Yeah, I was waiting for that. It takes my undergrads a couple of weeks to cease and desist from the giggling, squirming and texting re "P". It takes my grad a and doctoral students much longer :) (Why is that?) "P" definitely has sexual, and thus giggling, connotations/implicatures, as in: "I propositioned Walter in his office but he said what he really needed was some Oban. I was, like, totally devastated and humiliated! Like, he would prefer some Arab sheik to what he can clearly see I have to offer??! I've been wearing low cut blouses and bending down just for him for weeks now. I'm dropping this course, big time. And I certainly got a few things to say on the course evaluation form too." And, bitte, don't say: "To P or not to P." Procrastinationally facing piles upon piles of final papers and final exams, Walter O. Quoting Paul Stone <pastone@xxxxxxxxx>: > I would argue (Walter) that the right to pee is in most places, not a > right, but the obligation to pee is definitely mandatory, required, and > morally prudent - or you have accidents. > > humming Dave Matthews Band's "So much to say!" > p > > > On Sun, Apr 7, 2013 at 12:39 PM, Donal McEvoy > <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote: > > > > > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx> > > > > >I believe that in Australia, voters have both a legal right and a legal > > obligation to vote. Failing to vote results in a fine. > > > > Well, on one way of defining these terms it might be better to say they > > have simply a legal obligation to vote - not a 'right to vote', for they > > have no right or power on which they exercise choice as to its exercise, > > but simply vote as a matter of duty. > > > > On another way of looking at it, and defining terms, they have a power to > > vote and a duty to vote and so both a legal right and a legal obligation. > > > > I am unsure it matters much unless we get confused. Nevertheless there is > > something problematic about describing compliance with a duty as exercise > > of a power or right - problematic in a sense in which it is not > problematic > > to describe as a right something that I may do though I am not under any > > duty to do it. I have a duty not to drive negligently into my neighbour's > > parked car, for example, but surely it would be odd to say I have a right > > or power not to drive negligently into their car (even though, in another > > attenuated sense, it is true I have a such a right). > > > > In short, I am too tired trying to format a 64gb microcard in FAT32, > > having spent hours on this today and yesterday, to bring better analysis > to > > bear - perhaps Hohfeld helps:- > > > > "Hohfeld noticed that even respected jurists conflate various meanings of > > the term *right*, sometimes switching senses of the word several times in > > a single sentence. He wrote that such imprecision of language indicated a > > concomitant imprecision of thought, and thus also of the resulting legal > > conclusions. In order to both facilitate reasoning and clarify rulings, he > > attempted to disambiguate the term *rights* by breaking it into eight > > distinct concepts. To eliminate ambiguity, he defined these terms relative > > to one another, grouping them into four pairs of Jural Opposites and four > > pairs of Jural Correlatives. > > (1) (2) (3) (4) JURAL OPPOSITES > > [image: > GullBraceLeft.svg]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:GullBraceLeft.svg> > > Right > > No-right Privilege > > Duty Power > > Disability Immunity > > Liability (1) (2) (3) (4) JURAL CORRELATIVES > > [image: > GullBraceLeft.svg]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:GullBraceLeft.svg> > > Right > > Duty Privilege > > No-right Power > > Liability Immunity > > Disability > > This use of the words *right* and *privilege* correspond respectively to > > the concepts of claim rights and liberty > rights<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claim_rights_and_liberty_rights> > > . > > Hohfeld argued that right and duty are correlative concepts, i.e. the one > > must always be matched by the other. If A has a right against B, this is > > equivalent to B having a duty to honour A's right. If B has no duty, that > > means that B has a privilege, i.e. B can do whatever he or she pleases > > because B has no duty to refrain from doing it, and A has no right to > > prohibit B from doing so. Each individual is located within a matrix of > > relationships with other individuals. By summing the rights held and > duties > > owed across all these relationships, the analyst can identify both the > > degree of liberty an individual would be considered to have perfect > > liberty if it is shown that no-one has a right to prevent the given act > > and whether the concept of liberty is comprised by commonly followed > > practices, thereby establishing general moral principles and civil > rights<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_rights> > > ." > > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesley_Newcomb_Hohfeld > > > > Does this help? Does it clear everything up? > > > > In the Australian example there is a sense in which we might say a voter > > has a 'right to vote' and a 'right not to vote', except exercising 'the > > right not to vote' gives rise to a penalty by way of a fine, whereas there > > is no such penalty for voting. It would be different if in their system > > there were a legal duty to vote that was specifically enforceable i.e. > > people who tried not to vote would be compelled to:- in such a case, we > > might say people had no legal 'right not to vote' because they are legally > > compelled to vote. But in the Australian system there is simply a > financial > > incentive to vote or a financial disincentive to not vote (the > > dis/incentive applied by way of a fine): and this may fall short of there > > being 'no right not to vote'. And in the sense in which there is 'a right > > not to vote' we may say there is no duty to vote either, rather that > > exercise of the 'right not to vote' gives rise to a liability by way of a > > fine. Or, as against the foregoing, we might say the fine means there is > > no 'right not to vote' but rather a duty to vote, and dereliction of that > > duty gives rise to a fine. > > > > My suspicion is that these issues may turn on how we define our terms and > > this may largely prove semantic - nothing substantive may depend, for > > example, on whether we say in Australia there is a 'right not to vote' or > > whether we say (using a different definition of terms) in Australia there > > is 'no right not to vote': provided we are clear as to what's-what in > legal > > terms. So a lawyer asked by a client in Australia whether the client has a > > 'right not to vote' or has 'no right not to vote', might (rightly) > > side-step a direct yes-or-no answer - and simply explain the legal > > consequences of not voting (as against the consequences of voting). That > > way the client may be properly legally advised - it is a question beyond > > the remit of such advice to answer whether those legal consequences are > > such that we should properly say there is a 'right not to vote' or that > > there is 'no right not to vote' in Australia. That's one for the > > philosophers - the law doesn't much worry about even using the term > > "right", and other terms, univocally. > > > > Is that the time? > > > > Donal > > Needing format advice > > London > > > > > > > This electronic communication is governed by the terms and conditions at http://www.mun.ca/cc/policies/electronic_communications_disclaimer_2012.php ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html