[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2009 17:05:08 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> swmaerske wrote:
> > "Cayuse" wrote:
> >> swmaerske wrote:
> >>> "Cayuse" wrote:
> >>>> You are arguing that since we are talking about it,
> >>>> it must have an application. I maintain that we can talk
> >>>> about it, but that doesn't mean it has an application.
> >>>
> >>> Then there's nothing to be talking about.
> >>
> >> It's not a nothing.
> >
> > But it's not a something either.
> >
> > On the other hand, if there is, in fact, nothing to talk about then
> > that "nothing" is not what we mean when we call something "a
> > nothing".
>
> We can talk about it on the model of the whole and its parts.
> The "whole" in this particular case is /not a nothing/
> (else it couldn't be conceived as having parts),
> and the error is to treat it as though it were a /something/.
>
>
> >> Most of what passes for metaphysics is said without application, so
> >> demonstrating that lots can be said without application. What is to
> >> be gained here is a recognition of the limit of what has application
> >> -- i.e. any speculation going beyond the brute fact that "it is".
> >
> > To recognize the limit we must learn where and when to stop.
>
> And this is a case in point. It is /not a nothing/,
> and nothing more can be said about it.
>
>
> >> Metaphysics is widely discussed regardless of its lack of
> >> appliction. That includes idealism, materialism, and dualism.
> >> By your definition then materialism is mysticism.
> >
> > That's the point of asserting it's all a function of confused
> > language use a la the later Wittgenstein.
>
> That IS the point.
>
>
> >>>> and we clearly CAN talk about it (since we are doing so).
> >>>> My claim is that any such talk has no application.
> >>>
> >>> If we can do so intelligibly, then it must have an application.
> >>
> >> That doesn't follow. Most of what passes for metaphysics
> >> is not unintelligible, but it has no application none the less.
> >
> > The point of unpacking nonsense, of clearing up linguistic muddles,
> > is to discover when something that at first looked reasonable and
> > comprehensible is not because it is reflects words that have come
> > unmoored from their proper anchorage the language game. If there is
> > an "application" as you like to put it then there is a grammar and if
> > the word is a referring word, a referent. But this concept of
> > referentless referring is simply confused.
>
> The nonsense that needs to be unpacked is what follows hot on the
> heels of a recognition of this "what it is like to be me", and not that
> recognition itself. That recognition signifies a /limit/ to explanation.
>
>
> >>>> and I will continue to refrain from
> >>>> doing so except inasmuch as it is used to denote mental processes
> >>>> in contrast to physical processes (cf. "mental arithemtic").
> >>>
> >>> Then we aren't talking about the same thing, are we?
> >>
> >> Not if you keep replacing Chalmers' word 'consciousness' with your
> >> word 'mind'.
> >
> > I've told you HOW I use "consciousness"
>
> When I speak of Nagel's "what it is like", I'm not speaking of 'mind'.
> As long as you persist in replacing my talk of Nagel's "what it is like"
> with your word 'mind', I will persist in making this point.
>
>
> >> There is no "hard problem" of mental processes, and to think that
> >> this is what Chalmers is referring to is to completely miss his
> >> point.
> >
> > I'm well aware of what Chalmers is talking about. I just think he is
> > completely wrong to think that one must presume dualism (naturalistic
> > or otherwise) to account for the various features we recognize in
> > ourselves as what we call "consciousness". I believe Dennett offers a
> > very satisfactory model of how consciousness can be explained in
> > terms of physical functions without presuming any magic or mystery or
> > dualistic extras in the universe.
>
> Dennett doesn't make any attempt to address the issue that Chalmers is
> attempting to address.
>

That's because he doesn't see it as any kind of an issue at all. Dennett is 
very clear as to how he thinks what we know of as subjective experience in 
ourselves arises, through the workings of a particular kind of process-based 
system. The sense of being a subject, of seeing what we see, feeling what we 
feel, etc., is not some special phenomenon that is separate and apart from what 
we see, feel, etc., but, rather is part of that.

The error you're making is thinking Dennett's different treatment of the issue 
means he isn't recognizing Chalmers' point. That is simply not true. He is 
simply arguing for a different conception of all this, a different way of 
explaining it on a purely physical basis.

Chalmers hasn't got hold of something different, something Dennett is missing. 
He's just treating the same thing differently, relying on a different 
understanding (conception) of the matter in question. Chalmers' approach 
presumes non-reducibility from the get-go and thus begins from the premise of 
duality. Thus it cannot be said to demonstrate the truth of a conclusion of 
duality. Dennett merely offers a way of conceiving of mind (consciousness, 
being a subject) which does not require a revised picture of the world that 
implies at least two ontological basics.

SWM

>
> >> I'm arguing that there's a grammatical error here that leads to
> >> nonsensical metaphysical speculation.
> >
> > And the "grammatical error" you have in mind is what?
>
> The "whole" in this particular case is /not a nothing/


But all you do is assert that, while admitting that we cannot conceive of the 
whole, let alone say enough things about it to fully reference it. Of course, 
if it cannot be a referent, then that is to say it lacks the grammar of 
referring which means there is nothing to refer to. That doesn't mean we can't 
use the word anyway or think we are referencing something when we aren't. We 
make that kind of mistake all the time. But the point is to note such mistakes, 
recognize their implications for our thinking and move on, not cling to the 
form of the use when there is no content there.

SWM

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