I have been involved as I postpone those
replies yet again in an effort to meet a looming administrative deadline. My
being able to meet that deadline hinges on getting clear on a matter that
has
been befuddling me for some time now. I seek input both from the
philosophers
as well as from those blessed with common sense. (I grant, of course, the
intersection of those classes.) It has to do with the relationship between
giving reasons and morality. Here are two possible versions of the
relationship.
Version A
Moral principles and norms having to do with equality, autonomy, reciprocity
and
universality are general criteria which we apply to different contexts,
actions, policies, etc.. Reason-giving is one particular activity or
language-game. We can do it either in accordance with the above stated moral
norms or we can engage in the activity while violating those same norms.
Moral
principles originate within our socialization into a particular culture, set
of
traditions, etc.. So we, for example, come to learn to respect the equal
freedom of all persons and then we apply this norm within our particular
activities, one of which is reason-giving. (Or we fail to do so.)
Version B
Moral principles conceptually originate within the activity of giving
reasons.
The former necessarily presuppose the latter. Without this practice, we
could
not learn, nor would we have, moral concepts such as equality, autonomy,
right
and wrong, obligation, etc.. It's not that these moral principles and
concepts
are available to us first, learned first within acculturation, and then
applied
to various activities and contexts, one of which is reason-giving. Rather,
what it means to respect others as free and equal persons, what it means to
have an obligation, etc., are intelligible to us only because we understand
what it means to give reasons.
That's a quick and rough way of putting it, I realize. But any commentary on
which version is the correct one would be appreciated. I'm assuming they're
mutually exclusive, but perhaps not? I'm not attributing either of these
views
to any particular writer as I don't want to get embroiled in textual
hermeneutic matters.
Walter C. Okshevsky
Memorial U
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