[lit-ideas] Re: knowledge and belief briefly
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2013 13:10:53 -0800 (PST)
This is correct if (and only if) all propositions made by Newton are linked to
each other in the manner or logical conjunction. (P and Q) Not all statements
that stand next to each other in linguistic discourse are necessarily linked
in this manner, as I have attempted to show by the little description of Tom.
(In that example, the statements are connected thematically because they are
all about Tom, but they do not bear a conjunctive logical relation to each
other. The truth of one statement is in no way necessarily dependent on the
truth of the other.) If Newton's theories are consistently logically linked to
each other in the manner Donal claims they are, then he is right. If not, he is
not. Will leave it at this.
O.K.
On Thursday, December 26, 2013 10:47 AM, Donal McEvoy
<donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Omar wrote:- >A complex scientific paradigm like Newton's is surely
not reducible to a single proposition, but rather it is a set of propositions,
and so there is an at least theoretical possibility that it might be partially
true or partially correct.>
The suggested “theoretical possibility” is, in truth, a
logical impossibility – one that also does not follow from the premise.
Grant the premise:- Newton’s physics is “not reducible to a
single proposition, but rather it is a set of propositions”. But any
counter-example that falsifies any element of that set renders that set as a
whole false and not merely “partially false”; any counter-example therefore
renders
that set false so that the set cannot be “partially true”. The set cannot be
“partially
true” merely because elements of that set may be true, and it is a logical
confusion to suggest this. To say parts of that set are (or may be) true is
quite consistent with the set of propositions as a whole being not at all
“partially
true” but simply false; conversely, to say a set of propositions as a whole is
false is quite consistent with admitting that parts of that set are (or may be)
true.
The position is analogous to that mentioned in my previous
post as follows:-
>Of course we can take a statement like “All tables are
tables and all swans are purple” and split it into two – a false statement that
“All swans are purple” and a true statement that “All tables are tables”. But
it is just confused, logically speaking, to think this means that the statement
“All tables are tables and all swans are purple” is “partially true” and
“partially false”. It is not: the statement “All tables are tables and all
swans are purple” is simply false, even if within that false statement there is
a true statement. >
To amplify: if we sever the short statement “All tables are
tables” from the conjunction “All tables are tables and all swans are purple”,
we obtain the true (albeit tautologous) statement “All tables are tables”. But
that does not mean the conjunction of this true statement with a false
statement like “All swans are purple” is “partially true” – the
conjunction-statement
(“All tables are tables and all swans are purple”) is simply false: it is
simply false because the claim “all swans are purple” is false; and it is
logically
confused to consider such a conjunction-statement as “partially true” because
it contains within it a severable statement that if severed would be true. The
converse also holds, logically:- a disjunction-statement comprised of the two
shorter
statements (viz. “All tables are
tables or all swans are purple”) is
simply true: it is simply true because the tautologous part of this
disjunction-statement
is true; and it is logically confused to consider such a disjunction-statement
“partially
false” because it contains within it a severable statement that if severed
would be false.
The set of propositions that constitute Newton’s physics is
a conjunctive rather than disjunctive set. Any counter-example that falsifies
that set falsifies the set as a whole, so that the set is rendered simply false
by the counter-example rather than merely “partially false.” Equally, as that
set is rendered false and not merely “partially false”, that set cannot be
“partially
true” despite falsification.
Of course, there are many other questions left open by this,
including whether some severable form of Newton’s physics escapes a
falsification of some wider set of Newtonian propositions. But even in such a
case, the point still holds that the severable form will also be true or false
and cannot be instead “partially true” and “partially false”.
Where Newton’s physics proves inconsistent with an
experimental outcome, it is simply not a logical option to conclude that
Newton’s
physics is nevertheless merely “partially false”; equally, it is not a logical
option to conclude in such a case that Np nevertheless remains “partially true.”
Hope this helps clarify why Newton’s physics, as a set of
propositions, must be either true or false and cannot be “partially true” and
“partially
false.”
Donal
On Thursday, 26 December 2013, 9:39, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>Now, the physics that was used to do all that or
that would have to be used to repeat it, is, I suggest, consistent with or
identical with what Donal labels as that "false-false-false" Newtonian
physics.>
We can go further than a case where the physics "used" is "consistent with"
Newtonian physics - further, that is, than a case like Einsteinian physics
which is "consistent with" Newtonian physics to a large degree: i.e. to a large
degree Einsteinian physics ['Ep'] and Newtonian physics ['Np'] do not give
different predicted physical outcomes.
We can use Newtonian physics itself, not merely physics "consistent with" it up
to a point (as is Einstein's), to do all kinds of things. And while
Wittgenstein might be quoted or misquoted here to say it is nonsense to say so,
clearly Newtonian physics is "identical with" Newtonian physics. So we can use
what is "identical with" Np (i.e. Np itself) in all kinds of applied physics.
