The Sydney School Wikipedia page has a little box that names Michael
Halliday as the founder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sydney_School_(linguistics)
A lot of the prose is a poor advertisement for a literacy pedagogy! Here's
a sample: "The title 'Sydney School' was given to the body of research
however became quickly outdates as the study began to extended nationally.
By 2000 the Sydney School had firmly become attained international reach."
dk
2022년 6월 22일 (수) 오후 6:41, David Rose <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>님이 작성:
Annabelle, I agree that this Wikipedia edit was inappropriate. Can you
see when it was done?
It is a widely held misconception that MAKH was directly responsible for
genre pedagogy. One factor has been its dissemination without
acknowledgement to JRM, while functional grammar is strongly associated
with MAKH.
On the other hand, it is a major part of the careers of many in the SFL
community, who teach and research both genre and grammar. It is by far the
most widely known of SFL’s applications, bringing many 1000s of teachers to
the grammar. So the terms genre pedagogy and Sydney school could bring
readers to the Halliday page.
Would it be worth disambiguating this issue by saying that Halliday’s
research provided the basis for the later development of the genre-based
literacy pedagogy of the Sydney School, led by his student JR Martin?
I checked why a Sydney School link might lead to the Reading to Learn
site. There have been several papers downloadable on the site, but gooogle
scholar now directs mainly to researchgate.
David
*From: *sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> on
behalf of Annabelle Lukin <annabelle.lukin@xxxxxxxxx>
*Date: *Wednesday, 22 June 2022 at 1:07 pm
*To: *sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
*Subject: *[sys-func] Re: Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)
With apologies for another post, as this has gone on way too long.
Halliday's position is distinct from Martin's. A colleague contacted me as
someone had made the claim on Halliday's Wikipedia page that while he was
at Sydney University he founded the Sydney School of genre pedagogy, adding
a link to a Reading to Learn page. See screenshot.
This is completely false. Martin is responsible for the 'Sydney School',
and for genre pedagogy.
I've now removed that sentence.
Kind regards
Annabelle
*Annabelle Lukin (she, her, hers)*
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Department HDR Director
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------------------------------
*From:* sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> on
behalf of 데이브드켈로그_교수_영어교육과 <dkellogg60@xxxxxxxxx>
*Sent:* Tuesday, 21 June 2022 11:35 PM
*To:* sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
*Subject:* [sys-func] Re: Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)
We've never met, Kieran. There is no personal relationship, hostile or
otherwise.
If we ever do meet, however, at ASFLA or IFSC, I should very much like to
develop THIS set of your ideas in quotes (and my counter ideas without
them). I'll pay for the macchiato:
a) "that the 'exchange' is not one of 'goods and services' but of
'control',"
If we exchange words or clauses--e.g. if I offer an imperative and you
agree or disagree" I don't understand in what sense we are
transferring control. I am still in control of my meaning.
b) "that the exchange is not exchange but transfer,"
See above.
c) "the force/possibility of the transfer is to be found outside language,
in social (socially endorsed) relations of power and co-operation,"
Yes. A state is a bunch of people with guns protecting certain forms of
property. The government is a bunch of people with language running around
in front of it. The two are distinct. But--like language as action and
language as meaning--they are also linked.
d) "for a transfer to take place it requires a willingness to cede control
and a willingness to accept control,"
Not at all. Most transfers, at least under present social conditions, are
performed under some form of duress and some are quite violent. That is
another way in which exchanging words and clauses differs from transferring
control of objects.
e) "transfer essentially can't take place in an 'imperative',:"
That IS the integrationist position. But it doesn't help me understand my
Korean data. My data are imperatives. They are not transfers of control of
objects.
f) "the imperative as observed in language, is not an imperative but a
(proposed) action,"
Can I use "imperative as observed in language" to refer to lexicogrammar,
and "command" to refer to semantics? Then an imperative realizes a command
and is not of the same order of abstraction as a command. Yes, that's a
category error, exactly like saying that two cows are not three objects so
cattle don't exist.
g) "the transfer of control is oriented to activities, 'material/social'
purposes,"
See above.
h) "the transfer of control can be realized by actions, such as the
bus-driver passing sausages across to the passenger, or passing the carkeys
to my ten year old son, but such actions are semiotic to the transfer of
control,"
This looks like the reinvention of stratification to me. When we say that
something is semiotic, we mean that it is itself but it is also something
else. That something else is a different strata.
i) "my observations regarding proposals are such that the so called
'transfer of goods and services' should be considered in social-semiotic
terms rather than in physical terms,"
But THIS looks like the re-elimination of stratification to me. This time
we are replacing the material with the ideal instead of replacing the ideal
with the material. Why not just see them as distinct levels which are
linked through the realization relationship? That's what Hallidayans do,
and we get to do a lot of stuff that way.
j) "the transfer of control takes place at the time of agreement to
transfer control, rather than at the time of transfer of goods,"
See above. Conversation does involve a certain element of utopianism--the
assumption is always that we construe the hearer as a co-meaner. But that's
all the more reason for considering the transfer of material goods and
services on a different plane from the exchange of wordings and soundings.
