[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's paradigm shift.
- From: "BruceD" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 19:36:58 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
> Dennett argues that we can account for all the features we typically
associate with consciousness in ourselves
> by thinking of them in a different way, changing the paradigm.
The paradigm shift is what? A materialistic, causal account of C is as
old as the hills. The new neurology still doesn't tell us HOW brain
makes C. But there is something new here, you suggest.
> You want to say I or he have left out the transformation of a physical
phenomenon to a mental one. Fair enough.
Thanks for the recognition. But then you go on to sayy...
> But then you miss the point because we haven't left it out if one
accepts the paradigm shift.
Which is what? To deny that there we are conscious in the sense that we
have always seen ourselves. Yes, if we do that there is no B/M problem,
because there is no Mind. We've been kidding ourselves? Hmm...you
comment about D's work may help.
> Note that he says of his research at one point that "it turns out
Dennett was right".
In other words, both D's think that they have dispensed with mind by
describing everything we used to call "mental" in a material language.
Right? We use to think of feeling pain but now we say my C-fiber is
firing. We use to say "He is love" but now we say "his endorphins are
secreting. This sounds like silly word games to me. So, I misunderstand.
> His research is aimed at discovering what it is that brains do that
yield/produce/constitute/cause consciousness.
Hold on, didn't you say above that he doesn't show how brains actually
do that. One doesn't show how a C-fiber yield/produce/constitute/cause
pain by demonstrating the correlation. You've agreed time and again that
a complete description of C-fiber activity yields nothing about the pain
experience. So there is no possibility of discover. You know my
position. We can't discover how a C-fiber causes pain because the
relationship between the fiber and the experience is not causal in any
sense, but conceptual in view of the researcher.
> I have described consciousness as being an agglomeration of certain
features we recognize in ourselves,
> specifically in our subjective experience.
Surely there is no paradigm shift here, especially in the phrase
"subjective experience."
> By "we associate with" I meant (and have always meant) the things we
think of when speaking of consciousness!
Old fashion "mentalism". No? Perhaps you think me cranky, but if the
paradigm shift is away from talking about mind and consciousness as
something other than brains on fire, then you can't go back to
describing your consciousness.
> Think again of the wheel and its turning. If the wheel is an entity,
must we think its turning is, too??????
I can't see why this analogy has a hold on you. Yes, the turning is an
entity but turning is what entities do, from point A to point B. We can
"see" the turn in that we see the displacement of the wheel. But we
can't see the brain do consciousness because we don't see consciousness.
There is no analogy here beyond the fact that both C and turning aren't
entities, although turning is what an entity can do.
Another analogy,
> Here's the coin picture again: The brain's processes, its operations,
are the coin.
which we can see.
> The experiences occurring to the subject, the subjectness, are the
other (side).
It is intriguing to say that. What are we saying?
> Two sides, one coin, but each side is also itself and not the other.
Yes. And one side of a coin is a condition for there being another side
but not a causal condition. Logical? Well, in the sense that what we
mean by a coin is that it has two sides. We can also imply that,
basically, the two are the "same thing", since head and tails are
arbitrary.
In some ways this works for the brain/mind correlation. What's called
identity theory. I'm at home with that except for one nagging question.
If we describe the brain side causally, how do we justify describing the
mind side intentionally?
This returns us to the B/M problem as it always was. I see no paradigm
shift in any of this.
bruce
Not logical identity, something else, albeit something perfectly
ordinary and comprehensible if one can shake the fixation on identity as
a claim of logic.
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
