[lit-ideas] Re: knowledge and belief briefly

  • From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2013 19:42:11 -0330

Thanks to Omar, Richard and Donal (I think) for rushing away from family and
friends, turkey and stuffin', to pursue and promote philosophical inquiry over
the Holiday Season. 

Some replies to recent posts:

1. I say "false k" is logically self-contradictory in that if P is true, then
"k-that P" cannot be false. In other words, any inference to "k-that" from  a
false statement or belief yields a contradiction. It's "low-level" logical
knowledge, I know, but it works just fine for me (as far as I know). Here I
support Richard's promotion of financial contributions to W's Golden Poker
Award.

2. Donal's admission that no counter-example is available to rebut JTB theory
concurs with my view. I am happy to receive that admission. His subsequent
lament that unfortunately this admission "leads to a dead end in terms of
substantive discussion" betrays an odd adherence to a pragmatist ideal that
does not sit well with Donal's insistence, directed to Richard, that we need to
distinguish between the usefulness of a theory and its truth. 

I remain unhappy, however, that at this time of Christmas and resolutions for a
kinder, gentler and less ignorant treatment of others, Donal has reverted back
to the use of crass and unseemly ad hominem arguments as he did in a highly
inappropriate post to me from last week in which he called me a hypocrite,
amongst other very hurtful allegations. This time, Donal's target is Richard.
I'm sure I speak for everyone on this list when I say that Richard hardly
deserves to be characterized as a "very confused and/or scientifically
illiterate person ..."

And even if he were, it is not part of the norms of philosophical discussion to
deploy such content within the premises of one's arguments. I have typically
avoided engaging Donal in discussion because of his (her?) tendency to express
callous attacks upon persons not holding his (her) particular views, and I have
recently found it within myself to excuse Donal for past transgressions of
scholarly etiquette, out of a love of personkind and in the Spirit of
Christmas. But the future will not be like the past if allowances of generosity
are not recognized as such. Simply because one is reasonably well-read in a
couple of abstruse, technical areas of philosophy does not provide one license
to abuse and ridicule one's interlocutors. This list features many interesting
philosophers and educators who clearly have extensive experience in the
teaching of philosophy or teaching in other areas. Clearly, Donal is not
one of us, but perhaps (s) he could remain attentive from now on to the
*manner*
in which we proceed in presenting arguments and critiquing counter-arguments.
Now there's a New Year's resolution, nicht wahr? 

But I stray. Or not.

3. I remain quite befuddled why Donal and Omar insist on referring to theories
as "true/"false. The claim "I k-that theory T is false" makes no sense to me.
By my lights, propositions derived deductively or predicted by a theory can be
true or false, but not the theory itself. And then there's the likes of Richard
Rorty who claims truth is not a goal of inquiry in the first place. Only
Peircean justification can claim to be the end of inquiry (at the end of
inquiry).

4. On "false, false, false, false." (Does repetition heighten the epistemic
warrant of a claim? Note that I could display a woeful lack of social graces
here by likening Donal's method to George W Bush's approach to truth: Keep
repeating the same statement over and over, and after awhile it will become
true and people will recognize its truth. But I won't.) I would have thought
that if an observation statement derived from or predicted by a theory
turns out to be false, nothing is entailed regarding the whole theory itself.
The theory may continue to have strong explanatory force, predictive power,
simplicity and/or elegance on its side once we circumscribe the theory's scope
of application in light of the disconfirming evidence. I agree with Richard H.
on this point.  

Consider this example. Witters had a theory about the nature of certainty. One
derivation of the theory he made was that the statement: "I have never been on
the moon" (or was it "I've never been far from the surface of the planet
earth"?) is not a knowledge-claim or empirical statement open to
verification/falsification. Rather, it is an example of a "riverbed" or "hinge"
proposition that rational persons do not doubt - i.e., are certain about. Were
W still with us today, I believe he would retract that view on that particular
"statement." But I don't think he would retract the "truth" of his theory on
Certainty as a whole. (Just as he did not retract all of the Tractatus in light
of his thinking in the Investigations. In its proper place, at the right time,
it's perfectly in order.) Like Kant, who misapplied his own moral theory at
times big time, we do not throw out an entire theory because of a couple of
lapses, flies, in it. Donal wants us to believe that scientific theories are
somehow special, and unlike moral or philosophical theories. I fail to see the
difference. 

Despite a plethora of postings over the past few days, I find nothing that
shows JTB theory to be uncogent or an incorrect account of the nature of
k-that.
It remains, in my view, a justified and dare I say it, transcendental (T)
account of the possibilities and limits of propositional knowledge. 

Returning to leftover Chinese pancakes, Italian sausages, Newfie salt beef,
German potato salad, choco cheesecake,  and a very nice Speyside malt.

Of course, compared to what Phil is enjoying in Singapore, I realize these are
"low level" culinary and libationary offerings. But I'm just a simple ASM,
ekeing (sp?) out a living plying my trade ... 

