[lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Realm, Popper's Three Worlds, Hartmann's Four Levels
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2013 08:47:15 -0400 (EDT)
Grice's Realm, Popper's Three Worlds, Hartmann's Four Levels.
I'm changing slightly the header, since I was pleased that McEvoy found
Hartmann of interest, and he merits a subject-line of his own, this Hartmann.
In a message dated 6/15/2013 6:18:46 A.M. UTC-02,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes in "Re: Grice's Realm":
"Thanks for this post re Hartmann."
In re-reading the post, I note that Hartmann nicely uses the word
'category', which is perhaps NOT one that Grice would use at _that_ point.
Recall
that Hartmann speaks of "level" (or German equivalent), and of 'categorial
shifts', or something, between these four 'levels' of the 'real world'
(another expression, as per title of Hartmann's book, that Grice would NOT use
as freely).
McEvoy:
"Of particular interest is whether some of Hartmann's "four laws" would be
accepted, even in a modified form, by Popper."
Indeed. I found the idea by Hartmann of a very 'law' interesting. For he is
postulating diverse four levels, and YET, quite philosopher, discovers
some 'regularities' that apply to the four levels and formulates them in
'laws'. Note that he is doing this as a _philosopher_, rather than a
scientist,
which should fascinate Grice.
Incidentally, it may do to revise the vocabulary of the levels, since it is
so telling. I love Hartmann using a corresponding adjective for
'soul-like' for the psychological level.
SCHICHT I: anorganische Schicht
SCHICHT II: organische Schicht
SCHICHT III: seelische Schicht
SCHICHT IV: geistige Schicht.
Note that Level IV is 'ghost-like', and an interesting concept. What is the
difference between a 'soul' and a 'ghost'? Did the Greeks have a
distinction for this Germanic one? And so on.
McEvoy:
"I do not know enough to be sure I am not misunderstanding Hartmann but
offer brief off the cuff comments."
The first comment refers to a law that Harmann calls "of recurrence",
namely:
"A lower category recurs in a higher level as a
sub-aspect of a higher category, but never vice versa."
McEvoy comments:
"I think Popper prefers to use one level as a 'basis' for another but
without mixing 'levels': and if this is what is meant by saying lower
categories
are a "subaspect of higher categories" it may be unobjectionable to
Popper."
Indeed, it is not clear what Harmann mean by subaspect. He must be talking
of
-- a subaspect of the soul-like in the ghost-like: very complex this. The
emotional nature of something as cold as beyond-psychological-processing
copy of Michelangelo's "Davide" say.
-- a supaspect of the organic in the soul-like. This may be what
psychologists refer to as the psychosomatic. The interaction of organic
processes in
the psychological (This is crucial for Hartmann to postulate FOUR rather
than 3, or 1 levels.
-- a subaspect of the inorganic in the organic. The fact that living
substance is composed of chemical elements.
The idea of a 'subaspect' seems subjectivistic enough. It seems it's a
matter of _seeing_ a level N as 'composed' of more basic level N-1 items.
McEvoy goes on to comment on this 'recurrence' law:
"But the expression "lower categories recur in the higher levels" might be
taken to suggest the presence of the lower in the higher in a way that
mixes levels - and this may be a recipe for confusion. It is one thing to say
that brain states are the physical basis of mental contents but another to
say that the physics of the brain is 'present' in the mental content."
Well, yet, I do think that if we do not take an interpretation of
Hartmann's 'subaspect' as a 'mere way of talking', the very point that he uses
'recurrence' for this may be telling.
It may connect with what philosophers (such as R. M. Hare) refer to as
'supervenience'. Grice is a functionalist and does not talk of supervenience
much, but would say that a psychological process is a 'function' of a
nonpsychological dyad (perceptual input, behavioural output). But most
ontologists find occasion to discuss even further what we mean by 'recurrence'
(as in
Hartmann), supervenience, or 'being present' (as per McEvoy's wording
above).
