[Wittrs] Re: Proper Names --Wittgenstein, Russell, Kripke

  • From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 17:23:53 -0800 (PST)

(J)

.. this last message of yours really is hard to follow. It's all over the 
place. It's really hard to participate in the telephone-conversation format 
because adding up all of the short, off-the-head replies made to sentences 
instead of points in a message makes for a tedius effort on my end. And if I 
just do the same back to you, it ends up not really being "discussion" in any 
helpful sense. Also, I really want to avoid these little pithy sort of things 
that go on, ok? So, with that said, I'm going to try one last time to see where 
I think you have some serious trouble here.

IN GENERAL
Let me start this off with two general statements. I think the trouble here 
boils down to two basic things. 

1. You seem to think that names can only ever be "bearer-calls" and not 
bearer-assignments. (Now, it's hard for me to say for sure, because I have to 
read tea leaves here). It seems that you want to say that a name could never 
set forth criteria to ASSIGN its bearer, and must always, instead, always be 
the thing that a particular bearer calls to.  

2. Related to this, I think you also (as a consequence) must deny that names 
are a family resemblance, of which bearer-calls are only one kind (but perhaps 
an archetype).  This is why you seem to deny that nicknames are "names" or that 
titles (in the sense I spoke of) are. Or that the examples of hyperbole that 
take the form of names are a species of "name." And why you find no helpful 
sense in "historical Moses" as opposed to legendary "Moses" (the key being only 
to find the right bearer-call).   

I think, in your view, if we found out that Moses was actually named 
"Ghandalf," that only then could we say that Moses didn't exist. But in fact, 
note that one could validly say ANY of the following: (a) that "Moses" was 
really Ghandalf; (b) that Ghandalf is "Moses;" (c) that Moses is known by two 
names; (d) that Ghandalf has two names. This is the same as Wittgenstein's 
Excalibur. When bearers become separable from names, the names take on the 
power of assignment. 

Imagine knowing someone intimately for a long time. Then, the person changes. 
And you say, "That's not Jane anymore." You have separated the name from the 
bearer because the name has taken on a kind of status or criteria in your 
language. Of course, you don't mean that the bearer-called-Jane doesn't exist; 
you mean that attribute set X is no longer present in the bearer. Now, your 
view, J, seems to think that only bearer-calls are relevant. That Jane's name 
can only ever mean "the bearer-called Jane." But what I am saying is this: FOR 
THE LANGUAGE CULTURE, this use of "Jane" is a perfectly ordinary use. We hear 
it all the time. And it is surely NOT WITTGENSTEINIAN to make this objection: 
"that's not a proper use; names are only [this]." That would be the kind of 
thing a librarian would say. Rather, a Wittgensteinian would say, "That's not 
the sense of 'Jane' I meant."  And that is the key: "JANE" HAS SENSE.

And by the way, although it would be stretch -- actually, poetry -- this is 
also legitimate. Say you found a person, Rhonda, who seemed to exhibit 
attribute set X perfectly the same as "Jane." You could commit hyperbole with 
name (elevating it to a title) by saying, 'Rhonda is Jane.' This is a perfectly 
meaningful sentence. Making successful meaning is all that matters in 
the language game. It's a legitimate sense of "Jane" under the circumstances. 
People who understand "Jane" as you do would get the point entirely. So you 
aren't the one who controls this; the language culture does. If you were to 
deny that names work like this, you would be saying that they don't function in 
cognition or culture like ordinary words. And for you to imply that the only 
real "name" is the bearer-called-Jane is the same as saying the only 
real "chair" is the kind that looks like an archetype.   

TAUTOLOGY
1. You've misunderstood several points here. You've appeared to equate "Messy 
Marvin" (MM) with "Marvin is messy." These are not the same. MM is a name that 
is functioning as a title. When Marvin grows up, one could rightly say, "he's 
not MM anymore." Names mean more than historical bearer-calls. Also, your point 
about class valedictorian (cv) isn't right. CV isn't a "name;" it's an ordinary 
tautology like "bachelor" can be. For that example to occur, one would have to 
have their identity distinguished by that feature. Let's imagine a Greek 
demi-God called "Valedictor," who was said to have the best marks among all the 
learned gods. If we had found that Valedictor was runner up, we could validly 
play a language game as to whether "Valedictor" existed. The game would be 
between bearer-call and bearer-assignment. It would, in short, be between two 
senses of "names."     