Walter O
MUN

P.S. But I couldn't leave you without offering a moment of levity as seasonally
required:  

The past, present and future walk into a bar. ..... 

It was tense.                         (I can't believe I'm posting that.)
=============================================================================

Quoting Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>:

> 
> 
> Omar wrote:- >A complex scientific paradigm like Newton's is surely
> not reducible to a single proposition, but rather it is a set of
> propositions,
> and so there is an at least theoretical possibility that it might be
> partially
> true or partially correct.> 
>  
> The suggested “theoretical possibility” is, in truth, a
> logical impossibility – one that also does not follow from the premise.
>  
> Grant the premise:- Newton’s physics is “not reducible to a
> single proposition, but rather it is a set of propositions”. But any
> counter-example that falsifies any element of that set renders that set as a
> whole false and not merely “partially false”; any counter-example
> therefore renders
> that set false so that the set cannot be “partially true”. The set cannot
> be “partially
> true” merely because elements of that set may be true, and it is a logical
> confusion to suggest this. To say parts of that set are (or may be) true is
> quite consistent with the set of propositions as a whole being not at all
> “partially
> true” but simply false; conversely, to say a set of propositions as a whole
> is
> false is quite consistent with admitting that parts of that set are (or may
> be)
> true.
>  
> The position is analogous to that mentioned in my previous
> post as follows:-
>  
> >Of course we can take a statement like “All tables are
> tables and all swans are purple” and split it into two – a false
> statement that
> “All swans are purple” and a true statement that “All tables are
> tables”. But
> it is just confused, logically speaking, to think this means that the
> statement
> “All tables are tables and all swans are purple” is “partially true”
> and
> “partially false”. It is not: the statement “All tables are tables and
> all
> swans are purple” is simply false, even if within that false statement
> there is
> a true statement. >
>  
> To amplify: if we sever the short statement “All tables are
> tables” from the conjunction “All tables are tables and all swans are
> purple”,
> we obtain the true (albeit tautologous) statement “All tables are
> tables”. But
> that does not mean the conjunction of this true statement with a false
> statement like “All swans are purple” is “partially true” – the
> conjunction-statement
> (“All tables are tables and all swans are purple”) is simply false: it is
> simply false because the claim “all swans are purple” is false; and it is
> logically
> confused to consider such a conjunction-statement as “partially true”
> because
> it contains within it a severable statement that if severed would be true.
> The
> converse also holds, logically:- a disjunction-statement comprised of the two
> shorter
> statements (viz. “All tables are
> tables or all swans are purple”) is
> simply true: it is simply true because the tautologous part of this
> disjunction-statement
> is true; and it is logically confused to consider such a
> disjunction-statement “partially
> false” because it contains within it a severable statement that if severed
> would be false.
>  
> The set of propositions that constitute Newton’s physics is
> a conjunctive rather than disjunctive set. Any counter-example that falsifies
> that set falsifies the set as a whole, so that the set is rendered simply
> false
> by the counter-example rather than merely “partially false.” Equally, as
> that
> set is rendered false and not merely “partially false”, that set cannot
> be “partially
> true” despite falsification. 
>  
> Of course, there are many other questions left open by this,
> including whether some severable form of Newton’s physics escapes a
> falsification of some wider set of Newtonian propositions. But even in such a
> case, the point still holds that the severable form will also be true or
> false
> and cannot be instead “partially true” and “partially false”. 
>  
> Where Newton’s physics proves inconsistent with an
> experimental outcome, it is simply not a logical option to conclude that
> Newton’s
> physics is nevertheless merely “partially false”; equally, it is not a
> logical
> option to conclude in such a case that Np nevertheless remains “partially
> true.”
>  
> Hope this helps clarify why Newton’s physics, as a set of
> propositions, must be either true or false and cannot be “partially true”
> and “partially
> false.”
>  
> Donal
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, 26 December 2013, 9:39, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>  
> 
> >Now, the physics that was used to do all that or 
> that would have to be used to repeat it, is, I suggest, consistent with or 
> identical with what Donal labels as that "false-false-false" Newtonian 
> physics.>
> 
> We can go further than a case where the physics "used" is "consistent with"
> Newtonian physics - further, that is, than a case like Einsteinian physics
> which is "consistent with" Newtonian physics to a large degree: i.e. to a
> large degree Einsteinian physics ['Ep'] and Newtonian physics ['Np'] do not
> give different predicted physical outcomes. 
> 
> 
> We can use Newtonian physics itself, not merely physics "consistent with" it
> up to a point (as is Einstein's), to do all kinds of things. And while
> Wittgenstein might be quoted or misquoted here to say it is nonsense to say
> so, clearly Newtonian physics is "identical with" Newtonian physics. So we
> can use what is "identical with" Np (i.e. Np itself) in all kinds of applied
> physics.
> 
> 
> Not only can we but we have. As a matter of historical fact, Newtonian
> physics was a foremost instrument in producing the Industrial Revolution. We