McEvoy then refers to the second law, of "modification".
Namely:
"The categorial elements modify in their recurrence in the higher levels
(they are shaped by the characteristics of the higher levels)."
Note that the phrase 'categorial element' is rather tricky. For it suggests
that this inter-categorial levels share a basic 'categorial structure'
that is composed of these 'categorial elements'.
McEvoy comments:
"If this is suggesting for example that physical elements acquire mental
characteristics, then Popper would - I think - object."
"We are just mixing categories."
Mmm. Perhaps we should start with the higher categories. There is a
ghost-like element CONTAINS a soul-like element, but the 'soul-like' element
gets
MODIFIED if we see it as a subaspect of the ghost-like element. A work of
art, for example, is meant to produce a response, a psychological response
-- say, compassion -- in the addressee. This is merely soul-like. But a
theorist in aesthetics has to elaborate on this 'compassion' in terms OTHER
than merely individualistic psychological, when he sets to define or describe
the piece of art (now seen as a ghost-like element). He must generalise
over specific compassions, held by different addressees at different times and
occasions, etc.
I think Hartmann is merey abiding by something like Austin, "Modification,
Aberration". No modification without aberration. For what would be the
point of alleging a new level if there is not going to be some MODIFICATION?
McEvoy continues to comment on this law of 'modification':
"It is another thing to argue that, while physical elements never acquire
mental characteristics, downward causation by World 2 on World 1 may mean
that physical World 1 characteristics of the brain may be 'shaped' by mental
events: and this may be true of the brain's evolution as a physical organ
as well as of the rather less permanent aspect of the brain as a substrate -
or holding bay - for mental events."
I don't think that Hartmann is referring to this 'down-ward' aspect. But it
is true that the psychological causation on the physical realm is an
interesting phenomenon that may connect with this 'modification'. For only
because the ghost-like is a MODIFIED subaspect of the lower level of the
organic
may EXPLAIN WHY the ghost-like has this POWER to produce an EFFECT on the
lower level (the physiology of the brain).
McEvoy then turns to the third 'law' of the "novum", to wit:
"The higher category is composed of a diversity of lower elements, but it
is a specific novum that is not included in the lower levels."
Note 'included', "reduced" (as per Grice's distinction between 'reductive'
that he supports vs. 'reductionist' that he doesn't).
Hartmann:
"The higher category is composed of a diversity of lower elements, but it
is a specific novum that is not included in the lower levels."
McEvoy:
"Here again Hartmann's language tends to mix 'levels'. For Popper the
mental category has content of a different order to any kind of merely
physical
content. This is brought out in his W123 theory which emphasises how
certain World 2 content is dependent on World 3 content: as that World 3
content
is not merely physical content, this moves World 2 further away from its
(original) 'basis' in World 1.
Yes, Hartmann seems to be underestimating the causal influence of a higher
level on a lower one. But note that the emphasis, as this complements the
'recurrence' and the 'modification', is on the 'novum' -- and this HARDLY
seems to mix levels. I think one cannot emphasise enough the very point of
Hartmann's choice, 'novum' -- the 'new'. He is saying that 'life' is NOT good
old inorganic level -- where 'old' is very appropriate -- but something
opposite to 'old': "new". Similarly, the soul is not good old organic
(vital?) stuff, but a NEW "thing". And the 'ghost' is not the good old soul,
but
something new. In the case of Popper's downward causation of w3 on w2, as we
have seen, we are not devoid of problematic elements. A 'ghost-like' item,
like what we mean by 'infinite', say, is said to cause a psychological
event (as that suffered by Euclid when he discovered his theorem), and this
causation of the 'new' onto the 'old' is admittedly something that Hartmann
never seems to have cared much about.
McEvoy finally addresses the four 'law', of "distance" between levels.
To wit:
"Since the different levels do not
develop continuously but in leaps, they can be clearly distinguished."
