[Wittrs] Re: Proper Names --Wittgenstein, Russell, Kripke

  • From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2010 05:57:00 -0000

SW,


"That use must ALWAYS be indeterminate or that sharp boundaries cannot be 
drawn. Is that your position?"

Under most circumstances, names aren't indeterminate at all.  And where they 
are, we can always draw an arbitrary boundary for some specific purpose.  That 
doesn't mean with blocked all possibilities of indeterminacy.

"but you neglect Exalibur and W's position on sharp boundaries generally."

PI 39 is an elaboration of why we are tempted to the idea of simples such as is 
found in the Tractatus.  And this view is then extensively critiqued.

"Surely the better view is that one CAN draw such a boundary, but that doing so 
is only home to its purposes,"

This is actually close to what I wrote above.  And I have never denied it.

"Although the Excalibur example isn't that good,"

For the reasons indicated, you're right: it isn't.

"...I think it can illustrate the point. I take it that the whole reason why 
the blade can be shattered, yet the statement 'Excalibur has a sharp blade,' 
remain meaningful, is that 'Excalibur' has come to take on the sense of a title 
or status (a set of rules) that is independent of the bearer."

It may well never have had a bearer! (And no doubt, Wittgenstein was well aware 
of that point.)

"Let's say it this way: If any name becomes more important than its bearer, it 
becomes a title or a status."

I see nothing to be gained in speaking that way...

"These examples COULD include hyperbole, but need not. Example: Messy Marvin. 
The day he grows up one may rightfully say of him, 'he's not Messy Marvin any 
longer.' And this is because he no longer lives up to his rule (title). You 
seem to think that this is not a real example of a 'name' or is just fun 
talking or something. I want to suggest that this does, in fact, belong to the 
family of names and is a sharpe boundary imposed for parochial reasons (it gets 
work done in the language game)."

Nicknames are "proper names" in the sense that concerns logicians, albeit not 
in the sense of ordinary English.

The nickname may no longer be apt but may or may not persist nevertheless, as 
anyone whose ever tried to live down an embarrassing nickname can attest.

Don't forget that nicknames are also often ironic, as with guys named "Tiny", 
who may be slight of stature or quite large when they acquire the nickname.

I have no idea why you would think such a nickname to be "sharp boundary" 
though.  Especially a nickname based on something so vague and variable as 
"messiness".

"'Messy Marvin' functions in language the way Excalibur and Moses CAN.  One 
could rightly say of Moses, that if he did not save the Israelites, that he was 
not, in fact, 'Moses.' Imagine someone saying 'Jesus is a lie,' where it turned 
out that certain major things were untrue. In both of these examples, 'Moses' 
and 'Jesus' have become RULES. The only thing one who disagreed could say in 
response is: 'I didn't mean that sense of Moses.' 'I meant the historical 
Moses.' (You'll note this reply seems to have a bearer description in mind that 
makes use of branding and description)"

What possible sense does it have to speak of "the historical Moses" apart from 
whatever descriptions (mythological? historical?) we may have?

Again, Wittgenstein's choice of Moses for this example was deliberate.

"The difference between titles and descriptions is that the former operates as 
a rule (and turns PN's into a kind of jargon); the latter operates as a set of 
circumstances (attribute list)."

So "class valedictorian" is a rule but "the one who had the best grades in the 
class" is a "set of circumstances"?

"And so where the circumstance does not turn itself into a rule ('the man who 
lived down the road'), it never takes on the role of tautology. This is what 
you are not getting: I can make a name a tautology if I want to."

No.

You can't.

A name has no truth value, a fortiori it is not true in all possible states of 
affairs or true as a verbal explanation of a rule of grammar, or however you 
might wish to explicate "tautology".

I suspect you're saying that you can treat a proposition applying a particular 
description to a name as a rule of grammar.  If that's what you mean, I have 
nowhere denied that.

I would deny that the ability to treat the description as a rule of grammar for 
the use of a name is limited to descriptions that we would normally call 
"titles" or that this "distinction" you seem to be trying to make is really 
relevant here.  (And I find it nowhere in Wittgenstein's work, for whatever 
that's worth.)

"Messy Marvin is messy" is not like "Red apples are red", appearances 
notwithstanding.  Nor is "Tiny is tiny."

Serial killers may be the best example of what you seem to have in mind.  "The 
Unibomber".  We might say, "The Unibomber is the author of this manifesto".  
("Author" is a title.)  Or, "The Unabomber is the person who sent such and such 
a bomb to such and such a victim" (which is not a title).  And we might treat 
these as rules for deciding whether a particular suspect is the Unibomber.  If 
a suspect is arrested and charged, then we'd say "the alleged Unabomber".

