[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's paradigm shift.
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 03:35:27 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > What is it to be "physically detected"?
>
> Directly with the senses. At times with instruments. At times
> indirectly. Scat. Cloud chamber of a cyclotron.
>
Ah yes, and at times with reports from others, at times from observing
behaviors.
> >Why should not being able to "see" into another's mind be thought of as
> any different?
>
> Because, as you say, the mind is no entity. It exist no where.
Where is the gravity of the earth? Well we can feel it or at least infer it is
there because we don't go floating off into space and it takes a lot of boost
to get a rocket into orbit. It's there, sure enough, because we can see its
effects and those effects are explained by calling them features of this thing
called gravity. Why think that subjectness, being conscious isn't conceivable
that way? The mind isn't a parallel brain, right? But it is entirely dependent
on a physical platform (the brain) to be. So if it doesn't co-exist with that
platform where is it? Where is the gravity that holds us to the earth?
>There is
> no literal sense of "into." You can just as easily say "I understand
> you." It is an entirely different language game from physics.
>
Then why be concerned that we can't access another's subjectness or share our
own (except indirectly by telling or showing)? Why should it matter to the
understanding of what consciousness is and how it relates to brains then that
we can't locate it by certain directly observable properties as we can with
rocks and trees and beach balls?
But look, Bruce, aren't we still going round and round the same merry-go-round
(for the nth time on these lists)? Other than Budd you are probably the
interlocutor with whom I have had the longest discussion with. Isn't it obvious
by now where we each stand? What is the point of saying the same things over
and over and over again? Are we likely to make things any clearer than we
already have to one another? Convince one another?
I think all the evidence is against such a possibility!
> > If subjectivity exists it's a phenomenon in the universe
>
> Again, you are confusing the use of "exist" as in "my wife exists" with
> the use of exist in "I exist to please my wife."
>
Am I? Would you be comfortable saying subjectivity doesn't exist in the
universe? That there are no entities which have subjectivity? If you would I
suggest you could get away with a claim of linguistic confusion. But if you
can't honestly say you would be comfortable taking such a position, then there
is no confusion at work here.
People exist and people have minds therefore minds exist. Creatures exist and
they have a subjective dimension (to varying degrees) therefore subjectivit
exists. Nothing strange or confused in this.
> > If it's a phenomenon in the universe then why should we presume that
> it can only be encountered in the way
> > we encounter sticks and stones and bones?
>
> Because consciousness isn't a phenomena in the universe but the medium
> in which we can conceive of a universe, at least from a 1st person point
> of view.
If there is consciousness in the universe then it is a phenomenon in the
universe along with all the other phenomena of light and heat and
electromagnetism and gravity, etc. If it's a phenomenon then it exists along
with these other things and many, many more. NOT EVERYTHING THAT EXISTS IS A
PHYSICAL OBJECT. That is NOT a criterion for ascribing existence.
> But when you look at me, you are inclined to make my
> consciousness a feature or part of me, the way my brain is part of me,
> and then place them in a causal relation.
If the world is as I understand it, you are conscious whether I am looking at
you or not. You don't only become conscious when someone is looking your way!
> However, your use of
> consciousness as attributed to me isn't my consciousness. The causal
> relationship has to do with your theory about me but is, at best, an
> aspect of me. So, if you wish, you can say...
>
My idea of you is not you. That is true. And your idea of me is not me. So we
may have different ideas of what we are having our ideas about. That is, we may
be right or wrong about any given thing we happen to think about. But that
doesn't imply no tree has fallen in the forest!
> > ...under certain circumstances it would make perfect sense to speak of
> a brain as conscious,
>
> as when you look at my fMRI but, again, that is just a co-relational
> fact.
