Thanks Chris, (the architecture of thetheory matters, but also the various
implications of thatarchitecture, if one can tease out those implications)
And thanks David, for both comments,and now all three comments,
‘Context* is an interlevel, since itrelates language to something that is not
language; it is aninterlevel because it is not with the nonlanguage activity
itselfthat linguistics is concerned but with the relation of this tolanguage
form.’
‘*The reason why "context" ispreferred to "semantics" as the name of this
interlevel isthat "semantics” is too closely tied to one particular methodof
statement, the conceptual method… The linguistic statement ofcontext attempts
to relate language form to (abstractions from) other(i.e. extratextual)
observables.’
[1961 Categories of the Theory of Grammar]
The following is anattempt to look at some of the implications of the Scale and
CategoryGrammer, as presented very briefly by Chris and David. It is myattempt
at 'higher level theorising', a higher level than that towhich the nitty-gritty
me is accustomed. There are necessarily twoproblems,
-
the 'Scale and Category' theory is too briefly described for substantial
commentary
-
I am not accustomed to 'high level theorisings, and those/my theorisings risk
some 'not-really'-sequiturs
But I also bring to bear the assumptionthat language necessarily does stuff,
and if it does not do stuffthen it is no use to us/me. An assumption of that
kind is usuallydealt with in linguistics through an adoption of the
conduit(encoding/decoding) metaphor, often enough unstated or embedded inthe
discussion of language through the assumption that you and Ispeak the same
language.
Our speaking the same 'language' canseem a safe assumption if we look at
language as syntactic at core,which we don't, but it is a more difficult
assumption if we take amore 'semantic' approach to language, or a more
semantic/actionalapproach to language as I tend to do, coming from
an'experiential/interpersonal' tradition of thinking about language. Iassume
that a 'you' and an 'I' have our differences, that we do notspeak the same
language, in large part because we do not live in thesame reality, that is, we
have not had the same experiences andtherefore we do not operate with the same
'meanings'. Nevertheless,operating (acting) with language should be an
operation which canbridge gaps in our meanings, and in our 'reality'.
-
Hey Mum, where's the newspaper?
-
It's in the fridge. (an attested example where only the initial 'gap in
realities' was addressed. Damn, I've gone all nitty-gritty again.)
With that ability to bridge gapsentailing an agreed systematicity to our
languageing, but notnecessarily to our languages.
Roy Harris, a great admirer ofHalliday, nevertheless accused him of being a
segregationist, one whoseparated language from its context, and in this accused
Halliday asbeing someone who deployed the conduit metaphor.
We systemicists, of course, areinclined to take umbrage at someone suggesting
that we have separatedlanguage from context. But...
‘Context*is an interlevel, since it relates language to something that is
notlanguage; it is an interlevel because it is not with the nonlanguageactivity
itself that linguistics is concerned but with the relationof this to language
form.’
‘*The reasonwhy "context" is preferred to "semantics" as thename of this
interlevel is that "semantics” is too closelytied to one particular method of
statement, the conceptual method…The linguistic statement of context attempts
to relate language formto (abstractions from) other (i.e. extratextual)
observables.’
[1961 Categories ofthe Theory of Grammar]
As an attempt at 'higher leveltheorising', I would like to point to
-
the directionality of Halliday's 61 model (thinking),
-
for Halliday 1961 non-language activity is (to be) related towards language
(form), 'it is not with the nonlanguage activity itself that linguistics is
concerned but with the relation of this to language form' rather than for
language to be related towards non-language activity,
-
For the following example, specifically for 'this', it would seem, prima facie,
that the significant direciton of language action should be towards the
non-language. This is how you stroke a cat. (I don't have a great memory and,
this example has probably been taken from Ruqaiya Hasan, and misquoted.)
-
I would say that systemics has variously attempted to address this
'directionality' issue, with correlational notions of 'bi-construing' across
levels, but without engaging with the 'temporal/actional' perspective of
'language-ing', (but what of exchange theory? - this too, even in the exchange
of goods and services, doesn't engage with (explain) the actional consequences,
perhaps because of the chronically decontextualised language examples)
-
focussing towards language leads towards a 'meaning theory' of language, rather
than an actional theory, with even 'interpersonal meanings' understood as
meanings, rather than, as Paul Tibault might have it, focussings on an
experiential topology.)
