[Wittrs] Re: Nominalism / Sean
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 04 Sep 2009 15:30:01 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <jrstern@> wrote:
>
>
> Much like Sean, I'm wondering what "computational nominalism" is
> supposed to mean, and why does it matter.
Mostly, that there are a number of flavors of nominalism,
and I will need to define and possibly extend a particular (!) one,
from and for the purposes of computationalism, and so, this name.
> As a mathematician, I usually say that I'm a fictionalist. But,
> really, I find nominalism, fictionalism and platonism all pretty
> hard to distinguish.
In the end, the meaning is in the use.
However, in this area, computation has a gigantic advantage over
any other domains - computation is 100% observable, and is proven
in operation.
Most of what I'm trying to do in computational nominalism is to
explain what we SEE in today's ordinary, mundane computer systems,
in the development of their software, and understanding how it is
they prove useful in the world.
There are roughly two main conventional explanations, which I find
tremendously faulty. The first is Searle's "derived
intentionality", which claims computer systems, like written words
on a page, don't say anything, until a privileged human comes along
and makes sense of them. That's always seemed a good explanation
for words, but I believe it fails for computers, and failing for
computers, I'm now dubious that it's good for words, either. And
it fails for computers, because per Searle the paint on his wall
is just as much a computer as the workstation on his desk, which
seems to me a blatently non-working theory. Not to mention that
*any* theory of derived intentionality that privileges humans,
has yet to explain *anything* at all, about how the humans do it.
The other is that computers are useful by providing some kind
of correspondence to distal objects, events, etc. This one seems
partially correct, but still lacking. To see the lack, read Fodor.
Fodor's theory works just because his conceptual entities are
implemented computationally, and compose computationally just the
way they do, um, just they way they do in, um, ... heaven? I dunno,
he never quite explains that. Apparently the concepts behave like
the real objects do in the world, Fodor never mentions heaven, and
gives no direct hints of platonism.
So, bottom line, these don't work.
We need a theory of how all these computers work.
I believe computers work in part due to something like
Wittgenstein's linguistic turn, which Turing effectively wrote
into both his big papers, I believe more or less directly from
Wittgenstein.
And so, I spend a lot of time reanalyzing that particular
overlapping of events, ideas, etc.
> The way one does mathematics and the way one talks
> about mathematics would be pretty much the same for all.
> Cohen/Goedel proved the independence of the continuum hypothesis.
> I have a platonist acquaintance who insists that there is a fact
> of the matter as to whether the Continuum Hypothesis is true, and
> the independence proof does not settle that. So I suppose that's
> something that distinguishes the platonist. Still, the continuum
> hypothesis does not seem particularly important, so I'm not sure
> why anybody should care.
Again, in the end, the meaning is the use.
But meanwhile, it doesn't hurt at conventions to issue the
name badges color-coded by -ism, you're going to see the same
faces at the breakout sessions anyway.
> I guess I am raising the same point Sean raised. Why does it even
> matter? Why is philosophy so concerned about these "isms"?
Why did you choose that shirt?
> I'm just a plain old pragmatist. I do what works, and I don't care
> much for the isms. I don't care much for pragmatism either, at
> least as it is described by philosophy.
Fodor in LOT 2 makes "pragmatism" his main target, and never
quite explains what the heck he means by it, though apparently
it's something like the old AI idea that they can build a system
that works by brute force or other atheoretic engineering. Just
why he should find that so evil, I have some trouble even imagining.
> I'm not a computationalist either (with respect to the mind), but
> I'm not strongly anti-computationalist either. It seems to me
> that we need a good theory, and whether or not it is a
> computational theory is of little importance.
Fine.
But I'm working on finding what one can do in and around
computational theories. That's my mission statement. Preliminary
work looks to me very promising. And frankly, looking around at
other parts of philosophy, nothing else looks promising to me at all.
The "naturalizing" projects worked pretty well for the natural
(!) sciences over the past century or two, and I think we really
just need more of the same in computation, and the computational
theories of mind, that we have courtesy of Wittgenstein, Turing,
and McCarthy/Minsky/Chomsky/Newell and Simon/Fodor/Dennett/Schank
et al.
> > Do you think it odd that someone looking for scientific
> > theory should be interested in Wittgenstein?
>
> I don't think it odd that someone concerned with football would
> also be interested in poetry. People can have diverse interests.
> But it would be odd if a football coach were looking to poetry for
> ideas on how to coach the team. And it does seem odd to me that
> someone might look to Wittgenstein for ideas about a scientific
> theory of mind.
Hmm.
Y'know, I've spend some time over on some political blogs, and
when the topics touch on anything scientific, it's remarkable how
few of even the generally better participants seem to remember even
so much science as we expect kids to learn to pass out of 8th grade.
And that doesn't even count the fancier paradigms of unity of
science and reductionism and Kuhn and stuff like that. So when the
topics are about what one can expect from medicine, or the teaching
of evolution in schools, or global warming, or spending for
space exploration, or how weapons might work in war, it's remarkable
how the political discussion can drift free from reality.
I think the Wittgenstein/Turing connection makes it a rather
obvious place to look for perspectives on philosophy of mind,
just on the historical record, and as I've outlined above.
Or, again, not philosophy of mind, so much as, philosophy of
computation. IF Turing had elaborated his theories a bit
more philosophically, and IF Wittgenstein had, even for the sake
of argument, taken Turing's elaborations and seen where they lead,
then, ... then what?
Josh
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