[lit-ideas] Re: Popperian Jurisprudence [Amended]
- From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2012 20:35:10 -0700
Omar
the post itself is as unnecessarily lengthy and equivocal as any legal
ruling ever. Would it be possible to edit ?
Donal
Yesterday I wrote:
âBut there is something that links (a) and (b) of my post:-â
I should have written âBut there is something that links (1) and (2) of
my post:-â
Similar confusions of numbers and letters then continued in yesterdayâs
post.
Below is an attempt to correct these confusions, while taking the
opportunity to add a few more points and changes:-
If you look at the case [/Pilcher v Rawlins/] that (in English law) is
authority for the rule at (2) (that a buyer of a house in good faith
from a dishonest trustee takes ownership free of the trust), you will
find no explanation for this rule in terms such as discussed at (2) in
my post. In fact, there is scant explanation for the decision at all: in
the /Pilcher v Rawlins/ judgment, the rule is not located within a
framework of comparable rules [such as the common law rule that a buyer
of stolen property does not acquire a good title, and exceptions to this
like the 'market overt' rule]; still less is the decision explained as a
result of weighing up the consequences of deciding it one way or another
(so 'incentivising the party most able to prevent loss', as per (2)(b)
of my post, is not even implicitly a consideration). Instead, we find at
the end of the case that the plaintiff [the beneficiary of the trust who
was suing to get the house back] was "non-suited":- this tells us that
the result was not "judgment for the defendant" (on a matter which was
within the jurisdiction of the court - to decide for the plaintiff or
for the defendant), but that the court was ruling that _it had no
jurisdiction_ to do what the plaintiff wanted, which was to order the
defendant [the honest buyer of the house] to convey it to the plaintiff
or hold it for the plaintiff [as beneficiary of a trust to which its
legal ownership was subject].
Now what does this tell us (jurisprudentially speaking)?
It's long been my secret desire to reform, or at least to clarify,
British jurisprudence. Unfortunately, my doctor has given me only
twenty-five years to live (from 18 October 2012), and has suggested that
I look for the ultimate cause of the Hadron's being a Hadron and not a
mere grafitto on the face of time, which, she assures me is an easier
and more worthy task.
I've hired twelve pre-schoolers to march through the Oxford Botanical
Gardens, every Thursday evening, to search for such partially decisive
actions and events, yet in need of validation, as, e.g. when a player
touches the chess piece she's about to move but does not reveal its
ultimate destination. Whether its 'ultimate destination' is determined
observationally or by interrogating the player has no clear answer.
Does it, for example, invalidate the arguments at (2), as these do not
feature at all as considerations in the judgment given in /Pilcher v
Rawlins/? Not necessarily, or even ânot at allâ*/**: for these
arguments/considerations may well, in some shape or form, have been
decisive (or partially decisive) but not mentioned in the judgment; and
we might also bear in mind that what is said at (2) is far from
exhaustive of what arguments and considerations might logically affect
Robert Paul
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