--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote: > ... <snip> You were saying, I think, that N could stand for any persons so named, Hmm, I don't recall saying that. My point was that I thought the Direct Reference Theorists, who built their claims on Kripke's Naming and Necessity, were mistaken about rigid designation being a characteristic of names and that, on a Wittgensteininian view, a name is just how it's used and that a tag is a tag is a tag, nothing more nor less. There is no reason to suppose, as Ali seemed to want to say, that the existence of a pragmatic dimension to word usage, as distinct from a referential one implies that naming or referencing are somehow metaphysically fixed. But I was (and still am) somewhat unclear on what Kripke, himself, was really claiming and Walter actually gave what I took to be a very lucid account of it at the time, though, in trying to recall it now, I don't think I could reprise it. I guess I failed that particular exam as I apparently failed to process or retain the information Walter imparted! >and Walter was emphasizing that N was only standing for one of those >persons. Wittgenstein's view doesn't dispute what "reference" means > in this context. I didn't (and don't) think so either. Ali's point (and, of course, he isn't here to defend himself so he will have to just be a theoretical Ali for the purposes of this discussion) was that naming involved something beyond meaning-as-use (a la Kripke's claims) and I was disputing that, suggesting that tagging is just another kind of use and that there is no reason to think that the fact that sometimes we use words referentially undermines the meaning as use picture. > Wittgenstein isn't arguing that N stands for anyone so named (the way, e.g., > "chair" does). His view appears to be premised on the idea that the name and > its bearer are not identical. And that what a name does (to or about any > discreet bearer) is a function of what sense the name is playing in the > language game. > I think that's a good point. The name is a separate phenomenon from whatever we associate with it. It's a sound or symbol that plays a certain role in a particular set of practices we engage in. > One wants to say of words like proper names and of words like "is," the > language game is TIGHT one. Well I wouldn't say that. I think it's pretty loose, actually! > Imagine playing Charades versus the game of Operation. > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_(game). Proper Names is more like > Operation. What one is doing to or about the bearer takes place within more > limited confines. > > Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Hmmm, I don't follow that one! SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/