MARKING
1. This point isn't understood either. Because you only see names as 
bearer-calls, you don't see "numbering humans" as being a type of name. But in 
fact, the language culture doesn't support you (which is all that matters).  By 
this I don't mean that the culture treats an id number as a bearer-call -- 
although, it probably does in some limited cases -- I mean that the 
bearer-called are also numerically-borne AS A MEANS OF BEARING. The emphasis 
here is on the kind of activity it is. Just as names individuate, so do markers 
(brands). And what is not understood here is that the METHOD of creating a 
bearer is its MEANS. And so, we locate bearers by pointing, marking, describing 
and by tautology. And the activity of all of these behaviors can be understood 
as being the family of "names" -- i.e., the things we do to create bearers. 

Compare: the person X is called "Sally." The person X is "SSN 123-445-6677." Or 
those who say, "Sally is DNA such and such" (All that your cloning examples 
show is that the marking system isn't perfect. That's not germane). 

POINTING
1. Here, your points are most poor. I don't even know what you are talking 
about. I know well Wittgenstein's points about ostensive definitions. Here's 
what you are probably missing (a quote from my paper):

Some may find Wittgenstein a little unclear here. At one point, he says that 
pointing and saying “that” do not (together) constitute “naming.” Surely this 
is true. “That” is a pointing; not a naming. But he also says that we often use 
pointing as away to explain a name, such as, “That is Jane.” Here, the 
difference is that, thought we are pointing toward “Jane,” we are also, in a 
sense, pointing out her name, such that the expression really can be thought of 
as that-plus (that-plus-name).  See ¶s 38 & 43 in PI.
   
BRAIN BEHAVIOR
1. I think it would be too much to try to give you this one, J. The message is 
already too long. Have a look at the message board if you are interested. (If 
you are, start a separate 
thread). http://seanwilson.org/forum/index.php?t=msg&th=1240&start=0&S=8f6e252b1089a313b6ce32a7386f26e8

Also, I'd stay away from Glen's invite here, for he sees Wittgenstein as a 
"behaviorist," which isn't true in the ordinary sense of the idea, and which in 
general cannot be explained to him.

EXCALIBUR:
Just a quick point here. I think you misunderstand W's (and my) point. Here's 
the exchange: 

(Me:) "...I think it can illustrate the point. I take it that the whole reason 
why the blade can be shattered, yet the statement 'Excalibur has a sharp 
blade,' remain meaningful, is that 'Excalibur' has come to take on the sense of 
a title or status (a set of rules) that is independent of the bearer."
(You:)  It may well never have had a bearer! (And no doubt, Wittgenstein was 
well aware of that point.)

The point about Excalibur was not that the blade was mythical. It was that, in 
the myth, it could be destroyed, yet still be meaningful to speak about. Ask 
yourself: how is it meaningful to speak about a name when: (a) it's bearer is 
gone; or (b) it's bearer doesn't live up to its billing anymore? Answer: names 
can be more than bearer-calls. There are games where names separate from 
bearers and take on whatever meaning they do (tautology, title, status, 
idealization, what have you).

"... [Reasons one would offer for a name as a simple:] The word 'Excalibur," 
say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consits of 
parts combined a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur 
does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" 
makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if 
"Excalibur" is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when 
Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the 
name it would have no meaning. But it does make sense; so there must always be 
something corresponding to the words of which it consists. ...  We said that 
the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' made sense even when Excalibur was 
broken in pieces. Now this is so because in this language-game a name is also 
used in the absence of its bearer.  " (44, 39)  

Regards and thanks

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html 



=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Other related posts:

  1. Home
  2. wittrsamr
  3. Archive
  4. 02-2010