Linked, but distinct.
Finally, "Kieran seems to concede that language may be considered either
as action or as meaning". You began, I think, by telling me that "language
does stuff". I construed this, and other statements (including most
recently "language is not language" and "I have never produced a
sentence") as a fairly well rounded integrationist position.
Halliday describes this position (specifically the position that language
does not exist) as a refusal to rise to the level of theory. You are
obviously more than ready to rise to the challenge of theory, so I take it
you have conceded that language may be considered as either action or as
meaning. Perhaps pistols at dawn will not be necessary--a macchiato between
sessions might suffice..
dk
2022년 6월 21일 (화) 오후 9:00, Kieran McGillicuddy <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
님이 작성:
*Kieran seems to now concede, all language may be regarded as either
action or as meaning *
Dear David 2
Have we ever met? If we have I don't remember it, and as I said, (was it
the last posting?) I try, have always tried, to not engage within systemics
on friendly terms. Sometimes that goes wrong, and deep respect gets twisted
into something else, and I have a strange affectionate attitude towards
Ruqaiya, for instance, but for the main part my friendships from within the
systemic community, have nothing to do with systemics. One friendship has a
weird foundation in Rugby League from the 70s.
I'm friendly with Mick, but that has either nothing or very little to do
with systemics, and goes back to when we worked as barmen together at the
Sydney Trade Union Club (not a trade union type club, despite the name),
and perhaps when we were both concerned about someone we were working with
who was being seriously harassed by another barman. We didn't manage to
help her, and she left the job, with bad financial, and severe emotional,
consequences for her. At that time, Mick and I tried to talk semiotics but
in those days Mick couldn't tell an interpretant from a cleft-sentence. So,
if Mick and I are on friendly terms, it has nothing to do with systemics.
Have you and I met? And that may look like a question which should be
dealt with off-line, but we have engaged in exchanges on line which suggest
you have a profound personal dislike for me. I don't care, 'personally',
but I also don't approve, 'professionally', and I would like it to be
understood that I don't approve, 'professionally'.
I don't normally like using the term 'strawman', and I haven't so far, and
this seems like another good instance to not use the term, because it
doesn't really appear that you are presenting strawman versions of my
positions and then attacking them. Yes, you are making claims about my
positions/views which I don't recognize as mine, and which are perhaps
ridiculous or at least wrongheaded, then attacking them, but now you are
also attempting to present me as having conceded to your arguments, and
the/my positions which you find to attack... really, I might ask where do
you find the straw, but it's more like mist isn't it, and, really, I don't
think you think I hold those positions? And if you don't really believe I
hold those views, you are not strawmanning me, something else is going on.
*He also shows how little explanatory power we can invest in
anti-theoretical integrationist posturing. *
*An important lesson of this whole sorry-cum-wacky thread is the amount of
crudely anti-intellectual "thinking" that can be disguised behind appeals
to good or bad feelings, onomatopoeia, grunts, moans, gestures, etc. *
*if it is a mistake to go by a field with two cows and insist that there
are three objects there--a cow, a calf and a pair of animals--then it is
likewise a mistake to stoutly insist that there are no cattle there (only
two cows) and no such "thing" as cattle to begin with. *
*Yes, it is impossible to order a macchiato without a coffee shop to order
it in--an admirable grasp of the utterly obvious that makes these
protestations about being taken to be an idiot somewhat more ironic than
the protestor intended. *
*it's surprising how much of his posting he devotes to his public persona
and what we are and are not to make of it, and how very little he actually
devotes to any real arguments. It is almost as if the brain is not part of
embodied language use at all. *
I don't think I strawmanned the weather/climate analogy, and I have tried
not to, but I only presented one strand of objection.
*Kieran seems to now concede, all language may be regarded as either
action or as meaning *
I should go back and check what I wrote. I check before I post stuff and
worry about typos, and phrasings which will show me as saying something
which I don't believe, but mistakes happen. And I worry all the time about
presenting arguments, or statements which I 'mean' within my approach, but
will be heard/read from another perspective. But, your interpretations seem
a little more disordered than that. What does not seem likely is that I
would say that *all language may be regarded as either action or as
meaning*, and if I have conceded it, then I can't identify the/your
arguments which led to my concession.
I have a serious starting problem with 'my' concession, in that I am far
from convinced that language is language. I repeat the example which must
bore Mick to tears, as it does me, where I contrast
1. *The river ran into the forest.*
2. *The jogger ran into the forest.*
and we systemicists might want to 'code' one of the clauses as one type,
and the other clause as another type. Now, we might readily agree to our
classification of the clauses, but I ask how, or perhaps why, we agree. And
when asking how we agree, I am concerned about the recipient's *response*
to the text, more than the producer's *production*, which I see as very
different things.
