[Wittrs] Re: Dualism Cooties: Ontologically Basic Ambiguity
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2010 18:38:43 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <jrstern@> wrote:
>
>
> > I mean, we don't really know what is meant by "baseball", so some
> > guys get together and specify it, and then we all play.
>
> Similarly, we should just work on the principles of how to build an
> artificial cognitive system. All of the talk about physicalism,
> reductionism, dualism, etc, is just a distraction.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
Right, but in the meantime, we can clarify what you're after. Derived
intentionality such that we don't care whether what we call a cognitive system
is really a cognitive system?
Suppose Searle is just fine with weak AI and its possibility, as you suggested
earlier may be a bit optimistic on his part. That's one thing. Creating
robots is just awesome.
But wouldn't you want to distinguish between weak AI and a bona fide
theoretical issue as to how intrinsic intentionality works too?
On Searle's proposal, we have two noncompeting research programs.
On others' proposal (including Hacker) we have but weak AI as if that is as
good as it gets vis a vis philosophy of mind.
Enter Fodor: "Having thoughts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century,"
for starters.
Wittgenstein didn't change the game of philosophy after all. He (ironically)
allowed us to bypass epistemology and do a type of philosophy that some of his
more quietist admirers abhor, and sometimes with arguments.. But are they any
good?
Cheers,
Budd
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