If we embrace the view in which we reduce mental phenomena to nothing but third-person objective physical facts, both epistemically and ontologically, then we embrace a position like type physicalism or its close cousin token physicalism. The type physicalist identifies mental states with their third-person descriptions. In the neurology of pain, for example, stimulation of C-fibers correlate with the experience of pain. The type physicalist reduces pain both epistemically and ontologically and declares that C-fiber stimulation IS pain. But common sense tells us that the word "pain" means something that we experience in the first-person. Third-person stories about C-fibers do not explain or capture what we mean by the word. In effect we lose the concept of pain -- the very thing that interests us in this case -- when we reduce it philosophically to nothing but its objective third-person description. Type physicalism defies common sense, literally. One might ask why anyone should want to embrace type or token physicalism. It seems to me that many philosophers of the materialist persuasion (e.g., Dennett) cannot see that as materialists we can reduce mental phenomena scientifically to third-person descriptions while preserving their subjective reality -- and that we can do this *without* embracing dualism. Following Searle, we can reduce mental phenomena to third-person causal descriptions without reducing them ontologically. In this case, we can tell a complete scientific story about the neurology of pain while recognizing that our epistemic reduction to objective scientific facts does not entail an ontological reduction. Though causally reducible to third-person descriptions, mental phenomena also have an irreducible first-person ontology. And we can accept this brute fact of existence without adding any metaphysical baggage about non-physical properties or substances! -gts ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/