The idea of correlation is what underlies ascriptions of causality. That is, we
never say the cause but only speak of certain kinds of correlative occurrences
as cause and effect, others as the result of a common cause and still others as
merely coincidental. Looking at a person behaving we make certain judgments
about them, just as we make judgments about brains behaving as observed through
the appropriate equipment. The only difference is we don't generally need
special equipment with people and our judgments about people are ingrained in
us via a combination of inherited and learned dispositions, some of which are
embedded in our linguistic practices.
> And everything conscious you attribute to "the brain" is totally
> parasitic upon what I tell you is going on with me. Basically, this is
> no different from "reading my mind" from the clothing I wear or the car
> I drive.
>
There is no reason to presume the absence of access to others' subjectness
implies that something is missing in our ability to determine the presence of
that subjectness (or its absence). As Wittgenstein pointed out, our linguistic
uses are geared to such observable behaviors. The same principle of relying on
criterial indicators occurs when talking to others, listening to their reports,
using devices to gauge what is going on internally, etc. There is no
metaphysical threshold here that needs to be bridged.
> > The way is how Dennett does it, by explaining the features of
> consciousness as so many processes operating in concert
>
> tells me nothing about the transition from matter to mind.
That's because you're looking for a transition that isn't there. This only
means you continue to think there are two distinct somethings going on here
(despite your frequent denials) that require some kind of ontological bridge to
get us from one to the other. On the Dennettian view, on the other hand, there
is no such chasm and no need for such a bridge because one thing, certain kinds
of physical events, produces the subjectness we recognize in ourselves which is
just one more feature of that one thing (those events). Yes, subjectness is
different from what is known via it, but that's because we don't look at a
lense when we're looking through it.
> If he and you
> want to talk about certain brain areas as mental, fine. But everything
> "mental" you say about this computer is borrowed from mind. I see this
> as a verbal game. Not a new conception of mind.
>
As you wish. I don't and have given my reasons many times.
I note that you still insist on talking as though there are two "things", the
mental and the physical, and, because of this insistence, you want to say
Dennett's thesis fails because it doesn't show a transition from one to the
other. BUT THAT IS JUST HIS POINT. THERE AREN'T TWO THINGS AND THERE IS NO
TRANSITION. Thus there is no failure on this basis (though his thesis could be
shown to fail in other ways, e.g., by failing to account for some feature that
we all agree must be included in any description of consciousness or by failing
to lead to the successful implementation of consciousness on a synthetic
platform).
You can continue to deny being dualist in your underlying picture of mind, of
course, and in this way insist that you are not arguing for dualism. But your
claim that to speak of a causal relation between brains and minds is
unintelligible strikes me as just another stab at defending that same old
dualist presumption, i.e., that there is some kind of ontological divide
between the mental and the physical.
> > Another is the evidence of modern science itself where people like
> Dehaene and others are looking at brains to find consciousness.
>
> Is a neurological co-relation that doesn't address the philosophical
> puzzle of matter to mind. Of course, you deny mind is real...
>
Depends what you mean by "real". I certainly think my mind is real and I have
every confidence yours is, as well. But I don't think our minds are bottom
line, irreducible entities that exist in some way that separates them from the
physical platforms that give rise to them. But I already explained this (most
recently to JustinTruth). On the other hand, no amount of explanation seems
likely to reach you and that, I think, is because you are ideologically
committed to your position, i.e., I think all the evidence shows that you are
dedicated to not giving up this viewpoint of yours, no matter what I may say to
you.
Of course, you could conceivably say the same for me. But would that be right?
After all, I once held a view like Searle's and changed my mind. Of course I
can't prove that to you so you have to take my word on it I suppose. So in the
end we can each say the other is wedded to his views without possibility of
alteration. We could even both be right on that (especially because I think
it's fair to say that I am fairly wedded to my view now and in that I guess I
am not qualitatively different from you). How then to determine between our
different positions? In the end, understanding is just a matter of
understanding and no amount of argument will make a difference if the other
side doesn't get it. Nor can we take a vote since the majority cannot decide
such issues.
What to do? At a point like this I suggest we simply agree to disagree and move
on. Want to try for that?
