[lit-ideas] Re: view of names, or in ginocchio da te

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 14:44:46 +0100 (BST)




________________________________
 From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>

>2. it has one version, the bbs version available here 
 
 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6573580>
 
  

According to the abstract Adriano provides: "On the argument advanced here only 
a machine could think". 


If this accurately reflects Searle's view (or if Searle thinks machines can 
have 'intentionality') then his argument and position are very different from 
Popper's - on Popper's argument 'intentionality' transcends any physical or 
mechanical principle, and machines cannot think. 


Machines cannot even 'name', on Popper's view: they might appear to name (to 
those lacking a clear philosophical head) but they are not naming as this is 
done by humans (and how humans do it is the way 'naming' is done with 
intentionality). On Popper's argument (which predates Searle afaik) a machine 
that makes jam jars is not thinking anymore than a machine that washes jam jars 
- and a machine that attaches labels to jam jars that say 'Strawberry Jam Jar' 
is not 'naming' the jam jars as a human is when they refer (with 
intentionality) to it as a 'Strawberry Jam Jar'. The machine that makes the jam 
jar and the one that attaches the labels are all on the same level - the same 
W1 level - as far as Popper is concerned: the one attaching the labels is no 
more linguistically advanced than the one that makes the jars or washes them, 
and it is deluded to think otherwise.The 'naming' robot in my posts is simply 
the robot equivalent of a machine that attaches
 labels - it is no more linguistically advanced than the machine that makes or 
washes jam jars either, and it is deluded to think otherwise.


But this kind of delusion is widespread: here is a point where I feel Popper 
and Wittgenstein would agree (there are others btw). There is something about 
computers and other machines that can throw some humans into a deluded state, 
just as the ancients might have been thrown into a deluded state (say, as to 
the wrath of a deity) by the physical impressiveness of a thunderstorm or 
volcanic eruption. 


There is nothing in this reference to indicate that Searle explains or argues 
how the physics of words, the physics of objects and the physics of their 
relations, cannot give rise to a purely physical explanation of how a word 
functions to name (or refer to) a specific object - which is the crux of 
Popper's paper. So how Searle's argument is equivalent beats me - and of 
course, despite being asked,this alleged equivalence is left unexplained by 
Adriano. (Adriano's reference does not explain it either.)


Why Adriano thinks it worthwhile to provide such a bare reference without 
getting to grips with the arguments, and without justifying his view that there 
is 'equivalence' between Searle and Popper, is beyond me. Perhaps when he was 
given essays to write based on a reading list he got top marks for providing 
his own reading list by way of an answer - leaving it to the reader to figure 
out the brilliance of his answer from the material to which he referred. If 
only rational argument were so easy. Of course, providing reading lists and 
airily dismissive comments is not only much easier but a much greater sop to 
the inflated ego and delusional intellect than rational argument.


Here Adriano comes unstuck or hoist by own petard: as the upshot of Searle's 
position (as set out in the reference Adriano provides) - that "only a machine 
could think" - is not merely not equivalent but antithetical to Popper's 
position as set out in his paper and my posts - that machines can't think - 
indeed they can't even 'name'. 


Adriano's talk of "fake problems" is merely blather from someone who cannot 
even the grasp the plainest of fake equivalences.


Basta

Donal

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