--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > > > --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@> wrote: > > <snip> > > > > > --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote: > > > > > We are in agreement on the necessity of an experiencer in the above > > > formulation. Where we have disagreed is over what it means to be an > > > "experiencer". -- SWM > > > > Just what does it mean by your lights? I'll look around and see if you > > specify elsewhere. > > > > bruce > > > > ========================================= > > I don't even know how to begin answering this question after all the > discussions we've had to date. What do you think I've been writing, on this > and all the other lists, all this time? What have we been arguing about??? -- > SWM Hi Bruce and Stuart, The reason why this issue will be around forever, at least according to Colin McGinn, is that conceptual dualism is not amenable to elimination. Or is it? Eliminative materialism a la Dennett simply denies that something like ontological subjectivity can be a matter of science. It is eliminative in the sense that science is supposed to be helpless in discussing how ontological subjectivity can happen in a world consisting entirely of physical events. The premise at issue here is whether science can only be about third-person events (Dennett) or rather if it can also be about what Searle calls "ontological subjectivity." But is not as if Dennett denies he's conscious enough to write a book on how to explain consciousness without explaining ontological subjectivity.. Hacker, like Wittgenstein exactly or not (there was only one Christian too), will say that the thesis that the brain causes ontological subjectivity doesn't have a sense--it is nonsense. I think he's all wet but McGinn's point will forever stand. Here's how. Let's, for starters, agree with Searle that we may after all find out exactly how the brain causes consciousness on the model, say, of discovering the germ theory of disease. We find what look to be correlates of consciousness first. Then we determine whether they are actually causal and just what mechanisms are involved. Even if we get all the way, we will have an explanation that still leaves us distinguishing those things which have minds and those things which don't. Further, it will be left open to anybody to say that no matter how confident we feel about the above explanation, it is still based on induction and subject to possible falsification (or not if it is a computational theory...scattered snickers). Maybe God's voice comes out of the sky at the moment of informational singularity and says we got our explanation all wrong and the correct explanation takes into account quantum gravity on an infinitely dimensional plane. Then we say, "Oh!" The point is that it may in principle be possible for there to be an explanation of how consciousness is caused while that explanation is simply too deep for any human mind (and maybe even nonhuman mind except God's and maybe even God come to think of it, for all _anybody_ knows). So let us submit that we find it in principle scientifically responsible to aim at a theory arrived at by induction which may simply look overwhelmingly plausible. And the debate can go on forever. Or we can see limits to the debate by understanding what we mean. Then we need a theory of meaning. But Wittgenstein railed against philosophy toying with theories. But once you have speech acts, it is actually encumbent upon a philosopher to come up with a bare-bones sketch of how speech acts are part of the real world. This eventually is supposed to lead to a biological account of how the brain causes consciousness for Searle and he mentions that this is where he probably parts company with Wittgenstein, what with his theoretical account about why it is senseless to come up with theories if one is merely describing language use. Well, Wittgenstein is right if one is merely going to describe how language is used. It's just that one can go deeper. Well, so what? Go as deep as you want and any possible theory of consciousness is going to appear to be yet another case of consceptual dualism. Once you got your explanation, you still have two categories in the real world: Those things which have minds (sufficient causal processes which allow ontological subjectivity while being merely physical processes) and those things that don't. And who in the world would think that a denial of computation would be a denial of physical processes? Well, simply one who could distinguish enough senses! So, back to Wittgenstein and how people, especially philosophers with their sometimes crazy and tempting idiosyncratic linguistic usages, say the simplest things as well as the darndest things. A puzzle for puzzlers a la Wittgenstein. Is the following argument nonsense? 1. The most complete scientific account of all of nature would come in the form of a series of statements. 2. It is often possible to express the same propositional content with two or more differently worded propositions. Ergo, 3. There is a shortest way to express all the propositions necessary for the most complete scientific account of all of nature, as compared to longer ways using longer sentences. So, it would appear that if one is going to focus on describing the uses of language, one is thereby committed to focussing on science as well as on nonsense, one example of which might be "nonsense includes different types as in the statement that pictorial art is a different kind of nonsense than the musical art, since only statements can have senses, if you know what I mean by senses as meanings, art not being about senses of statemsents, ergo...". If you know what I mean. Perhaps I'm speaking idiosyncratically, if you know what I mean or if you don't, or some other possibility. I won't say I've proved anything if all the conceptual dualists won't either! Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/