Stuart thanks. This indeed covers what I wanted to say.Language appears a never ending puzzle with pieces that fit in themselves when necessary but taking their names with them. *How many senses of "think" are there? I would agree that there are many, and that many may be quite different from one another. Moreover, I would note that there are some words whose meanings are much harder to pin down. *Like W's chesspieces idea? A Knight and a Bishop must do different moves but both are chesspieces bound to a chessboard. Some chesspieces transform on the board when needed and become a Bishoplyknight. Mind is such a 'hydro-formic' word. Fits the situation and attaches to 'think'. I look at my toaster and say ... I think it is hot enough. Thinking and knowing also are hydro-form friends so it seems. What is the difference between I know X and I think I know X. 'Think' here introduces doubt. But is that the same think as 'think' from the toaster example? Also, I think when I say I know. I know I think is thinking and knowing that one thinks but the latter is thinking too. Nevertheless: I think I know is different from I know I think. So knowing is a part of machine thinking. Why can't we say my toaster knows my intention to toast a sandwich. It is making all the preparations to answer a question namely ... can you toast this sandwich? Yes => hot enough, No => not hot enough. But Yes/ No answers can be based on rule-based machine behavior ... that is not thinking? Can there be intelligent toasters? Whoever did say that toasters could not think ;-). Hm,.., I think I go toast a sandwich after this Wittgenstein immitation act. Would W have asked why a toaster cannot think? Han On 21 June 2011 16:15, SWM <swmirsky@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Han Geurdes <wittrs@...> wrote: > > > > Thanks. I read that Wittgenstein was concerned with things like > 'following a > > rule'. f(n) = 2n + 1, is such a mathematical rule. When is this thinking > in > > your x-grammar ( for instance it is not thinking in neurological grammar > but > > it is in psychological grammar or in mathematical) and when is it like > what > > a machine can do. Do we have a grammar that allows you to say the machine > > thinks in his grammar but I do not allow this to be called thinking in my > > own Han-and-Sean--define-thinking grammar of it ? Han and Stuart can > share a > > grammar and call it thinking but then Sean enters and says... hey fellows > > that is not thinking becuse in my grammar ..... or do we have general > > categorical grammars? No personal Han-and-Sean grammars but > > science-this-and-that grammars? Then Stuart comes from Yes-it-is-thinking > > grammar and you from No-it-is-not. What have we gained? > > > > > > Not much, I'd say, Han. > > Sean rightly points out Wittgenstein's notion that language plays many > different roles (consists of many different language games) and a word that > means X in one situation may mean Y in another, such that there isn't a > necessary commonality between them except, perhaps, for some historical > affinities, some overlapping connections (family likenesses), some factual > elements which govern and constrain us as language users, etc. > > But I don't think that can answer your question, nor do I think that > Wittgenstein would have simply said it's all a matter of what anyone chooses > to mean as Sean seems to me to be suggesting. For language to work it must > be a group enterprise which means there must be a mechanism (or mechanisms) > to allow for shared meanings. Otherwise there can be no real understanding. > That means the discipline of learning and adhering to common rules of usage. > This doesn't mean we shouldn't explore those rules when questions like this > arise. But it does mean, I think, that we cannot simply settle on an answer > that it's all rule driven and thereafter ignore the differences or > similarities. THAT can't solve these kinds of questions (what do we mean by > "think" and can we just assume we each mean something different whenever we > disagree). > > I would say that it's meaningful to expect some commonality in our uses and > to attend to these as much as we attend to and emphasize the divergences. > > How many senses of "think" are there? I would agree that there are many, > and that many may be quite different from one another. Moreover, I would > note that there are some words whose meanings are much harder to pin down. I > think words about our mental lives fall into this category quite clearly. We > speak of minds as if we are denoting things in the way we denote baseballs > or rivers (terms whose meanings are relatively easy to pin down, even given > multiple senses. > > But the fact that a word like "mind" has the form (the grammar) of > designating a thing looks to be misleading. It prompts us at times to > imagine (maintain a mental picture) of some especially rarified object > seated in the head, or the brain. Such a picture suggests the possibility of > co-existence and even independent existence (dualism). Yet when we look > inside the head, there's no mind to be seen. > > The word, in ordinary usage, seems to designate an array