[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2009 16:42:44 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
> > "Cayuse" wrote:
> >> This is not an accurate portrayal of my view. We don't need to
> >> envision or imagine "the all" in order to understand that, where
> >> 'parts' are identified, /collections/ of 'parts' are also
> >> identified. We may or may not envision or imagine some kind of
> >> 'whole' at the limit of those collections, but it is not necessary
> >> that we do so in order to understand the idea of /collections/ (and
> >> I have consistently made the claim that any such vision or image is
> >> nonsensical).
> >
> > You say we don't need to imagine or envision it in order to think
> > about it and assert it is nonsensical to do so.
>
> No, I said that we don't need to envision or imagine "the all" in order to
> understand that, WHERE 'PARTS' ARE IDENTIFIED, /COLLECTIONS/
> OF 'PARTS' ARE ALSO IDENTIFIED. We may or may not envision
> or imagine some kind of 'whole' at the limit of those collections, but it is
> not
> necessary that we do so in order to understand the idea of /collections/.
>

Collections of what? Of course we know that there are collections of things and 
things that include collections of other things. But so what? How does that in 
any way speak to the question of what consciousness is, what it does, how it 
works? Aren't you reaching here?


>
> > But then what are you saying we need to do?
>
> I didn't say we "needed to do" anything.
>

Then why do you think we need to talk about "the all", "the microcosm" and so 
on as a proxy for what anyone means by "consciousness"?


>
> > If you're equating "consciousness" with "subjective experience"
>
> I'm not equating "consciousness" with "subjective experience"
> but with "experience".
>

It should be clear from our past discussions that, in this context, I equate 
the two (and only include "subjective" as a way of emphasizing the private 
nature involved, rather than to differentiate types of experience).

>
> > and saying this is the same as "the all" or "the microcosm"
>
> I'm not saying that "consciousness" or "experience" is "the same as the
> all or the microcosm", but that we /conceive/ of a whole on the same
> model as the parts/whole relationships that obtain /within/ experience.
> Moreover, that any such conception is nonsensical.
>


Then why would we conceive of it or worry about the possibility of doing so? If 
something is "nonsensical" then we cannot really conceive of it at all, only 
think we are doing so. And you did, in the past, say that what you meant by 
"consciousness" was the same as "subjective experience" and the same as "the 
all" and the same as "the microcosm" and the same as "the visual room". But 
when one is dealing with terms that have neither referent nor grammar, it's 
pretty easy to make such equivalencies. The problem is what do they really mean?


>
> > what is the point of such locutions?
>
> To point out that any attempt to account for the very existence
> of the "contents of consciousness" is misguided. Such accounts
> are only useful if they explain the existence of some /subset/ of
> those contents in terms of some /other/ subset.
>

Sorry but this makes on sense to me. Obviously if we have a brain and it 
produces a mind that mind consists of lots of subjective events/phenomena that 
are directly accessible only to that mind. That's what it means to have a mind. 
Aren't you really just trading on the special needs linguistic usage requires 
when we start to consider these sorts of things?

SWM


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