[Wittrs] Re: Nominalism / Sean
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 04 Sep 2009 00:39:39 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> Josh:
>
> So am I to understand that "computational nominalism"
> is your theory in the making?
With remarkable difficulties at every turn,
I believe we are however on the same page.
I hesitate to lay claim to such a broad term
as "computational nominalism", a thing whatever the label
that others have worked on directly and indirectly
for many years, but call it what you will, yes.
>And that it is a book
>you are working on (did you say with others)?
A book from me may some day result.
But the others are just giants I'm standing on the
shoulders of. In this literature, it is common enough
to talk of "the project" of a naturalized theory of
mind. There is however not actually a secret handshake
or decoder ring, ... at least, none that anyone has
shared with me.
>And that it is not ready yet to provide a helpful
>example of what is one versus what isn't one,
>in terms of how a person would behave in the world?
Er, maybe we're not on the same page here.
I'm not saying that Dick or Jane is a computational
nominalist and so they buy their groceries in a certain
way, I'm saying computational nominalism is (to jump ahead
in your questions here) a theory - not particularly a
scientific theory, it is more a philosophical theory,
hence the philosophers more than scientists that I
reference - of how it is that Dick or Jane manage
to do anything at all that we recognize as mindful.
This broadly overlaps areas of what is traditionally
western/analytic philosophy, from Hume to Kant to
Wittgenstein, most broadly in areas like philosophy
of language and philosophy of mind.
>(The cat on the mat
>is no different from the Cat in
> the Hat -- there is no real problem for philosophy or
>science here).
Right.
But surely a philosophical or scientific theory has
to be able to deal with such mundane facts, without
them being "problems" as such.
> For example, if you say to an "idealist," what
> does it mean? You get some sort of talk about the tree
> being in your mind. And if you talk to a realist, you
> get some attempt to "prove" that "the tree is there'
> when the grammar of such assertions never have anything
> to do with proving anything, anyway. And so what
> you get out of this is an allegiance game for philosophy
> students. Political science students do the same
> thing with politics. Really, these things are nothing
> but social-club ideologies.
Really?
I'm not quite so dismissive, but then, I don't have to be,
I don't particularly call on such generalizations, either.
> Whenever you can figure it out, tell me what a
> "computational nominalist" says about the tree.
...
> If, however, you are chasing a scientific theory, then
> the matter would be different. You wouldn't have
> an example to give about the tree; you would have
> some sort of brain-process argument that exists as a
> theory in some research program that has
> such-and-such data to support the journalism.
> I don't have any issue with that.
Well, that's right, and why I don't have anything
really to say about any trees. I'm just surprised it
takes such a lot of breath to make the point.
But just to clarify, I'll let the neurologists worry
about the brain process as such, I could hypothesize
stuff for them, well, someone will have to, but probably
some other intermediate step between the computational
theorizing we have to go through first, and then eventually
it will all prove out in the brain, probably with a bunch
of surprising twists and turns.
The general concept of "multiple realizability" licenses
this, if it needs a license. Well, actually, I suppose
I'm bending that, a nominalism that constructs generalities
from particulars is a stronger form of multiple realizability
anyway. "Multiple realizability" is just the kind
of reinventing the wheel (and having it come up flat)
that I think we've done too much of in compsci and AI,
the nominalist ideas have been around for millenia and
do the job better.
> One more thing regarding your counter-example of not
> believing in feet. If one doesn't believe in feet,
> it is, in fact, the same exact sort of thing as not
> believing in "computational nominalism" as I understand
> the matter.
Er, hmm?
> Because in both cases, one has to account for what one
> does in the experience of life, no
> matter what one calls it. And if I meet a human not
> suffering any deformity or illness who says to me "I
> don't believe in feet" -- as if to deny their existence
> -- I would treat it precisely the same as one who
> said, "the tree isn't there" or "I'm a computational
> nominalist." All of these replies I would only meet
> with, "I root for the Steelers."
Well OK, I sort of see your game, as perhaps you sort
of see my "scientific theory" game.
Do you think it odd that someone looking for scientific
theory should be interested in Wittgenstein?
> Gotta go -- Steelers are comiong on! ... aaahhh
I'm in Los Angeles, so we have to wait
for basketball season. Or at least USC.
Josh
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