In any case, I look at the two clauses (if I am looking at clauses, but we
can get to that later) and see them as different types of clauses, but what
is there about the clause which makes me see them in different ways. The
difference seems to lie somewhere in the difference. One contains '*river*'
and one contains '*jogger*'. As linguists, and when looking at
clauses/sentences, we may be inclined to think that *jogger* and *river*
are words, and that we are engaged with the '*meaning*' of those words
when we understand the clauses/sentences, but, as words 'river' and
'jogger' don't allow me to distinguish the clauses as different types of
clauses. I can look at the word *river* and relate that to *a river*, and
the same for *jogger*, but seeing *jogger* and *river* as concepts or
words or simply as things, doesn't allow me to interpret the clauses in
different ways, which I do. The problem seems to lie with real-world
'entities' such as *rivers* and *joggers*, but more for the real world
potential for interaction than as things. As I understand *rivers*, from
my experience of rivers rather than my experience of concepts of rivers,
they cannot 'run' in the way that a jogger runs. They do not *have*, and
I think the issue of *having* is a serious related issue, legs or feet.
Let's leave 'having' until after considering 'affordances/modality/causal
powers'. Rivers/joggers as things which I encounter in the world, can do
certain sorts of things under certain conditions, and not do other things.
So that when I read/hear *A river ran into the forest*, I am constrained
by the nature of rivers as to how I can understand what is being said. I am
willing to say that I am not being constrained by the word 'river' and that
I am not being constrained by the meaning of the word *river*, I am being
constrained by the nature of '*rivers*'.
I don't see much thinking within systemics about what it means to be on
the signified end of a linguistic sign. Generally there seems to be some
correlation conception of the relation between signifier and signified, but
what it means to be a signified doesn't seem to be dealt with much. I
watched the discussion between Paul Thibault and Ed McDonald about
Saussure, but they both for perhaps obvious reasons limited the scope of
their talks. In any case, it is not much use to us to conceive of rivers as
just rivers. What matters to us, and in our living in the world, and in our
understanding of clauses, is what *rivers*, and other *things*, can do.
Now, I don't whether people would generally want to say that a thing *is*
what it *can do*, but generally speaking, it is our appreciation of what
things can do and have done to them and where, which matter to our
existence. That relates, of course, to Gibson. And it relates, quite
fundamentally, to what we should consider as our units of analysis. That's
another problem.
My understanding of '*The river ran into the forest'*, then, is not
language, or not simply language.
It is the materiality of my world, the interactional materiality, which I
deploy in my understanding of the clause/sentence. I don't, then, recognize
myself in,
*Kieran seems to now concede, all language may be regarded as either
action or as meaning *
initially because I don't concede that language is language.
Along the same lines, but more simply, I have in recent times been saying
things like, when I say that *Freddy Starr ate my hamster*, what is in
play are real world phenomena. You may not know who *Freddy Starr* is,
and you may not have met *my hamster*. But they are not words.
In passing, I have in some passing recently been making comments about the
problem of analyses, of taking examples from where they existed and
analysing them out of context. I take it that David 2 has been interpreting
that as an antitheoretical integrationist position. As it happens, I am
astonished by the high quality of the thinking from various
integrationists, (Adrian Pable) but I nevertheless see systematic variation
between 'material processes', and 'relational processes'. In good part my
concern is to deal with what we are actually looking at rather than what we
think we are looking at. I may agree with the distinction without agreeing
with the distinguishing. Another part of my concern is that I think I can
reasonably say,
- *A river can run into a forest while a jogger cannot*
and be consistent with
- *A jogger can run into a forest while a river cannot.*
but the two claims cannot be 'consistent' without context. The
context/utterance relationship, and what we mean by context, as what we
mean by language, is vitally important to an understanding of the action of
language. And, of course, 'context' can be thought of in a variety of ways,
which can make our communication difficult. For their own sakes, it seems
that the Hallidayans and Martiniques, and the Hassanists, need to try and
get some coordination as to what they each think they are talking about.
*Category errors*
My ears prick up when people talk about 'category errors', as David 2
does. And I wonder whether I am engaging in a category error when I say
that *I have never produced a sentence*, as I do from time to time.
A long time ago, while reading *Cohesion in English**,* if I remember
correctly, I came to wonder why one would ever want a text to cohere. Much
of the same wondering wondered me when Jim was teaching us *English Text*.
And the wondering spread, so that I now wonder why one would want to
produce a sentence. And I look at my practice and I haven't been able to
think of a situation in which I have produced a sentence. I do stuff and I
talk and occasionally write in the doing, but my engagement is always with
the doing stuff, with the the writing and talking always, let's say,
'subordinate' to whatever it is that I am doing.
When I am doing stuff and language is involved in that doing, would I be
deploying a category error to say that I am not producing a sentence, or
would I be category errorising to say that I am producing sentences?
If I am not producing sentences or clauses or such, because who in their
right mind would want to, then maybe I am languageing, rather than
producing sentences, and if I were to be a linguist, the question would be
how that languageing works in relation to whatever it is that I am doing.