> > If brains aren't causal of the conscious behaviors and self-reports of
> the people with them, then why bother to look there?
>
> Because we use our brains to think the way gymnasts use their toes to
> balance.
>
What else could we use to think? Do we also use our brains to be conscious the
way a gymnast uses his/her toes to balance? Are brains functionally then just
the equivalent of toes?
Aren't you using "use" with regard to brains in different senses? (I can say
for instance to someone who is stumped by a puzzle, 'think, use your brain!'
and expect a response of a sort. Maybe the person squeezes his or her eyes
shut, starts to pace, looks harder at the puzzle symbols before him or her. And
then maybe he or she solves the puzzle and says, 'thanks, that was the very
encouragement I needed!' But can I say, when someone is in a coma, use your
brain and start thinking again?!!! Will that make a difference?)
> > How do you kill the mind other than by impairing the brain?
>
> Yes, you are reflecting upon the internal relation of mind and brain.
Internal where? And what kind of relation do you have in mind? If not a causal
one then what do you think is going on, some kind of parallelism? Coexistence?
> Notice. You don't kill the brain first and later have the mind die.
Can you kill the mind and have the brain die (simultaneously or otherwise)?
What would count as killing the mind other than doing harm to the brain?
> When
> I put you in a trance, you brain changes. They are two sides of a coin.
> A conceptual coin.
>
Everything we think about is conceptual. The question is what does this
particular conception entail!
You shift from assertions of unintelligibility to allegations of two different
types of thing (physical brains and non-physical minds) which somehow must
metamorphose or transform from one to the other. How intelligible is that?
> > This is about whether consciousness can be explained in a way that is
> consistent with physicalism
>
> Depends upon what you mean by "physicalism." If you mean that we can
> give a red blooded account of C with only the accounts found in physics,
> then any fool can see it doesn't have chance.
Can they? If by this you mean that there is no chance of showing how brains
cause minds to happen in the world by certain things they do, then there must
be lots of us fools and they must include folks like Dennett and Dehaene and
me. But if you mean by only speaking about the physics without attending to
things on our level of operation then no one is suggesting that since it's the
occurrence on our level of operation that is of interest here. Once again, I
think you simply confuse different uses, in this case the idea of claiming a
physicalist picture is viable even including consciousness as a phenomenon of
the universe.
>If only mean that
> psychological (non-physical) accounts can't be inconsistent with
> physics, then have no fear. Psychological accounts are irrelevant to
> physics.
>
That reads like dogma to me.
> And the now the wheel
> > "The analogy to mind is" that the brain's operations result in certain
> kinds of behaviors of the entity with the brain
>
> A wheel turns. A brain fires. OK. Each is an event.
>
As Dehaene argues, the brain's multiple firings set up a series of patterns in
the brain across the entire organ and these firings involve information
processing and it is these complex events that have the features we associate
with what we call "consciousness". Nor is Dehaene alone in making this
argument. Edelman and Hawkins say the same. As does Dennett. As does Searle.
(Though they all differ on the details and many of the fine points.)
> > the brain in operation gives us the occurrence of subjectivity.
>
> Subjectivity isn't an event or an occurrence. My subjectivity is my
> everything. Not just one event. Either I'm conscious or not.
There are times you are conscious and times you are not and there were times in
history when you weren't and there will be times in the future when you will no
longer be. So the times you are conscious represent the occurrence of Bruce in
the world. Thus the mind of Bruce, his consciousness, his subjectness is
manifestly an occurrence in the universe.
> But, as I
> said above, you can look upon my subjectivity as an "event". "Look he is
> conscious." It is an event for you. But that event, the fMRI scan, the
> way I move and speak, are criteria for you to attribute subjectivity to
> me. But that attribution isn't what I am experiencing or who I am.
>
> This is a serious confusion.
>
> bruce
Yes but only one of us is suffering from it!
SWM
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