Re: [Wittrs] Wittgenstein on Machines and Thinking
- From: Han Geurdes <han.geurdes@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2011 14:12:03 +0200
Thanks. I read that Wittgenstein was concerned with things like 'following a
rule'. f(n) = 2n + 1, is such a mathematical rule. When is this thinking in
your x-grammar ( for instance it is not thinking in neurological grammar but
it is in psychological grammar or in mathematical) and when is it like what
a machine can do. Do we have a grammar that allows you to say the machine
thinks in his grammar but I do not allow this to be called thinking in my
own Han-and-Sean--define-thinking grammar of it ? Han and Stuart can share a
grammar and call it thinking but then Sean enters and says... hey fellows
that is not thinking becuse in my grammar ..... or do we have general
categorical grammars? No personal Han-and-Sean grammars but
science-this-and-that grammars? Then Stuart comes from Yes-it-is-thinking
grammar and you from No-it-is-not. What have we gained?
On 21 June 2011 09:07, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> (Han)
>
> ... my sense is twofold. (1) to the extent that these things appear
> different, they constitute senses of "think," each of which bear family
> resemblance to one another. (2) Science finds information about the matter
> that introduces technical grammar into the the language game, for whatever
> purposes those grammars serve. To understand "think," one must understand
> its uses in the language game and the information that arrives about it from
> science (or whomever).
>
> And if a way of speaking comes along to say that X "thinks," no matter what
> it purportedly said, it would seem to be confined to its sense and dependent
> upon the information it was conveying. Imagine you say to yourself: "I'm not
> thinking today." Or, "my thoughts aren't working." And someone else says:
> "My parrot thinks." Neither of these ideas could be said to be
> contradictory; they all say something meaningful.
>
> So I guess when you ask "what is think," we must ask back: what do you want
> to know? What neurological grammar says about it? What psychological grammar
> does? (I don't know these answers). Think how silly it would be for science
> to say "the parrot doesn't 'think,'" when so much capital is exchanged in
> the language marketplace with such an expression. I guess the real question
> is this: how do technical senses of "think" differ from ordinary senses, if
> at all? (Cf., "motion." -- the lay sense versus that of particles and so
> forth).
>
>
> Regards and thanks.
>
> Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
> Assistant Professor
> Wright State University
> Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
> SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx
> Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs
>
>
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