of things > including certain kinds of behaviors and certain kinds of experience we > have. Since I go with Wittgenstein in the notion that language is ultimately > a public enterprise, I conclude that the application of a word like "mind" > (or "thinking," for that matter) is mainly in the public sphere, i.e., it's > used in relation to certain criterial facts we observe in the world (the > behaviors). But I think it's pretty clear that we also mean by such terms > what we experience subjectively, within the context of our mental lives. > > The feelings and motives and thoughts we have all seem to be part of what > we mean by a word like "mind" in this sense. And we typically relate these > private elements to the observed behaviors of the publicly driven usage. > > Chalmers suggests, rightly I think, that we have a dual understanding of, > or dual usage for, mental words, though, with Wittgenstein, I think we have > to recognise that the public usages take precedence. As such, words like > "thinking" and "mind" can be hard to pin down because of their private > referents that cannot be easily extricated from the public ones. > > So what do we mean by "think"? Is it the calculations a machine like a > computer does? Is it sophisticated programs, consisting of such calculating, > which enable these kinds of machines to make choices according to different > data received, seemingly mimicking the kind of considerations and choices we > humans make everyday? Is it such activity accompanied by an array of other > features (mental pictures, being aware, complex associations of ideas)? If > so, can these be produced computationally or are computer processes forever > barred from this achievement (as some, like Searle, seem to think and as > many of us may want to think)? > > In a certain sense ALL are variants of what we mean by "think", on my view, > but this is only because thinking is not a particular thing but only a > "thing" in a more general sense of the latter word (i.e., as an object of > reference). Thinking is sometimes understood as a process (the stream of > thoughts qua mental steps we take when we think something through, say) but > THAT process is not the same thing as whatever brain processes underlie > instances of thinking in us, despite the use of the same word "process", in > both cases. > > So my view is that it is meaningful to ask what we mean by "think" (always > as long as we're attending to the contexts in which the word is used) and > that we expect to come up with enough commonality in usage to enable us to > share the meaning of the term and thereby understand one another. If not, if > we cannot share meanings, what's the point? > > SWM > > > > > > > On 21 June 2011 09:07, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote: > > > > > (Han) > > > > > > ... my sense is twofold. (1) to the extent that these things appear > > > different, they constitute senses of "think," each of which bear family > > > resemblance to one another. (2) Science finds information about the > matter > > > that introduces technical grammar into the the language game, for > whatever > > > purposes those grammars serve. To understand "think," one must > understand > > > its uses in the language game and the information that arrives about it > from > > > science (or whomever). > > > > > > And if a way of speaking comes along to say that X "thinks," no matter > what > > > it purportedly said, it would seem to be confined to its sense and > dependent > > > upon the information it was conveying. Imagine you say to yourself: > "I'm not > > > thinking today." Or, "my thoughts aren't working." And someone else > says: > > > "My parrot thinks." Neither of these ideas could be said to be > > > contradictory; they all say something meaningful. > > > > > > So I guess when you ask "what is think," we must ask back: what do you > want > > > to know? What neurological grammar says about it? What psychological > grammar > > > does? (I don't know these answers). Think how silly it would be for > science > > > to say "the parrot doesn't 'think,'" when so much capital is exchanged > in > > > the language marketplace with such an expression. I guess the real > question > > > is this: how do technical senses of "think" differ from ordinary > senses, if > > > at all? (Cf., "motion." -- the lay sense versus that of particles and > so > > > forth). > > > > > > > > > Regards and thanks. > > > > > > Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Wright State University > > > Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org > > > SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx > > > Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Wittrs mailing list > > > Wittrs@... > > > http://undergroundwiki.org/mailman/listinfo/wittrs_undergroundwiki.org > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Wittrs mailing list > > Wittrs@... > > http://undergroundwiki.org/mailman/listinfo/wittrs_undergroundwiki.org > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Wittrs mailing list > Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://undergroundwiki.org/mailman/listinfo/wittrs_undergroundwiki.org > >