[lit-ideas] Re: Giving Reasons and Morality
- From: Walter Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2006 12:01:57 -0230 (NDT)
Thank you John, Lawrence, Mike, RP and Phil for your very thoughtful,
interesting and often insightful replies to my question. They are proving
to be very helpful in my getting clearer on what I want to say. Here are
some responses to the replies.
John Wager
I believe John's first consideration actually strengthens the
supporter of version B (henceforth, as held by "B" over "A", the
supporter of version A). If one cannot give a reason for one's belief or
action, then that belief or action cannot count as a moral one, either in
formal or substantive terms. That is part of what it means to say that
morality conceptually or logically originates in, can be derived from the
giving of reasons. "A" agrees to that as well but claims that reaons are
only morally relevant reasons on the basis of principles which identify
the relevance of the reasons given. The usual principles are autonomy,
equality, universality, reciprocity/solidarity. "B" argues that these
principles are originally epistemic principles necessarily operative
within the practice of giving reasons.
John's second point: Both A and B have grave doubts about the possibility
of "immediate perception" of morally relevant factors of a situation. Such
perception is argued to be "concept-dependent or principle-dependent."
=====================================
RP
Both A and B view reson-giving as justification. Indeed the only form
justification can take. Neither would understand justification to comprise
but a species of reason-giving, as if reason-giving functioned to do
things other than provide justification. (Why else would we give reasons?)
(Your text has alot of Japanee characters in it from here on in so I'm not
sure if I'm getting all that you say.)
Your par. 2: I think B would say that Jesus's remark and the Utilitarian
principle are both instances of the specification of a criterion for moral
justifiability. As such, each is also (and originally) a specification of
a criterion for legitimate reason-giving in moral contexts. Without a
concept of reason-giving, those substantive moral principles would be
unintelligible.
Yes, the justifiability of such principles are themselves open to question
and require reasons for their justifiability. But, for B, both the first-
and second-order justifications must accord with necessary epistemic
presuppositions of reason-giving such as autonomy, equality, universality.
B is clearly emerging to be a Kantian of sorts since these are the
epistemic criteria set out by the Categorical Imperative as the supreme
principle of impartial reason-giving. Bargues these criteria annot
themselves be substantiv, moral criteria since this would defeat the
purpose of the CI test by rendering it circular.
On keeping promises and the Skipper's mother:
B would maintain that Kant's argument that violations of maxims of
promise-keeping for purposes of self-interest are morally impermissible
is grounded in the CI as an epistemic (non-moral) principle.
(Self-contradictory maxims being epistemically squirrelly and hence
morally wrong.)
===========================================================================
Mike G:
I think both A and B would say that acting on the reason of securing
somebody's love is not an epistemically relevant reason for the moral
justifiability of action and belief --- even one's own mother's. The
reason fails on the epistemic criterion of autonomy, minimally. Same with
the idea of an "emotional reason" or "emotively-based reason. And even
more so with sex as the determining ground of action. (I'm not bashing sex
as being "pathological" in Kant's sense, of course.)
=======================================================================
Will return momentarily with replies for Lawrence and Phil's very
interesting but I think wrong claims below.
Walter C. Okshevsky
Memorial U
On Mon, 4 Sep 2006, Phil Enns wrote:
snip
> beliefs are
> meaningful insofar as they are held by particular people. Terms like
> 'Leftists' can function much like pseudonyms in that they are constantly
> in danger of not being accurate reflections of what actual individuals
> really believe. If the majority of 'Leftists' would not be the authors
> of a particular belief, there is no authority to the claim that
> 'Leftists' hold such a belief.
>
> The other way of addressing the problem is the one I mentioned earlier.
> Amago and Spratt can post to this list all sorts of claims but there can
> be no certainty that these claims are the beliefs of the individuals
> behind the pseudonym. In this way, these pseudonyms may contribute what
> has the form of a reason but can't be a reason. Reasons are reasons
> because someone believes they are reasons to do such and such or to
> refrain from doing this or that. If there is no author for the
> statement 'I believe that ...' then there is no authority for the claims
> to be reasons. Reasons and claims regarding morality have their force
> through lives lived, and if we are confronted not with a lived life but
> a portrayed life, then we only have the form of reasons, lacking
> authority and ultimately meaningfulness.
>
> I have met Walter and he can hold me accountable for all the things I
> have posted to this list, but does anyone believe that there are
> individuals who we can hold accountable, in the same manner, for the
> things posted by Amago and Spratt? Whatever is contributed to the list
> by these pseudonyms cannot have the authority of being beliefs and so
> can never have the authority of being reasons for moral activity. Moral
> reasons depend on moral actors who authorize them. Where there is only
> the form of an actor, there is only the pretence of moral reasoning.
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Phil Enns
> Toronto, ON
>
>
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