[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2009 19:49:36 -0000

For what it's worth, I've just posted an amazon review of Hawkins' On 
Intelligence if anyone's interested. It can be found here:

http://www.amazon.com/Intelligence-Jeff-Hawkins/product-reviews/0805078533/ref=cm_cr_dp_synop?ie=UTF8&showViewpoints=0&sortBy=bySubmissionDateDescending#R3W3GHIV5C7GS1

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> swmaerske wrote:
> > "Cayuse" wrote:
> >> swmaerske wrote:
> >>> I'm well aware of what Chalmers is talking about. I just think he is
> >>> completely wrong to think that one must presume dualism
> >>> (naturalistic or otherwise) to account for the various features we
> >>> recognize in ourselves as what we call "consciousness". I believe
> >>> Dennett offers a very satisfactory model of how consciousness can
> >>> be explained in terms of physical functions without presuming any
> >>> magic or mystery or dualistic extras in the universe.
> >>
> >> Dennett doesn't make any attempt to address the issue that
> >> Chalmers is attempting to address.
> >
> > That's because he doesn't see it as any kind of an issue at all.
> > Dennett is very clear as to how he thinks what we know of as
> > subjective experience in ourselves arises, through the workings of
> > a particular kind of process-based system. The sense of being a
> > subject, of seeing what we see, feeling what we feel, etc., is not
> > some special phenomenon that is separate and apart from what
> > we see, feel, etc., but, rather is part of that.
>
> The "what it is like" is not a /part of/ anything, and not
> /apart from/ anything, but it is the /collective entirety/
> of the contents of consciousness. There is nothing "special"
> about a collection of contents summing to an entirety.
>


Then there's nothing to talk about. There is no "what-it-is-like" and the best 
evidence for this is that there is no real word for it in our language, i.e., 
to talk about "it" people have to constantly create and explain and argue 
endlessly for complex locutions such as this AS IF they were real terms.

If there is no referent then there is no referring and anyone presuming 
otherwise is simply playing with his or her words at best, fooling him or 
herself at worst.

Confusing what we mean by "consciousness" with such a complex and referentless 
term only magnifies the muddle.



>
> > The error you're making is thinking Dennett's different treatment of
> > the issue means he isn't recognizing Chalmers' point. That is simply
> > not true. He is simply arguing for a different conception of all
> > this, a different way of explaining it on a purely physical basis.
>
> The error is attempting to explain what is at the
> limit of explanation, whether that attempt is made
> by Chalmers, or Dennett, or anybody else.
>


There's no "what-it-is-like" to explain though there is a sense of being a 
subject that we all have when we're aware (conscious). And that sense can be 
explained. But it is not some mysterious "what-it-is-like".


>
> >>>> I'm arguing that there's a grammatical error here that leads to
> >>>> nonsensical metaphysical speculation.
> >>>
> >>> And the "grammatical error" you have in mind is what?
> >>
> >> The "whole" in this particular case is /not a nothing/
> >
> > But all you do is assert that,
>
> "Nothing" cannot be comprised of contents. This is not
> a mere assertion but an argument. If you consider the
> argument to be invalid then present a refutation.
>

I asked for the grammatical error you think is there. Note that I initially 
used "nothing" differently than you did when you referred to "a nothing". I 
didn't use it that way. So you are in error when you assume your usage is 
reflective of mine (or vice versa).

You talk about "the whole" where before you spoke about "the all" and "the 
microcosm". What are these things? Well you've told us they aren't because 
there are no such referents. But you want to say still we can conceive of them, 
so in that sense there is a referent. But I can conceive of a unicorn or a 
flying purple people eater without there being such things. A word can relate 
to some conceptual picture we hold or imagine without that picture having any 
relation to any actual thing in the world. You agree that the whole or the all 
is not any actual thing, presumably because it cannot ever be completely 
captured, enumerated in all its parts, etc. Yet you insist it can be named even 
if it cannot be encountered. Aren't you really just confusing words with 
artificial or imaginary referents with words that have the real thing?

Isn't the grammatical error you have in mind here really yours?


>
> > while admitting that we cannot conceive of the whole,
>
> We not only CAN conceive of a whole, but we DO conceive
> of a whole.

We IMAGINE we do. It's sort of like Dennett's argument about philosophical 
zombies. Proponents of the idea say we can imagine creatures exactly like 
ourselves in every particular, even down to the way their physical components 
work, and yet still lacking consciousness in the form of awareness of what they 
are, what they're doing and what's around them. Dennett points out that that is 
incoherent because it is inconceivable that such an entity, acting precisely as 
we do, would be thought of as anything but conscious like us. I suggest that 
what is really going on is people are thinking about the Hollywood picture of 
zombies, or robotic replicas of ourselves, and supposing by this that they have 
thought of the so-called philosophical zombie. What is happening is a 
confusion, i.e., people imagine one thing and call it something else. I think 
you are doing the same thing here, imagining that when you say "the all" or 
"the whole" you are thinking of everything when, by your own admission, you 
cannot be. And this is compounded when you try to equate this imagined 
referentless referent with what others mean by "consciousness," "awareness," 
"subjectness", etc.

Because we can fool ourselves doesn't mean we really do conceive of such 
things. Recognizing that mistake is what it means to clear up  linguistic 
confusions, etc.


> Furthermore, we conceive that /every/ person is
> associated with such a whole. And this is where the trouble begins.
>

It's where it should end. There is only trouble when we fail to see how much 
linguistic confusion is driving us here.

SWM

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