If languageing rather than language were the issue, how would our
languageing be organised such that it can act upon the 'real world',
whatever the real may be. I am now forced to rehypothesize Jay Lemke saying,
*What if we thought of language not as a system of symbols to be
manipulated, but as a living process by which we more complexly embed
ourselves in the social ecology around us and thereby enlarge our capacity
to understand and influence it? What if we viewed language in use not as
something originating in “minds” or thoughts, but in our biological
processes of perception and action, exploring and being emotionally
enmeshed in our social and natural environment? *
and I do that partly because I get annoyed at Jay being dragged in to
support views that I find difficult to believe he would genuinely support,
as I find myself being presented as expressing views which I find very
difficult to see myself saying. Oh well. But please note that I don't see
languageing and language in use, as being the same thing.
I remember in recent years, not too long before Covid, I was listening to
David 1 give a talk, and detailing his understanding of the organisation of
'semiotic' phenomena in the classroom, and I couldn't see why he needed to
call the 'semiotic' phenomena semiotic. And it is a long concern of mine
which goes back to generic structure, but the problem seemed to crystallise
in David's talk, the 'recipe problem', about which much might be heard
later.
Sometimes, in order to do something, something else needs to be done
first. In order to make an omelette, you need to break some eggs. So, in a
recipe we may find some instructions, such as get a 33 inch skillet, prior
to instructions for the breaking of the several dozen eggs. But this is not
a staging of language. The staging can be seen more generally in terms of
obtaining the equipment to perform a task, and obtaining the raw materials
in order to perform a task, and locating the skills required to perform a
task, prior to performing the task, in which some tasks necessarily precede
others. Within an academic domain, we may be required to establish that we
are such a person as should be listened to, prior to expressing our views,
prior to being allowed to make an omelette. For Halliday, within the
systemics community, it seems that he didn't need to make claims as to why
he should be listened to, prior to expressing his views. Also, within the
systemic community, there seems to be a need to establish why particular
people, such as Huddleston, should not be listened to.
There seem to be related errors in Peirce's semiotics, where he identifies
as semiotic phenomena what are matters of the properties of things. But
damn, if I'm going to accuse Peirce of this sort of error, I am really
going to have to do my homework first.
*Kieran seems to now concede, all language may be regarded as either
action or as meaning *
I have been given two problems, at least, *language as action or meaning*,
and *proposals v propositions*. Now recently I made some quick comments
on the exchange of goods and services (the proposals end of things)
suggesting
- that the 'exchange' is not one of 'goods and services' but of
'control',
- that the exchange is not exchange but transfer,
- the force/possibility of the transfer is to be found outside
language, in social (socially endorsed) relations of power and
co-operation,
- for a transfer to take place it requires a willingness to cede
control and a willingness to accept control, and
- transfer essentially can't take place in an 'imperative',
- the imperative as observed in language, is not an imperative but a
(proposed) action,
- the transfer of control is oriented to activities, 'material/social'
purposes,
- the transfer of control can be realized by actions, such as the
bus-driver passing sausages across to the passenger, or passing the carkeys
to my ten year old son, but such actions are semiotic to the transfer of
control,
- my observations regarding proposals are such that the socalled
'transfer of goods and services' should be considered in social-semiotic
terms rather than in physical terms,
- the transfer of control takes place at the time of agreement to
transfer control, rather than at the time of transfer of goods,
I don't think I commented on congruency relations between a demand for
goods and services and the imperative, but implications may well be drawn.
If one were to think of 'propositions' a little differently, perhaps in
something like the above terms, then it is possible that 'information
exchanges' might also be able to be rethought.
For a not too great example, is *Can I have the gun*? an information
exchange, or one half of the process of transfer of control, of which the
other half is '*yes*', or '*no way you dangerous batard*', or perhaps '
*okay*', or perhaps, '*after you've brushed your teeth*'.
If transfer of control happens outside of language, from an interactant
who is socially accepted as having control, to someone whose subsequent
control (over this particular good or action) might be legitimated, then it
would be wise for me to focus on where the transfer happens, and under what
conditions, if I want to understand social processes.
'having'? Mmm. I'm going to truncate this. And I want to make a
multimodality comment.
*The jogger ran into the forest.*
*The horse ran into the forest.*
Let's say that these are material processes, and that we agree that they
are 'material processes', and we code them as such, is 'ran' the same in
the two cases? Now, I may be odd, but my understanding of 'ran' is not the
same as 'ran' even though they are sort of the same word and even though
they both seem to be material processes. My objection is that I 'see'
different things in the two cases. I suggest that perhaps the obsession in
systemics to 'properly' code processes, may be blinding us to the more of
what is happening. Now I don't know much about horses, and if you say the
horse ran into the forest, I have a quick understanding of some horse
running into a forest. I think it is galloping, rather than cantering or
trotting. I quickly get past the visual phenomenon, and move on to whatever
follows, but the understanding of the clause is not (simply) language, and
is in very large part visual, which starts to tickle at the foundations of
multimodality as different modes. The visual character of some horse
running into a forest would be a little clearer if we contrasted the
example with, say, a jogger running into the forest, but there is a lot of
visuality, even without the jogger. For me, the forest, by the way, is a
sandy pine Landes forest. I grant you a forest of whatever character you
might choose. Given a particular signifier my signified doesn't need be
yours, we can happily proceed with our different signifieds, and never even
notice.