> could give myriad other examples of the application of Np, many more
> impressive than Richard's posted example.
> 
> But we should not for one second (whether that second is understood in terms
> of time in Newtonian physics or in Einsteinian physics) confuse the
> usefulness of a theory as an instrument with its truth or its degree of
> truth.
> 
> We can go further with this last point: imagine we produce a differential
> prediction between Ep and Np and experiment produces an outcome consistent
> with Ep and inconsistent with Np. We now have grounds to say Np is false - it
> has been falsified by experiment. This could be so even though there is no
> practical application of Ep that we can "use" where Np cannot be used
> instead; and indeed it could be the case that in practice we always use Np
> and not Ep in our applied physics because Np is more straightforward to use.
> Yet none of this massive instrumental prowess of Np, nor its greater
> practical advantages from an instrumental point of view when compared with
> Ep, reverses the crucial experiment - none of this greater instrumentality
> means Np is true or more truth-like than Ep. Np may be false yet more useful
> in practical terms than Ep.
> 
> 
> Only a very confused and/or scientifically illiterate person would suggest
> that crucial experiments, decisive between two competing theories, are, in
> effect, overthrown or reversed by practical considerations as to how useful a
> theory is in applied physics. Yet that seems to be the long and short of
> Richard's post. 
> 
> 
> Perhaps Richard's post should wear its own cap: "truly a "tempest in a (tiny,
> tiny) teacup" of practically 
> irrelevant, wrong-headed philosophizing of the worst stripe"?
> 
> Donal
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, 26 December 2013, 2:22, Richard Henninge
> <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>  
>  
> Let's get this straight: Newtonian physics (Np) is 
> "[f]alse. False. False-false-false. False as false can be," according to 
> Donal.
>  
> Then consider this: of recent memory, Chinese 
> physicists managed to launch a rocket from the surface of the earth carrying
> as 
> payload, among other things, a lunar rover-type vehicle, cameras and various 
> other pieces of scientific equipment, and managed to land that payload in 
> operating condition on the surface of the moon. Wittgenstein famously said in
> 
> the first proposition of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus that "[t]he world
> is 
> everything that is the case." As a thought experiment, imagine everything
> that 
> had to be the case from an hour before blast-off to an hour after the
> landing. 
> Picture it to yourself as a sort of three-dimensional cartoon along the
> actual 
> timeline of the days on which the actual events occurred. Imagine that every 
> piece of equipment could be modeled to be as close to functionally identical
> to 
> the equipment that was actually used. Or, what is practically-speaking the
> same 
> thing, simply imagine the actual equipment that was actually used.
>  
> Now, the physics that was used to do all that or 
> that would have to be used to repeat it, is, I suggest, consistent with or 
> identical with what Donal labels as that "false-false-false" Newtonian 
> physics. Np is not only "partially true, or true under certain conditions"; 
> there are only extremely limited circumstances in which it doesn't "hold" (I 
> would prefer to say) apparently--subatomically, i.e. below the order of 
> magnitude of the atom and in relation to objects in motion at or approaching
> the 
> speed of light. I doubt if any of the scientists on the project or involved
> in a 
> future similar endeavor to the moon or Mars is even, nor need 
> be, conversant with Eddington's results or relativity theory or quantum 
> physics. Proof enough of this would be to see whether any correction
> reflecting 
> twentieth-century physical "discoveries" is reflected in the computer
> programs 
> used to carry out such a feat. 
>  
> Wittgenstein, the "Austrian engineer," worked on 
> kites and a newly invented jet-propulsion engine. All he needed to explain
> that 
> was Newtonian physics. There comes a point at which one realizes that,
> analogous 
> to the world inside the atom, the "revolutionary impact on philosophy [of,
> say, 
> Eddington's findings] via Popper's philosophy of science and theory of 
> knowledge," is truly a "tempest in a (tiny, tiny) teacup" of practically 
> irrelevant, wrong-headed philosophizing of the worst stripe, perhaps in 
> particular in the philosophy of science and theory of knowledge, well worthy
> of 
> Wittgenstein's Golden Poker Award.
>  
> Richard Henninge
> University of Mainz
>  
>  
>  
> >So one experimental result that is incompatible with  Newtonian physics
> (where that physics makes claims that hold throughout the  whole physical
> universe), is enough to show Np is false – not merely  “partially
> false” and not merely so we can claim Np is nevertheless “at least 
> partially true, or true under certain conditions”. False. False. 
> False-false-false. False as false can be.
> > 
> >This is why Eddington’s experiments were so important.  There was more at
> stake than merely showing that Newton’s physics was now only  “partially
> true, or true under certain conditions”. What Eddington’s results 
> appeared to show was that the Newtonian physics under test was false. That
> meant that physics was false even in the  myriad cases where it was proven
> consistent with the experimental  outcome. 
> >
> >
> >
> >Now that is something with potentially revolutionary impact on  the
> direction of scientific theorising, testing and research. It also had a 
> revolutionary impact on philosophy via Popper's philosophy of science and 
> theory of knowledge.
> >
> > 
> >Donal
> >
> >

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