Not only can we but we have. As a matter of historical fact, Newtonian physics
was a foremost instrument in producing the Industrial Revolution. We could give
myriad other examples of the application of Np, many more impressive than
Richard's posted example.
But we should not for one second (whether that second is understood in terms of
time in Newtonian physics or in Einsteinian physics) confuse the usefulness of
a theory as an instrument with its truth or its degree of truth.
We can go further with this last point: imagine we produce a differential
prediction between Ep and Np and experiment produces an outcome consistent with
Ep and inconsistent with Np. We now have grounds to say Np is false - it has
been falsified by experiment. This could be so even though there is no
practical application of Ep that we can "use" where Np cannot be used instead;
and indeed it could be the case that in practice we always use Np and not Ep in
our applied physics because Np is more straightforward to use. Yet none of this
massive instrumental prowess of Np, nor its greater practical advantages from
an instrumental point of view when compared with Ep, reverses the crucial
experiment - none of this greater instrumentality means Np is true or more
truth-like than Ep. Np may be false yet more useful in practical terms than Ep.
Only a very confused and/or scientifically illiterate person would suggest that
crucial experiments, decisive between two competing theories, are, in effect,
overthrown or reversed by practical considerations as to how useful a theory is
in applied physics. Yet that seems to be the long and short of Richard's post.
Perhaps Richard's post should wear its own cap: "truly a "tempest in a (tiny,
tiny) teacup" of practically
irrelevant, wrong-headed philosophizing of the worst stripe"?
Donal
On Thursday, 26 December 2013, 2:22, Richard Henninge
<RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Let's get this straight: Newtonian physics (Np) is
"[f]alse. False. False-false-false. False as false can be," according to
Donal.
Then consider this: of recent memory, Chinese
physicists managed to launch a rocket from the surface of the earth carrying as
payload, among other things, a lunar rover-type vehicle, cameras and various
other pieces of scientific equipment, and managed to land that payload in
operating condition on the surface of the moon. Wittgenstein famously said in
the first proposition of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus that "[t]he world
is
everything that is the case." As a thought experiment, imagine everything that
had to be the case from an hour before blast-off to an hour after the landing.
Picture it to yourself as a sort of three-dimensional cartoon along the actual
timeline of the days on which the actual events occurred. Imagine that every
piece of equipment could be modeled to be as close to functionally identical to
the equipment that was actually used. Or, what is practically-speaking the same
thing, simply imagine the actual equipment that was actually used.
Now, the physics that was used to do all that or
that would have to be used to repeat it, is, I suggest, consistent with or
identical with what Donal labels as that "false-false-false" Newtonian
physics. Np is not only "partially true, or true under certain conditions";
there are only extremely limited circumstances in which it doesn't "hold" (I
would prefer to say) apparently--subatomically, i.e. below the order of
magnitude of the atom and in relation to objects in motion at or approaching
the
speed of light. I doubt if any of the scientists on the project or involved in
a
future similar endeavor to the moon or Mars is even, nor need
be, conversant with Eddington's results or relativity theory or quantum
physics. Proof enough of this would be to see whether any correction reflecting
twentieth-century physical "discoveries" is reflected in the computer programs
used to carry out such a feat.
Wittgenstein, the "Austrian engineer," worked on
kites and a newly invented jet-propulsion engine. All he needed to explain that
was Newtonian physics. There comes a point at which one realizes that,
analogous
to the world inside the atom, the "revolutionary impact on philosophy [of, say,
Eddington's findings] via Popper's philosophy of science and theory of
knowledge," is truly a "tempest in a (tiny, tiny) teacup" of practically
irrelevant, wrong-headed philosophizing of the worst stripe, perhaps in
particular in the philosophy of science and theory of knowledge, well worthy of
Wittgenstein's Golden Poker Award.
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
>So one experimental result that is incompatible with Newtonian physics (where
>that physics makes claims that hold throughout the whole physical universe),
>is enough to show Np is false – not merely “partially false” and not merely
>so we can claim Np is nevertheless “at least partially true, or true under
>certain conditions”. False. False. False-false-false. False as false can be.
>
>This is why Eddington’s experiments were so important. There was more at
>stake than merely showing that Newton’s physics was now only “partially true,
>or true under certain conditions”. What Eddington’s results appeared to show
>was that the Newtonian physics under test was false. That meant that physics
>was false even in the myriad cases where it was proven consistent with the
>experimental outcome.
>
>
>
>Now that is something with potentially revolutionary impact on the direction
>of scientific theorising, testing and research. It also had a revolutionary
>impact on philosophy via Popper's philosophy of science and theory of
>knowledge.
>
>
>Donal
>
>
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