[lit-ideas] Re: view of names, or in ginocchio da te

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 16:18:37 -0700 (PDT)

I can't help wondering again why Searle or Popper or someone writing in the the 
1950s when PC was science fiction and a washing machine was a rare commodity 
would be considered an authority on the subject of machines thinking. 


O.K.




________________________________
 From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Sent: Wednesday, September 4, 2013 12:05 AM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: view of names, or in ginocchio da te
 

Donal wrote (in a long and interesting post)

> If this accurately reflects Searle's view (or if Searle thinks machines
> can have 'intentionality') then his argument and position are very
> different from Popper's - on Popper's argument 'intentionality'
> transcends any physical or mechanical principle, and machines cannot think.

Searle does not believe that machines 'think,' or that they can have 
intentional states. Quite the opposite

'Intentionality,' is a Medieval concept introduced into modern 
philosophy in 1874 by Franz Brentano, in Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint CPsychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt).

Intentionality concerns the directedness or ‘aboutness’ of 'many, if not 
all,' conscious states. No state of a machine has such a relation to 
anything else; this would seem to entail, more broadly, that machines 
can't think.

Robert Paul



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