But it may have been that we discovered that the author of the manifesto was 
just some crank trying to ride the publicity of the person who bombed so and 
so.  Then the author is not the Unibomber.  Or it may be that the most 
publicized bombing or the one that prompted the nickname was in fact a copycat 
or perhaps someone who wanted tenure and, knowing of these bombings, decided to 
murder a colleague under cover of those bombings.  So, the Unibomber didn't do 
the bombing that first brought his crimes to national attention.

"You also aren't getting this branding thing. I don't mean like brand names."

I hadn't supposed that.  I'm not sure why you'd think that I did.

"I mean like branding a cow."

Yes.  That was my understanding.  And the reason I don't think it's an apt 
simile for your examples (DNA and SSNs) is that the former is not a social 
convention though we do carry it with us, while the latter is a convention but 
not something we carry with us.  Tattoos worn in various cultures to mark 
status, kinship, and so forth, or imprinted in Nazi concentration camps or 
Russian prisons and even "Hello My Name is..." stickers and military dog tags 
would all be far more aptly compared to brands (and of course, some cultures 
practice branding literally).  But the examples you gave don't seem at all 
fitting.  And you seem to have simply ignored the various points about 
similarities and differences between various uses of DNA and SSNs.

"Marking. Individuating. This is a specific behavior in the 'naming language 
game.' If I say, 'Sally is DNA such and such,' what I have done is to separate 
Sally from all the other humans or animals out there."

Except for her identical twin, if she has one. (Undeniable possibility.)  Or 
her clone, if that technology develops.  (Certainly plausible.)  And if gene 
therapy develops to the point where Sally's DNA can be radically altered?  (Not 
beyond the realm of future possibility.)  Or if Sally's body is replaced with 
various prostheses, by steps, including her brain being replaced in stages with 
inorganic materials able to perform those same functions?  (Completely 
speculative SF but not logically excluded.)

"Same as if I say, 'Sally is SSN 2323232.'"

In what sense is that the same?  Both of them make an identification more 
precise, as I previously acknowledged.  But so does, "the tall, red-headed 
Sally," albeit not so precise, depending on how large a group of people we're 
dealing with.  (It may be perfectly precise for a particular purpose.)

By the way, who speaks that way?  Sally isn't a number.  Sally is the person 
assigned such and such a number.  Sally is not a DNA profile.  Sally is the 
person whose DNA profile is such and such.  And the rule for using "Sally" may 
be to apply that name to whoever has such and such DNA (unless she has an 
identical twin or...).  And the rule may also say that we can substitute such 
and such SSN for the name "Sally".

"Marking or branding are behaviors in the name game. That is a particular 
sense. The sense is 'Sally's marker.' By 'Sally,' I sometimes mean her marker."

No.  "Sally" is not the name of her marker.  "Sally" is the name of a person.  
And the marker can be used in place of the name.  And by "Sally", you sometimes 
mean, e.g. "the person assigned such and such a marker".

"Pointing is very simple."

Wow!  And all the difficulties attending to the notion of ostensive definition 
that Wittgenstein uncovered?

"Imagine a greeting. 'Hi Mark. This is Jane.' 'Nice to meet you Jane.' From 
Mark's standpoint, 'Jane' is simply 'that.'"

Simply "that" what?  In this context, the person to whom he is being 
introduced.  But there's a whole lot more required in terms of "stage setting" 
to be able to learn to use a person's name!

"The name simply says 'pointer call.'"

Ouch!  Um, you aren't making a deliberate computer science reference, are you?  
I'm hoping that was entirely inadvertent.  If not, could you explain the 
comparison you're making?  If it was inadvertent, feel free to disregard my 
query.

"It's the same as if you say 'the dog is Snoopy.' You now know what mark or 
noise to say when you see 'it.'"

I know how names are used and I know what a dog is and so I now now how to call 
to this dog or talk about this dog.  I do things with names.  I don't just 
blurt them out when I see their bearers.  At least not typically.

"I'm not against the idea that the four senses of names I have described are 
integrated. You are right that people might mix and match in complicated 
circumstances (e.g., identifying the historical Moses). But my point is that 
names involve four types of brain behaviors: point, mark, generalize 
(describe), and 'tautologize' (status or rule)."

Why in Heaven's name are you calling these "brain behaviors"?  Brains don't do 
these things.  People (who presumably have brains) do these things.  And what 
is bringing something that sounds vaguely neurological meant to contribute?  
Some of my other reservations are covered above and in my previous message.

"I've go to run on the other points. Later on, I'd like to come back to the 
meaning-is-use point and where I think you are wrong about what W's view does 
to Russell."

I'll try to be helpful in my responses.

JPDeMouy



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