I don't know how much multimodality has addressed the 'visual character'
of language in recent times. An important hint, it may be central to the
active/passive distinction.
A theoretical issue would have to do with the relationship between 'ran'
in 'The horse ran...' and the experience which prompted it and the
experience it prompted, which should be substantially more than the bare
semantics of 'ran'. '*Ran*' might be thought of as 'simplexifying',
providing a term which is experientially reductive enough that it can be
used in company of a variety of understandings.
My concerns here, based here on apparently minor examples, are at a
lexicogrammatical level. Despite the examples being 'minor' they may carry
further more serious theoretical consequences for systemic analyses.
Systemic analyses, like most sentence/clause analyses, are of a largely
componential character. However, if the subject (river, jogger, or horse)
is determinative of our analysis of process-types, then the subject (river,
jogger, horse) precedes the formation of 'the clause' in our comprehension.
Perhaps the implications will be wider, entailing that no componented
clause is actually to be found in the wild. There are reasons to consider
that the componented clause may be a product of our analysis of deceased
sentences rather than live ones.
The battle between Hallidayan conceptions of context, and Martiniquian
conceptions, are constructed in correlational terms. One might say that
they both lack immediacy and dynamism.
A correlational conception of text/context is perhaps inevitable starting
from the current lexicogrammar, when the lexicogrammar has been constructed
from patterns of language which are essentially decontextualised, even if
attested and to be found in corpora.
I want, or need, a conception of languageing which always and only occurs
in a context, and where that context precedes and is changed by the
languageing. This is not a context which is a material situation. In one of
Ruqaiya's very interesting articles, I forget which, she commented on the
material situation of a shop, and for the life of me I couldn't see how a
shop could simply be a material situation. And, for the life of me, I
couldn't imagine myself ever being in a material situation. I always seem
to be in shops, or living rooms, or theoretical messes, or buses where the
driver supplies the sausages, where the bus is something more than a partly
glass-sided container with wheels in which I sit. I want contexts like
those ones in which I umwelt, where when I say 'that' or 'that' or 'that'
or 'that' or 'that', I mean something, and that which I mean, is not a
'meaning' of *that*, but something more substantial, a *that*, or a *this*,
as in
*This is this. This is not something else, this is this.*
Or
*That's the second biggest arrow I've ever seen.*
more like somethings I/we can perceive (Tokens) and which come readying
for integration into activities and purposes (Values).
Sheet? Am I an integrationist?
On Tuesday, 21 June 2022 at 00:40:42 BST, 데이브드켈로그_교수_영어교육과 <
dkellogg60@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Thanks, Mick.
I completely agree that Kieran (I think I spelled it right this time) is a
pussycat inside; it's surprising how much of his posting he devotes to his
public persona and what we are and are not to make of it, and how very
little he actually devotes to any real arguments. It is almost as if the
brain is not part of embodied language use at all.
I think Halliday argues somewhere that psychology is "relevant but not
necessary" for understanding SFL, and I agree with that (at least insofar
as "understanding" just means being able to butter parsnips, code clauses,
and do stuff with it). But the last time I heard Martin speak he was
proposing that the relevance of psychology to SFL could be entirely done
away with and replaced by good old fashioned Aristotelian rhetoric. I think
your comment shows how this particular move would reduce discourse analysis
to what it was for Zellig Harris: a grammar above the clause.
From a Vygotskyan perspective, semantics is just thinking, verbal and
nonverbal. Verbal thinking is derived from inner speech but not reducible
to it. It's derived from inner speech in exactly the way you are suggesting
in the stolen book example--through elision, which sometimes produces
semantic chains that are little more than one damn predicator after another
(at least in Korean where nominal groups are the first to go). It's not
reducible to it because it is also derived from the kind of touchy feely
sensations that Kieran is so interested in trying to convey.
Perhaps there is another reason why verbal thinking isn't reducible to
inner speech (that is, wording without sounding). Semantics has to include
all of the meaning potential required to get from relevant context to
wording, and we can't arrive at a model of that meaning potential simply by
taking grammar and elliding bits of it: "The book was stolen" is not quite
the same meaning as "The book was stolen by someone" because it's not as
actionable (as even Kieran seems to now concede, all language may be
regarded as either action or as meaning). Besides, since we are always
finding new ways to say the quiet bit out loud, the border between verbal
and nonverbal thinking must be there but never quite in the same where. Any
model of verbal thinking has to be able to account for imagination and
creativity in ways that a model of phonology or phonetics need not.
