Joseph Polanik wrote:
we are not concerned with your inability to explain the existence of experience. we are concerned with your inability to explain the non-existence of the experiencer.
It will simply not do to argue that an experienceR exists by virtue of the claim that it experienceS (or "has") experience -- this does not establish the existence of the putative experienceR. If the putative experienceR experienceS (or "has") experience (as though the experienceR and its experience were somehow distinct), then what is it about the experienceR that permits us to claim that it experienceS (or "has") this experience, short of stamping one's foot and proclaiming "it just does!" ? If the answer is "nothing" then the claim that the experienceR experienceS the experience cannot be upheld. If the answer is "something distinct from the experience" then this "something" must be yet another experienceR, and we fall into an infinite regress. If the answer is "experience experienceS itself" then experience would be constantly reflexive, which it is not. Why might it be premature to conclude from the above that this putative experienceR is a prime candidate for Occam's Razor? ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/