[lit-ideas] Re: "A right and an obligation"
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2013 13:05:17 -0400 (EDT)
I enjoyed McEvoy's quoting from wiki:
"Hohfeld argued that right and duty are correlative concepts, i.e. the one
must always be matched by the other. If A has a right against B, this is
equivalent to B having a duty to honour A's right. If B has no duty, that
means that B has a privilege, i.e. B can do whatever he or she pleases
because B has no duty to refrain from doing it, and A has no right to prohibit
B
from doing so. Each individual is located within a matrix of relationships
with other individuals. By summing the rights held and duties owed across
all these relationships, the analyst can identify both the degree of liberty
— an individual would be considered to have perfect liberty if it is shown
that no-one has a right to prevent the given act — and whether the concept
of liberty is comprised by commonly followed practices, thereby
establishing general moral principles and civil rights."
>Does this help? Does it clear everything up?
It does. I would not be surprised if people tried to formalise Hohfeld's
genial claims.
Indeed, I'm not, when I find it is, as per
_http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4471-1488-8_1_
(http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4471-1488-8_1)
The Hohfeldian fundamental legal conceptions that deal with solely deontic
LEGAL RELATIONS, the duty/privilege and right/no-right pairs, require not
only an adequate definition of agency for the person who is obligated or
permitted to act, but also the same of patiency for the person to-or-for whom
that action is directed. Person-i’s DUTY to see-to-it-that that
state-of-affairs-s is so for the benefit of person-j is defined here in terms
of a
deontic OBLIGATION operation and DONE-BY (D2) and DONE-FOR (D4) relations
between a state of affairs and persons. This paper is a refinement of the
author
’s earlier efforts to modify, extend, and enrich Hohfeld’s fundamental
legal conceptions into a more general notion of LEGAL RELATIONS (defined
concepts are expressed in all capital letters.) In particular, the agency
concept of DONE-BY is being brought into closer conformity with Belnap’s
emerging stit logic, with the modifications of deontic logic accompanying such
changes. The S4–D2 action modal logic considered here is intended to be a part
of the A-HOHFELD logic in which LEGAL RELATIONS are defined and from which
a representation language called the A-HOHFELD language is derived. The
A-HOHFELD language is being used as a representation language for
constructing MINT (Multiple INTerpretation) interpretation-assistance systems
for
helping lawyers to detect alternative structural interpretations of sets of
legal rules.
Cheers,
Speranza
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