(Korean, for example, has a whole register of 혼잣말, a kind of inner speech
which is designed to be leaked and overheard. It's quite unmistakeable,
because the verbal and mental processes that refer to the speaker are
stripped of honorifics: it's not modest or humble to use honorifics on
yourself, particularly when you are just saying or feeling or thinking. But
it's designed to be overheard, because it is louder in larger and noisier
rooms: Vygotsky showed that this was also true of Piaget's
"egocentric speech". It's really handy for showing other people how you
think without actually talking to them, e.g. answering the teacher's
questions in class without coming off as the class know-it-all. It is
mostly predicative, but that's true of Korean grammar quite generally
because nominal groups are more optional than they are in English.)
dk
2022년 6월 20일 (월) 오후 9:04, Michael O'Donnell <micko.madrid@xxxxxxxxx>님이 작성:
Hi David,
Never mentioned a resolution, I was after an understanding. I
asked a question to you whether in the Martin-Rose model whether there
can be meaning which is not anchored to text, e.g., in a Hallidayan
semantics, there may be an Actor to a process (talking about
Ideational semantics, not Transitivity) which is not realised in the
text (The book was stolen), but I get the sense that Discourse
semantics is not a "semantics" in Halliday's sense, but rather, a
grammar above the clause, and thus has no place to meaning-annotate
elements which are not there in the text.
My question to you as above was the last post before we got shut down
for being unruly interpersonally, and the question has bugged me ever
since.
Sorry, not sure if my question is clear enough, but if so, an answer
appreciated...
Mick
On Mon, 20 Jun 2022 at 11:15, David Rose <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
resolving key Martin vs Hallidayan model differences is still making it
Hi Mick
A decade’s not such a long time in lx is it? getting to the point of
interesting ;-
of special investments, a choice is possible’ ...well, it’s been 30 years
As BB predicted... ‘At some point, sometimes later than sooner, because
so far since ET.
works, according to Popper and MAKH. Maybe we should just be looking at
But is resolution or refutation really necessary? A model is valid if it
differences in appliability, and labelling models by those criteria, or by
internal features that afford them.
behalf of Michael O'Donnell <micko.madrid@xxxxxxxxx>
David
From: sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> on
Date: Monday, 20 June 2022 at 5:57 pmcontext : in a conference in 1996 I made the point that some language
To: sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [sys-func] Re: Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)
Hi all,
On David K's request, the example I posted was:
Talking about the e predictivity of language instances from known
choices, while possible, are inappropriate, thus unlikely. I gave the
example of getting on a bus and saying to the busdriver "pound of sausages
please". A Scotsman in the audience said that in his remote village, that
is exactly what you would say to the busdriver, who would pick up the
sausages in the next village and bring them back to you.
taken along with a wide allowance of cultural variation in context-meaning
So, whatever we think about the predictability of language needs to be
appropriacies.
interpersonal rather than ideational motives, I was trying to lighten the
Now, Kieran was spot-on when he said I basically posted it for
tone of a conversation getting a little tense. But not aimed at you Kieran
as an individual, but rather at the whole chain getting too personal. And
you are not a 'coldhearted, completely insensitive, vicious batard'. You
are a pussycat inside.
think Keiran has never expressed his ideas so clearly, and DavidK has been
Although I do think that the tension in the air brings us to our best. I
forced to put into words his position (and his reading of Keiran's) more
explicitly than ever, which is only good.
decade ago. For me, it was getting to the point of resolving key Martin vs
It reminds me with a biff we were having with David Rose on Sysfling a
Hallidayan model differences when the thread was shut down for being too
rowdy.
towards the truth.
Ths my injection. Be polite and considerate guys, but keep moving
dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Mick
On Mon, 20 Jun 2022 at 09:12, Kieran McGillicuddy <
friendlier tenor into the exchanges. I didn't pick up that it was also a
Yo David 2 and whatever remaining others,
I took Mick's 'example' as a generally directed attempt to inject a
good illustration of a particular point, as Geoff Williams observed, but
the quality of Mick's example, I think, would have been 'in addition' to
the attempt to introduce a friendlier tone.
been directed towards me, either to protect me from attack or discouraging
I don't think Mick's attempt to introduce a friendlier tone would have
my attacking. Mick has plenty of reasons to believe in my gross
insensitivity, and related utter imperviosity to personal attacks, or
reasons.
civilized discourse, if that is what he was implying, but no-one would take
On the other hand, I would endorse Mick's implied call for a more
me seriously. I observe, if anyone were to care what I observe, that there
are many reasons for people to care, and to care deeply, about what is said
in systemic fora. I understand, that for me to say that the weather/climate
analogy is silly or stupid, especially when I write stupid 'stoopid', is
offensive to the memory of Michael Halliday, even though I seem to think
that I have huge respect for Michael Halliday, and Ruqaiya incidentally,
but bugger it, the analogy is stoopid, and in saying that, I am also
insulting people who have accepted the analogy, implying that they who
accept it are 'stoopid', but luckily my thinking is sufficiently shallow, I
am so insensitive, that I am not aware of that offensiveness.
