Hi Sean, A being with free will is very different from one without it. The former can strive to make the world, and his self, as he wants it to be; the latter is just a 'puppet' of external forces. So the question of whether we have free will matters for our conception of ourselves. The conception we have of ourselves can make a difference to our lives and happiness even if it makes no difference to our actions, like seeing the world in colour rather than in black-and-white. However, since how we conceive of ourselves can make a difference to the way we live our lives, whether or not someone thinks he has free will could make a difference to the sort of life he leads. I think that people with fatalistic attitudes tend to achieve less and put up with more than people with 'can do' attitudes. Of course, there is no logical connection between holding a deterministic theory about the world and having a fatalistic attitude: many determinists are persistent strivers. But one would expect a belief in determinism to undermine effort at least sometimes, or at least with regard to some decisions, in many people. One who holds a deterministic theory has available an excuse for not exerting himself, whether or not he avails himself of it. So the way one answers the question of whether we have free will could make a difference to the decisions one makes, at least in some cases. Yet it would not change the phenomenology of decision. When we decide, certainly in many cases where we decide after deliberating, it does seem to us that we can decide either way, it does seem to us that we have free will; and things continue to seem that way even if we subscribe to a deterministic theory, and even if we decide not to exert ourselves because we think that determinism is true. Danny Messages to the list will be archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html