[lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Realm
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2013 09:18:38 +0100 (BST)
Thanks for this post re Hartmann. Of particular interest is whether some of
Hartmann's "four laws" would be accepted, even in a modified form, by Popper. I
do not know enough to be sure I am not misunderstanding Hartmann but offer
brief off the cuff comments.
>1.The law of recurrence: Lower categories recur in the higher levels as a
subaspect of higher categories, but never vice versa.>
I think Popper prefers to use one level as a 'basis' for another but without
mixing 'levels': and if this is what is meant by saying lower categories are a
"subaspect of higher categories" it may be unobjectionable to Popper. But the
expression "lower categories recur in the higher levels" might be taken to
suggest the presence of the lower in the higher in a way that mixes levels -
and this may be a recipe for confusion. It is one thing to say that brain
states are the physical basis of mental contents but another to say that the
physics of the brain is 'present' in the mental content.
>2.The law of modification: The categorial elements modify in their
recurrence in the higher levels (they are shaped by the characteristics of the
higher levels).>
If this is suggesting for example that physical elements aquire mental
characteristics, then Popper would - I think - object. We are just mixing
categories. It is another thing to argue that, while physical elements never
acquire mental characteristics, downward causation by World 2 on World 1 may
mean that physical World 1 characteristics of the brain may be 'shaped' by
mental events: and this may be true of the brain's evolution as a physical
organ as well as as of the rather less permanent aspect of the brain as a
substrate - or holding bay - for mental events.
>3.The law of the novum: The higher category is composed of a diversity of
lower elements, but it is a specific novum that is not included in the lower
levels.>
Here again Hartmann's language tends to mix 'levels'. For Popper the mental
category has content of a different order to any kind of merely physical
content. This is brought out in his W123 theory which emphasises how certain
World 2 content is dependent on World 3 content: as that World 3 content is not
merely physical content, this moves World 2 further away from its (original)
'basis' in World 1.
>4.The law of distance between levels: Since the different levels do not
develop continuously but in leaps, they can be clearly distinguished.>
Popper sees continuity in the development from one level to another from the
evolutionary POV - even if there is a 'leap' in other terms [as indicated,
there is continuity of a physical kind between the insect's wing as
thermo-dynamic to aero-dynamic, but the change of purpose may be a leap in
other terms].
Of course, there is a sense that all evolution involves leaps - a mutation is a
leap. But the leaps tend to be very gradual. Evolution is a gradual
accumulation of tiny leaps.
While agreeing that "different levels...can be clearly distinguished", Popper
might find it somewhat unnecessary and perhaps pretentious to describe this as
a "law of distance". In Popper's view this field of speculation is unavoidably
one of substantive metaphysics - but we should not dress up our metaphysical
speculation in pseudo-scientific clothes. Speaking of a "law" here, as Hartmann
does in the above examples, may be such dressing.
Donal
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