with power within the systemic community, then perhaps I would behave
If you take offense, well, yeah, fair enough, and if I was someone else,
otherwise, and I would be a little bit more careful about insulting people
directly, rather than Halliday, who is a big boy who can look after
himself. I remember in 94? I gave a paper somewhere, a systemic conference,
which attacked Halliday's discussion of modality in the then current IFG,
but in a very rare attempt to be civil I identified another very close
version of Halliday's position and attacked that instead. And after the
talk a senior systemicist praised me on the quality of my arguments but
said that I should have highlighted the quality of Halliday's alternative
approach. What moral was I to take from that?
O'Donnell is correct in describing me as a 'coldhearted, completely
I'm going to quote David 2, momentarily, but firstly, to show that Mick
insensitive, vicious batard', I am going to agree with a point that David 2
makes, or implies, at least in his capitalisation. I did not address a
delicacy in Michael's arguing, that 'we invest' a theory with explanatory
power. I ignored the 'we invest'. I was aware that I was ignoring it. And I
am not going to unignore it now.
even anti-theoretical pose, and even the use of 'pose' instead of, say,
As for the 'monstrously bad' in the monstrously bad atheoretical and
'stance', I can cope with that, I can perhaps even cope with
'atheoretical', but 'antitheoretical', I will see you sir at dawn.
integrationist stance, comes from reading Bhaskar and Harre between 94 and
Roy? I am not his fault. My position, which you identify as the
97. Admittedly, I was shocked when I finally learnt of Roy Harris'
existence, and that he agreed me with me on so many points.
anti-theoretical pose. In defense of Kieren, it's not original; it's the
First of all, there is the monstrously bad atheoretical and even
stance that Roy Harris and the integrationists take. Any attempt to try to
INVEST a theory with explanatory power is halted by their stout insistence
that a theory of language cannot explain anything because it leaves out the
non-linguistic channels of communication. This "refusal to rise to the
level of theory" (as Halliday called it) is also category error: if it is a
mistake to go by a field with two cows and insist that there are three
objects there--a cow, a calf and a pair of animals--then it is likewise a
mistake to stoutly insist that there are no cattle there (only two cows)
and no such "thing" as cattle to begin with. Yes, of course, a theory
explains no actual "thing" by itself; a theory is a virtual object and not
a sentient being and "explaining" is a verbal process. That is precisely
why Halliday says that WE invest the theory with explanatory power.
that, but
Now, I don't take the integrationist position..., let's not get into
by their stout insistence that a theory of language cannot explain anything
Any attempt to try to INVEST a theory with explanatory power is halted
because it leaves out the non-linguistic channels of communication.
something I misunderstood. And, do I take that integrationist position? I
that's not really the integrationist position is it? There must be
wouldn't have thought so, but who am I to disagree with David 2?
reasons for people to care, and to care deeply, about what is said in
I observe, if anyone were to care what I observe, that there are many
systemic fora. And when people care so deeply, and have so much of their
lives invested in the theory, and the good that the theory does, (I mean
'invested' in a non-financial sense) at times things go wrong, and
sometimes rather profoundly wrong. But, I certainly don't think David 2's
attack on me is a 'going wrong', it's Mick O'Donnell I can't forgive.
propositions/proposals
There's a string of issues that David 2 has (re-)introduced, such as
propositions and proposals--in fact, the distinction between proposals and
But I am not deceived or disarmed when he breaks off before he tackles
propositions--that is, between language as action and language as
meaning--is just what we were talking about.
distinction is a crucial issue. I have to be careful, because I might say
I broke off at that point. Fair enough. The propositions/proposals
something about the non-existence of the imperative, when the existence of
the imperative is obvious to anyone with half a brain, and obviously it has
existed since, well, forever. And then, there is risk that I might say that
the distinction is not between language as action and language as meaning,
and we would be down a rabbit hole, at least I would be and David and most
others would be refusing to follow.
include context, because context is always and only what Ruqaiya Hasan
Kieren misconstrues Halliday... for the integrationist, text cannot
called the material situational setting.
as an oxymoron, and explaining how I see it as oxymoronic, would be..., to
context is always and only (…) the material situational setting
And again here, I break off, as I see 'the material situational setting'
start off with, not now the important issue.
be a need to apologize would be a pain in the ar.e, at a time when I have
I'd kind of like to apologise to David 1, but explaining why there might
some sciatica, and I certainly don't trust me not to do it again. Who
would? Perhaps though, David 2, you need to appreciate the extent of insult
to David 1 when you say,
was misconstruing him
Kieren misconstrues Halliday in very much the same way that David Rose
to some issues in my previous post,
That is borderline unforgiveable.
