(J) ... Just some comments on big points where I see "issues" (I have to type fast because I've got work to do): First, I think we are in agreement that W's position on PN's is thus: (1) PN's have sense; (2) bearers and names are separable; (3) meaning is use for PN's; (4) the language game of PN's are such that use is allowed to be indeterminate and is even allowed to alter some things after the package is delivered. But where trouble arises is as follows: 1. That use must ALWAYS be indeterminate or that sharp boundaries cannot be drawn. Is that your position? Because my position was to show that WHETHER names have bearers in accompaniment or not, or are sharp in boundary, is a function of the SENSE of name being used in the language maneuver. And I illustrated four such senses which I could imagine. They are: Point, Brand, Describe & Title. Let me further explain: SHARP BOUNDARIES AND TITLES There is confusion on the issue of whether a name can have a "sharp boundary." You use Moses as the example to say (apparently) that it never can, but you neglect Exalibur and W's position on sharp boundaries generally. Surely the better view is that one CAN draw such a boundary, but that doing so is only home to its purposes, as all sharp boundaries are for family resemblance ideas. Although the Excalibur example isn't that good, I think it can illustrate the point. I take it that the whole reason why the blade can be shattered, yet the statement "Excalibur has a sharp blade," remain meaningful, is that "Excalibur" has come to take on the sense of a title or status (a set of rules) that is independent of the bearer. Let's say it this way: If any name becomes more important than its bearer, it becomes a title or a status. These examples COULD include hyperbole, but need not. Example: Messy Marvin. The day he grows up one may rightfully say of him, "he's not Messy Marvin any longer." And this is because he no longer lives up to his rule (title). You seem to think that this is not a real example of a "name" or is just fun talking or something. I want to suggest that this does, in fact, belong to the family of names and is a sharpe boundary imposed for parochial reasons (it gets work done in the language game). 'Messy Marvin" functions in language the way Excalibur and Moses CAN. One could rightly say of Moses, that if he did not save the Israelites, that he was not, in fact, "Moses." Imagine someone saying "Jesus is a lie," where it turned out that certain major things were untrue. In both of these examples, "Moses" and "Jesus' have become RULES. The only thing one who disagreed could say in response is: "I didn't mean that sense of Moses." "I meant the historical Moses." (You'll note this reply seems to have a bearer description in mind that makes use of branding and description) DESCRIPTIONS, BRANDING AND POINTING The difference between titles and descriptions is that the former operates as a rule (and turns PN's into a kind of jargon); the latter operates as a set of circumstances (attribute list). And so where the circumstance does not turn itself into a rule ("the man who lived down the road"), it never takes on the role of tautology. This is what you are not getting: I can make a name a tautology if I want to. The language game allows for that. Or I can make it an attribute list that allows me to supplement and amend after delivery. The language game allows that. You also aren't getting this branding thing. I don't mean like brand names. I mean like branding a cow. Marking. Individuating. This is a specific behavior in the "naming language game." If I say, "Sally is DNA such and such," what I have done is to separate Sally from all the other humans or animals out there. Same as if I say, "Sally is SSN 2323232." Marking or branding are behaviors in the name game. That is a particular sense. The sense is 'Sally's marker." By "Sally," I sometimes mean her marker. Pointing is very simple. Imagine a greeting. "Hi Mark. This is Jane." "Nice to meet you Jane." From Mark's standpoint, "Jane" is simply "that." The name simply says "pointer call." It's the same as if you say "the dog is Snoopy." You now know what mark or noise to say when you see "it." INTEGRATION I'm not against the idea that the four senses of names I have described are integrated. You are right that people might mix and match in complicated circumstances (e.g., identifying the historical Moses). But my point is that names involve four types of brain behaviors: point, mark, generalize (describe), and "tautologize" (status or rule). I've go to run on the other points. Later on, I'd like to come back to the meaning-is-use point and where I think you are wrong about what W's view does to Russell. Regards and thanks. Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860 Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/