This relates to the very point that brought Hartmann to this forum,
motivated by McEvoy's reference to the 'seismic'.
McEvoy comments on Hartmann's 'distance between levels':
-- "Since the different levels do not
develop continuously but in leaps, they can be clearly distinguished" --
"Popper sees continuity in the development from one level to another from
the evolutionary POV - even if there is a 'leap' in other terms."
Here McEvoy provides an interesting illustration:
"As indicated, there is continuity of a physical kind between the insect's
wing as thermo-dynamic to aero-dynamic, but the change of purpose may be a
leap in other terms."
Here the talk of 'purpose' seems crucial, and for the record, I should note
that some refer to Grice's programme as 'teleo-functional' (a bit of a
hybrid, linguistically, but there you have).
I think the distinction by Hartmann between a continuum and a leap needs to
be stressed. Philosophers like Popper and Grice indeed may prefer an
'evolutionary continuum', but I think Hartmann's 'leap' is pointing to the
philosopher's puzzlement in realising that a level N represents something new
from lower levels N-1, and that an explanation that is valid in level N-1 is
NO longer valid in the level N. A continuum interpretation seems consistent
with, say, mechanistic explanations of vitalism (say): a 'leap'-based
construal requires, precisely, another type of explanation that is NOT seen as
a mere tweak of an old explanation that is found adequate for a lower
level.
McEvoy continues:
"Of course, there is a sense that all evolution involves leaps - a
mutation is a leap. But the leaps tend to be very gradual. Evolution is a
gradual
accumulation of tiny leaps."
But a mutation seems to be a leap within a level. And Hartmann is talking
of the crucial leaps between levels: when inorganic became organic, the
organic became soul-like, and the soul-like became ghost-like. Similarly,
anthropologists may argue against Hartmann re: the leap between the
psychological and the 'cultural' (ghost-like) for it may be argued that in homo
sapiens, the very 'soul' of man is shaped by 'nurture' and not just 'nature',
and
that there is a reciprocity between the psychological and the cultural
("zoon politikon" of Aristotle, man as a political animal). Only in a scheme
where the psychological can be defined in terms OTHER than constructively
cultural does the point about a 'leap' taking place between the psychological
and the now new level of the 'cultural' seems to make sense.
McEvoy further comments on Hartmann's 'law of distance between levels':
"While agreeing that "different levels...can be clearly distinguished",
Popper might find it somewhat unnecessary and perhaps pretentious to describe
this as a "law of distance"".
Well, the very idea of a 'law' here seems controversial, in that they seem
to be regularities arrived at by the philosopher upon reflection, rather
than empirical generalisations. We may revise the audience Hartmann was
addressing, and forgive him for this or that 'pretentiousness' in his choice
of
epithets for this or that reflection on 'the levels of the real world'.
McEvoy closes his interesting post:
"In Popper's view this field of speculation is unavoidably one of
substantive metaphysics - but we should not dress up our metaphysical
speculation
in pseudo-scientific clothes. Speaking of a "law" here, as Hartmann does in
the above examples, may be such dressing."
This may refer to our previous commentary on science vs. metaphysics in
Popper and Grice (hypostasis, hypothesis or rather, hypostasis for
metaphysics, and hypothesis for science). For it may be argued that the
vocabulary is
originally METAPHYSICAL, as when we speak of 'arkhai' or principles. The
vocabulary was created in Greek and Latin before the advent of science, and
so it is not necessary to think that the choice of a word like 'law' is
pseudo-scientific in nature. At most, it may reflect what Russell, jokingly,
but Grice took the joke up, referred to as a 'Stone-Age Physic", "Stone-Age
metaphysic".
It may do to reconsider the claims of what McEvoy calls 'substantive
metaphysics' (as opposed to 'revisionary'?) and wonder why the metaphysician
(who is not merely a diagnostic realist who abides by the deliverances of
science) need to control his choice of words. Or not.
Cheers,
Speranza
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