And finally, a personal explanation as to why I broke off with respect
propositions and proposals
But I am not deceived or disarmed when he breaks off before he tackles
(huge? enormous?) streak of intensity and faith and commitment and
To my mind, the post wasn't 'about' those kinds of issues. I see a great
community within the systemic community, which I don't share, and which I
have consciously chosen, from my earliest engagement with systemics, not to
share, for reasons which muchly don't matter to you guys. However, also,
over the years, repeatedly, there have been outbreaks of intolerance and
malevolence, and paranoia and misinterpretations, directed internally and
externally, and perhaps the community might like to get a grip on it.
dkellogg60@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
A suggestion in that respect, consider blaming Mick O'Donnell.
On Sunday, 19 June 2022 at 23:22:37 BST, 데이브드켈로그_교수_영어교육과 <
coin a phrase, "monstrously bad".
Geoff:
I don't think that Kieren's example is a beautiful one--I find it, to
anti-theoretical pose. In defense of Kieren, it's not original; it's the
First of all, there is the monstrously bad atheoretical and even
stance that Roy Harris and the integrationists take. Any attempt to try to
INVEST a theory with explanatory power is halted by their stout insistence
that a theory of language cannot explain anything because it leaves out the
non-linguistic channels of communication. This "refusal to rise to the
level of theory" (as Halliday called it) is also category error: if it is a
mistake to go by a field with two cows and insist that there are three
objects there--a cow, a calf and a pair of animals--then it is likewise a
mistake to stoutly insist that there are no cattle there (only two cows)
and no such "thing" as cattle to begin with. Yes, of course, a theory
explains no actual "thing" by itself; a theory is a virtual object and not
a sentient being and "explaining" is a verbal process. That is precisely
why Halliday says that WE invest the theory with explanatory power.
David Rose was misconstruing him (i.e. a semantics without discourse). For
Secondly, Kieren misconstrues Halliday in very much the same way that
the integrationist, text cannot include context, because context is always
and only what Ruqaiya Hasan called the material situational setting.
Similarly, language is always and only embodied language. Yes, it is
impossible to order a macchiato without a coffee shop to order it in--an
admirable grasp of the utterly obvious that makes these protestations about
being taken to be an idiot somewhat more ironic than the protestor
intended. It is likewise unnecessary to order it without a body to drink it
with. But it is also impossible to order a macchiato without the word
"macchiato" and something very much like a system network (i.e. a menu),
not to mention some aliquot and fungible form of value (cash or credit),
and that's a little hard to explain without investing in some form of
abstraction.
this whole sorry-cum-wacky thread is the amount of crudely
Thirdly, and more generally, Annabelle is right. An important lesson of
anti-intellectual "thinking" that can be disguised behind appeals to good
or bad feelings, onomatopoeia, grunts, moans, gestures, etc. Kieren would
like to fit his acute content to a cutesy form, and I am willing to accept
it and even admire it--for a moment. But I am not deceived or disarmed when
he breaks off before he tackles propositions and proposals--in fact, the
distinction between proposals and propositions--that is, between language
as action and language as meaning--is just what we were talking about. It's
the whole meta-functional distinction between the interpersonal and the
ideational that was the chief difference between Halliday 1961 and Halliday
1985. More importantly for me (because I work on child language) it is the
"macrofunctional breakthrough" that Halliday notes in Learning How to Mean:
it's the distinction between the pragmatic orientation and the mathetic one.
his own. He accidentally slips back into the non-relational one-to-one
In the end, I think all that Kieren does is to prove my argument and not
analogy between weather and text and climate and language in that very
email (there is no reason to accept the cogency or even relevance of his
argument that a theory of climate explains nothing about climate unless you
accept the climate-to-language analogy). He also shows how little
explanatory power we can invest in anti-theoretical integrationist
posturing. It will butter no parsnips, and code no clauses. To coin another
phrase, it is language that doesn't do stuff.
작성:
dk
2022년 6월 18일 (토) 오후 7:26, Geoff Williams <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>님이
<https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/u9zrCMwGxOt5D3QvBUGmD-g?domain=aladin.co.kr>
Beautiful example, Mick!
Geoff
Geoff Williams
mobile: +61 (0)417540821
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Sangmyung University
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Sys-func is the original email list of the Australian SFL community.
It was established in 1992, first for the benefit of Sydney scholars,
but very quickly came to service the needs of scholars worldwide.
--
David Kellogg
Sangmyung University
정서 학설 2 - 역사-심리학적 연구 | 비고츠키 선집 14
레프 세묘노비치 비고츠키 (지은이),비고츠키 연구회 (옮긴이)살림터2022-06-18
https://www.aladin.co.kr/shop/wproduct.aspx?ItemId=296200809
<https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/u9zrCMwGxOt5D3QvBUGmD-g?domain=aladin.co.kr>
--
David Kellogg
Sangmyung University
정서 학설 2 - 역사-심리학적 연구 | 비고츠키 선집 14
레프 세묘노비치 비고츠키 (지은이),비고츠키 연구회 (옮긴이)살림터2022-06-18
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