[lit-ideas] Re: Giving Reasons and Morality
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2006 20:30:56 -0400
Walter Okshevsky wrote:
"Moral reasoning (and its institutional embodiment within constitutional
democracies) concerns the obligations we have to each other as free and
equal persons in a just society. B argues that our moral obligations
derive from the epistemic obligations all (not just "I") must respect as
rationally autonomous agents. Whether I or my tribe believe I should
treat you in certain ways, it remains the case that such substantive
moral beliefs must appeal to reasons and their epistemic requirements. I
don't think it's accurate to say that "I believe" that to give a reason
is to make a universally valid claim, open to assessment by all
individuals as equals and respectful of the autonomy of the recipients
of my reason-giving. It may be accurate as a report on what a particular
person believes. But epistemic presuppositions/requirements of
reason-giving are operative within justifiable moral deliberation and
judgement not because particular people believe it's good or right that
such requirements hold. Kant's claim that moral-practical reason
proceeds independent of the particularities of individuals' beliefs and
circumstances is relevant here. Recent revisions and interpretations of
that claim within the work of Rawls, Habermas and other figures in the
"deliberative democracy" tradition consequently allow greater
intelligibility to the idea of the "form" of reasons, and the "form of
an agent.""
I am a bit confused regarding B. From an earlier post, I understood B
to include the claim that moral principles develop from epistemic
practices. We learn to give reasons for our actions and from these
epistemic practices develop moral principles. Yet, the above seems to
suggest that moral principles develop from the form of reason-giving
such that what matters for the articulation of moral principles is not
the reasons people actually give but that they have engaged in
reason-giving. The difference between particular epistemic practices
and their 'form' is important, especially for the likes of Rawls and
Habermas.
However B takes shape, I don't see how it escapes the problem Habermas
cannot resolve, namely, the relationship between a reason and a
practice. Following Habermas, the content of reasoning derives from
those practices we consider good or moral. When confronted with
incommensurable claims regarding what is good or moral, we turn to the
epistemic practice of giving reasons. This epistemic practice is
abstracted from moral activity such that the only things that matter are
good reasons. A particular practice is judged based on whether good
reasons can be provided, rather than on criteria internal to the
practice itself. If good reasons are provided, moral principles can be
formed.
The problem, though, is that it is not clear how one determines a 'good
reason' except without reference to the criteria internal to the moral
activities to which one is committed. How can I determine a good reason
for a moral principle regarding stealing without drawing on all the
things I have learnt about stealing being wrong? Yet, the epistemic
criterion of abstraction from those activities rules out such
referencing. As Habermas makes clear, the background for determining
good reasons are the moral activities I engage in, yet determining what
counts as a good reason can't reference those same activities. And so
we have the rather odd situation where I attempt, through good reasons,
to draw moral principles from my lived moral activities, yet those good
reasons are independent of those same activities.
For Habermas, and perhaps Walter, the consequences are significant. If
the reasoning I use to draw moral principles is abstracted from moral
activity, there can be no assurance that these principles can be
instantiated in moral activity. The abstraction involved in producing
good reasons leaves open the question of application: what criteria
exist to fix the application of moral principles? One would think that
moral traditions would fit the bill but the abstraction of producing
good reasons necessarily rules these traditions out. It would seem,
then, that moral principles have no connection to moral activity, both
in production and application, and so it isn't at all clear how
meaningful such principles can be. On this point, Habermas admits the
problem: there can be no certainty that moral principles developed from
good reasons have any application in the lifeworld.
My suggestion, returning to the distinction between reasons and their
form, is twofold. First, that moral activities necessarily carry within
themselves epistemic practices. I don't think it is possible to account
for moral activity without reference to reason-giving and so any attempt
to split off reason-giving from moral activity is artificial. Second,
because moral activity involves epistemic practices, reasons articulated
within any particular moral tradition can likely be translated into
other moral traditions. Here we have the criterion of
universalizability without the problematic attempt at abstraction. In
short, I think both A and B are faulty insofar as they artificially
split off the epistemic practices that are a necessary part of moral
activities. The reasons we give for producing moral principles
regarding stealing draw on the moral activities that contribute to our
lifeworld, and we know what are good reasons for such principles
precisely because our lifeworld is constituted, in part, by moral
activities.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Toronto, ON
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