-
Halliday's attention to the relationship of activity (non-language
activity=phenomena?) to(wards) form, rather than the thing/noun focus of a lot
of semantics (the conceptual method?) would lead (would have led) to (the much
more useful) clause-level conception of meaning, (Scale and Category?)
-
Halliday is employing a conception of context as 'abstractions from' rather
than an immediate context on which and with which language acts (can act). 'The
linguistic statement of context attempts to relate language form to
(abstractions from) other (i.e. extratextual) observables.' ’Language cannot
act upon 'abstractions from...'.
-
For Halliday 61, context is already a theoretical category rather the locus of
operation of language
-
'categories of grammar' are amenable to correlation with 'categories of
context',
-
it is difficult, for me, to see how 'non-language activity', presumably some
sort of actual activity, could be related to language form if the relationship
has to pass through '(abstractions from) other (i.e. extratextual)
observables.'
-
also, this kind of model obscures the role of language as productive of
observation, 'Look over there', (actual observing rather than observables which
may or may not be observed) and bearing upon the other's experience,
-
there seems to be a rather simplistic conception of non-language activity in
terms of observables, also rather simplistic in Halliday's 61 diagram, such
that any issues of our world (Umwelt?) being more complex than just being
observable, are distanced from thinking about language,
-
later systemics seems to have attempted to address non-linguistic 'observables'
as being construed through a linguistic optic
-
This interposition of an 'abstractions from'-context between language
'functioning' and the specific circumstances in which it acts, may be the move
which has led towards a conception of language as 'construing experience',
since it distances languageing from the effects and change and consequences of
languageing, including distancing languageing from the effects it may have on
the language system itself, (and on the 'meaning' of 'words')
-
that is,context as an interlevel places a theoretical barrier between language
and action/activty, of a kind which is amenable to later stratification, but
with that stratification then constituting further barriers for an
understanding of language as action and that which is acted upon,
-
Systemics has tended to separate the materiality of utterances (experiential
meaning?) from the 'interpersonal consequences', Your dog has just been run
over.
Consequences of utterances aredifficult to conceive of once we separate the
experiential from theinterpersonal.
-
Halliday 1961 has not yet come to grips with the slipperiness of terms such as
'grammar' and 'linguistics'. He says 'it is not with the nonlanguage activity
itself that linguistics is concerned but with the relation of this to language
form.’, but, one would think that linguistics is concerned with language, and
language, absolutely fundamentally, is concerned with nonlanguage activity.
'Put it over there!', 'You can have two.' 'I've counted every mandarine on the
tree and I'll know if you take one.' Such that, if one is to tackle the study
of language, one has to initially study the relationship of utterance to
activity.
-
There are aspects of the scale and category grammar which could make it
amenable to an actional theory of language-ing, where, for example, the
semantics of, say, 'Christian Matthiessen' are/is the nonlanguage Christian
Matthiessen, (except precluded by the interlevel 'context').
Halliday 1961 speaks in terms of'relating' language and non-language, rather
than of language actingon non-language or of language changing the
non-language, which wouldbe consistent with not having completely stepped away
from 'theconceptual method'. I wonder whether the 'conceptual method' which
heis abjuring might be interpretable as an attempt to avoid the effectsof the
conduit metaphor.
In 61 Halliday would not have had themechanisms to conceive of language as a
material phenomenon whichmight act directly upon material phenomena. The
hamster which waseaten by Freddy Star, is not to be understood as an
indefinitearticle followed by a noun.
The context conceivedtheoretically/abstractly stands between languageing and
that which ising-ed, and will necessarily obfuscate what is happening.
David, just being careful with'empirical',
Despite the empirical developments you mention,in metafunctions and axis,
my understanding would be that'metafunctions and axis' are theoretical devices
to explain whatsystemic modelling interprets as phenomena, rather than
'empiricaldevelopments'. But even so, unless we can look at directconsequences
of language, which we can't do when looking at the words'Give me the gun!', we
will have difficulties claiming that ouranalyses are empirical.
Work is the curse of the drinking class,Kieran
On Wednesday, 15 June 2022 at 06:54:09 BST, David Rose
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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His own research focused on phonology and grammar, expanding the model into
metafunctions, axis and delicacy. This helps explain why phonology becomes an
inner language level by 2004, rather than an ‘interlevel’. Both grammar and
phonology are fleshed out as metafunctional, axial systems.
