Indeed Stuart, if aliens were created out of Silicon and not Carbon would they count as thinking machines? On 20 June 2011 16:25, SWM <swmirsky@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote: > > > > [corrected version] > > > > > > 'Is it possible for a machine to think?' ... the trouble > > which is expressed in this question is not really that we > > don't yet know a machine which could do the job. The > > question is not analogous to that which someone might > > have asked a hundred years ago: 'Can a machine liquify > > gas?' The trouble is rather that the sentence, 'A machine > > thinks (perceives, wishes)' seems somehow nonsensical. > > It is as though we had asked 'Has the number 3 a > > colour?' (BB 47) > > > > But a machine surely cannot think! - Is that an empirical > > statement? No. We only say of a human being and what > > is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no > > doubt of spirits too. Look at the word 'to think' as a tool. > > (PI §360) > > > > SW > > And the issue, Sean, would be whether a machine can be like us in a > relevant way. Say a machine were built to speak to us in a thoughtful and > autonomous way. (By "autonomous" I mean without being pre-programmed to give > certain answers to certain questions under certain conditions.) Now we have > a machine that is like us in a relevant way. Maybe it lacks a body like ours > (it's not Commander Data). Maybe it lacks all our sensory capabilities > because of different equipment to which it is attached. But if it has enough > sensory capability to share enough of our world and language capability (for > putting information into words we can understand) AND it has the capacity to > learn and think about what it encounters and has learned, then if it > answered questions intelligibly (without being programmed to the question, > as it were) then what would the problem be? > > Is it that "think" or "understand" are not simple terms with simple > meanings? Well that's fine because a great many of our terms are not, even > when applied to entities like ourselves. > > Would you make the case that Wittgenstein, in the above passages, was > saying that it makes no sense to say of a machine that it thinks? > > But what about an ape, many of which have shown clear thinking behaviors. > Or dogs? What about an alien organism from another planet? Could we not > think of it as thinking merely because it is sharply different from > ourselves? > > If any of these can be said to think, why not a machine, too? Of course > this is not to say that it would make sense to say of any old machine that > it's thinking! My toaster certainly shows no signs of contemplation before > browning my bread. Nor does my pc. But why would we not be able to say of > some machines that they think, even if there are no such examples as of now? > > SWM > > > _______________________________________________ > Wittrs mailing list > Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://undergroundwiki.org/mailman/listinfo/wittrs_undergroundwiki.org > >