[lit-ideas] Re: knowledge and belief briefly
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 24 Dec 2013 20:59:23 +0000 (GMT)
Walter writes:
>I submit that the idea of "false knowledge" is
self-contradictory. If I k-that
P, then P can't be false. If P is false, then I don't/can't k-that P. (Although
I can of course k-that P is false.) >
We may stipulate so we define “knowledge” so only ‘what is
true’ counts as “knowledge”. Given such a definitional stipulation then “false
knowledge” becomes an impossibility. Perhaps not quite “self-contradictory”, as
the words “false knowledge” still permit an understanding that is not
contradictory in terms of pure logic, as we may see. But, given such a
stipulative definition, “false knowledge” becomes something of a contradiction
in terms.
There is nothing that can be given as a counter-example to
refute such a stipulation: for any possible example of “false knowledge” will
simply be dismissed as not “knowledge” because it is “false”. This stipulative
approach soon leads to a dead end in terms of substantive discussion.
The dead end of that stipulative approach aside, we may give
Newton’s physics by way of possible counter-example to the view there cannot be
"false knowledge". This counter-example
depends on sustaining two claims about Newton’s physics [‘Np’]:
(1) that Np
is false (at least in certain respects);
(2) that even though Np is false, it
should still be considered “knowledge”.
Not only may Np be considered “knowledge”
even though false, but it may be considered a most important and significant
contribution to “knowledge” even in the
respects in which it is false – much more so than trivial truth like “2 +
2 does not equal 74.6” or “All tables are tables”; and Np is also much more
significant a contribution to “knowledge” than any view that stipulates that
anything
false cannot therefore be “knowledge”.
>Let's not conflate k-that and k-about or k-of (the latter 2 in the
"familiar
sense of k" or "k by acquaintance" as per Russell). I can k-of
or k-about, be
familiar with, all sorts of accounts. That does not mean I k-that anything.>
This I take as a criticism by Walter of the approach in Omar’s
post. My criticism would not be that Omar conflates “k-that and k-about or k-of”
(which may only lead into the morass of distinguishing “k-that and k-about or
k-of”), but that Omar’s post concerns something that is an irrelevance. Omar
does not focus on something like the truth or falsity of Np but on “knowledge
of” Np:-
>If I say that an eight-grader knows Newtonian physics,
what I probably mean
> is that e.g. he knows the laws of motion as Newton stated them. For
example,
> he knows that the Third Law of Motion states that for every action there
is
> an equal and opposite reaction. This knowledge is true in the sense that
this
> is indeed what the Third Law of Motion states, irrespective of whether the
> Law itself is true.
Omar is not here discussing the knowledge claims made by Np
but, at best, the knowledge claims involved in
reporting the knowledge claims made by Np. Clearly we can accurately report
the knowledge claims of Np even if the knowledge claims of Np are themselves
false. But the accuracy of such reports does not tell us, and is irrelevant to,
whether Np itself constitutes “knowledge”. Even should we accept the
stipulative view that there can be no such thing as “false knowledge”, we may
accept that there may be “knowledge of” false claims or false propositions (as
Walter indicates): we may have, for example, true knowledge of what is the
content of those false claims, and of who made them, and when etc.
Omar’s post is on matters that may be admitted by either
side in any discussion of whether there can be “false knowledge”. These matters
are irrelevant to the issue. We could of course raise the issue of “false
knowledge” in terms of whether false reports of knowledge claims, e.g. a false
account of Np, may
constitute “knowledge” of any sort. But in terms of what is at stake
philosophically, there is no advantage in shifting from discussion of the
falsity of Np to discussion of the falsity of reports of Np – and there is the
likely disadvantage of confusing or over-complicating the issues.
My suggestion remains that Newton’s physics is as good as an
example as any for examining whether there can be “false knowledge”.
It might help here for others to indicate how resistant they
are to the claim that Newton’s physics is false: this may indicate how much the
discussion should first focus on examining the alleged falsity of Newton’s
physics? For example, does anyone wish to deny that the experiments famously
conducted by Eddington (and their subsequent validation through experimental
re-examination) produced results that were inconsistent with Newton’s physics
though they were consistent with Einstein’s? Does anyone further wish to deny
that the inconsistency amounted to showing that Newton’s physics was false in
the respect in which Np would predict a different observable outcome?
Of course, all those who simply rest on a stipulation that
there is no such thing as “false knowledge” should also indicate this: for them,
there is no point in demonstrating Np to be false as part of any argument that
there can be “false knowledge”, for they will simply insist that in so far as
Np is false then it is not “knowledge” of any sort.
Yet their insistence that Newton’s physics is not “knowledge”
of any sort may nevertheless be taken as a reductio
ad absurdum of their stipulative stance.
Donal
Wishing everyone a Happy Christmas
Salop
On Tuesday, 24 December 2013, 16:23, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
wrote:
I submit that the idea of "false knowledge" is self-contradictory. If I k-that
P, then P can't be false. If P is false, then I don't/can't k-that P. (Although
I can of course k-that P is false.)
Let's not conflate k-that and k-about or k-of (the latter 2 in the "familiar
sense of k" or "k by acquaintance" as per Russell). I can k-of or k-about, be
familiar with, all sorts of accounts. That does not mean I k-that anything.
Try this: I may claim to k-that natural selection is different from sexual
selection in Darwin's theory. The cogency of my claim that I k-that the 2
differ depends upon whether I believe they differ. And that belief is itself
dependent/conditional epistemically upon my having the relevant justification
for that belief. Otherwise I believe irrationally.
Or not?
Walter O
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> If I say that an eight-grader knows Newtonian physics, what I probably mean
> is that e.g. he knows the laws of motion as Newton stated them. For example,
> he knows that the Third Law of Motion states that for every action there is
> an equal and opposite reaction. This knowledge is true in the sense that this
> is indeed what the Third Law of Motion states, irrespective of whether the
> Law itself is true. But if he doesn't know what the Third Law of Motion
> states, or if he states it incorrectly, then he doesn't know Newtonian
> physics. Similarly, if I say that I know the Book of Kings, I mean that I
> have studied the book and that I know its content, irrespective of whether
> the historical account in the book is true. I am still not persuaded that
> such examples represent instances of 'false knowledge', which I suspect they
> are meant to be.
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 22, 2013 8:10 PM, David Ritchie <profdritchie@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> Wensleydale, the chicken. She who is one with the Druids.
>
> David
> On Dec 22, 2013, at 1:39 AM, John McCreery wrote:
>
> > Shropshire does the trick for me. A blue sharp aged cheddar. A transcendent
> and irrefutable argument for cheese.
> >
> > John
> >
> > Sent from my iPad
> >
> >> On 2013/12/22, at 16:16, David Ritchie <profdritchie@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> I can't recall whether I believe or I know that today is the solstice.
> Wensleydale will no doubt put me right.
> >>
> >> David Ritchie,
> >> Somewhere,
> >> Heading towards the
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