In contrast, semantics remains as ‘interlevel’, lacking the axial relations of
LG and PH systems. Instead, its organisation is realised only interstratally by
lexicogrammatical systems. Its descriptions derive from grammatical research,
including H&M 1999, and RH’s ‘message semantics’.
As an ‘interlevel’ semantics ‘interfaces’ with the tenor, field and mode of
contexts. As context is ‘extra-textual’, tenor, field and mode are not
organised systemically, but are described instead as notes on ‘settings’, in
various publications from the 1970s on.
David
From:sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> on behalf of
David Rose <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wednesday, 15 June 2022 at 11:20 am
To: sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [sys-func] Re: Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)
Can I also admire how neatly his 1961 model synthesises his three major 20C
influences...
1. Firth’s ‘linguistic levels’ – phonetics, phonology, grammar, lexis,
semantics, context
2. Hjelmslev’s form and substance
- expression form -> phonetics
- expression substance -> phonology
- content form -> lexicogrammar
- content substance -> semantics
3. Malinowski’s contexts of ‘situation’ and ‘culture’.
These are precisely the categories arranged as strata in CMIMM’s 2004 diagram
in IFG below.
It’s a neat hypothesis that points both back to prior authorities, and forward
to empirical research (which we’ve all been doing ever since).
David
From:sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> on behalf of
David Rose <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tuesday, 14 June 2022 at 9:58 am
To: sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [sys-func] Re: Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)
Thanks Chris
It’s illuminating to follow the path of his model. He does in fact explain why
he avoided ‘semantics’ in 1961...
‘Context* is an interlevel, since it relates language to something that is not
language; it is an interlevel because it is not with the nonlanguage activity
itself that linguistics is concerned but with the relation of this to language
form.’
‘*The reason why "context" is preferred to "semantics" as the name of this
interlevel is that "semantics” is too closely tied to one particular method of
statement, the conceptual method… The linguistic statement of context attempts
to relate language form to (abstractions from) other (i.e. extratextual)
observables.’
[1961 Categories of the Theory of Grammar]
Despite the empirical developments you mention, in metafunctions and axis, his
stratal model remained essentially identical for the next 40 years... 1961
‘situation’ becomes ‘context’ and 1961 ‘context’ becomes ‘semantics’...
semantics remains an ‘interlevel’ between lexicogrammar and ‘extra-textual’
context.
The symmetry of the model was appealing and persuasive, with (lexico)grammar at
the centre. In 1961, phonology was also an ‘interlevel’ with phonetics. By
2004, phonetics becomes the ‘interlevel’, to maintain the symmetry...
[2004 On Grammar as the Driving Force from Primary to Higher-Order
Consciousness]
This is the same model drawn by CMIMM in IFG3/4, as co-tangential circles.
As ‘context’ is modelled as an asemiotic ‘extra-textual’,‘eco-social
environment’, this model isincommensurable with semiotic models such as JRM’s
1992 description of register and genre as connotative semiotics.
David
From:sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> on behalf of
Dr ChRIS CLÉiRIGh <c.cleirigh@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Monday, 13 June 2022 at 9:33 am
To: sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <sys-func@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [sys-func] Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)
Dear Colleagues,
The following might be useful to anyone who is unaware of the extent to which
Halliday's first theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961),
is different from the theory that replaced it, Systemic Functional Grammar. Its
stratal organisation is given by Halliday (2002 [1961]: 39) as:
It can be seen that Scale & Category Grammar has no semantic level,
and in fact, the words 'semantic' and 'semantics' do not feature at all in this
paper.
'Context' is defined as 'aninterlevel relating form to extratextual features'
(ibid.).
The theory does not include system networks, nor metafunctions,
and the elements of clause structure are simply Subject, Predicator, Complement
and Adjunct.
The theory also does not distinguish realisation from instantiation,
the word 'exponence' being used to cover both of the later concepts.
--
chEers,
dr chris cléirigh
We have now sunk to a depth
at which restatement of the obvious
is the first duty of intelligent men.
— George Orwell
====================================
My Linguistics Sites
Thoughts That Cross My Mind
Deploying Functional Grammar
Martin's Model Of Paralanguage
Informing Thoughts
Making Sense Of Meaning
Systemic Functional Linguistics
Sys-Func
Sysfling
The Thought Occurs…
Martin's Discourse Semantics, Register & Genre
Thoughts That Didn't Occur…
Working With Discourse: Meaning Beyond The Clause
The Cardiff Grammar
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Factoring Out Structure
Attitude In Systemic Functional Linguistics
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