[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 18:31:40 +0100

swmaerske wrote:

"Cayuse" wrote:

I pointed out that there is a use of the word 'consciousness' that is
overlooked by any empirical investigation, and that is the subject of
Chalmers' "hard problem". You could at any time have expressed your
disinterest in that use, but instead you have continued to engage in
conversation, and so I continue to indulge you.


Hmmm, an interesting way of putting it.

<snip>

I have a suggestion. In his paper "On a confusion about the function
of consciousness" (1995), Ned Block distinguishes between what
he called "access consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness".
Regardless of my conviction that this is too simplistic a distinction,
we could agree that you're interested in a-consciousness and I'm
interested in p-consciousness.



If there is nothing to be said, don't say.
(Those things whereof we cannot know . . . .).


Precisely!


So why do you keep saying?


Because this is where metaphysical speculation (materialism,
idealism, dualism, etc.) enters in an attempt to explain the
existence of what is at the limit of explanation.


So what?


So there's a misguided attempt at explanation that needs light shedding
upon it. It's perfectly fine for you to express your uninterest.



The fact of the existence of the "contents of consciousness" is
incontravertible.


What has that to do with the point that "what it is like" refers to
nothing, absent some additional phrase connected to it like "being a
bat"? There is no "what it is like" because it doesn't name anything.
There is "what it is like to be this or that" but this only has
meaning when we add the this or the that.


I find the "what it is like to be me" a little more interesting,
since the "me" is just another part of the "what it is like".
Kind of reminds me of a Klein Bottle:
http://www.kleinbottle.com/whats_a_klein_bottle.htm



I pointed out that there is a use of the word 'consciousness' that is
overlooked by any empirical investigation, and that is the subject of
Chalmers' "hard problem".


Insofar as Chalmers thinks this renders the only explanation of
consciousness a dualist one, he is wrong on my view


I agree -- he is attempting to explain what is at the limit of explanation.



If your use of the word includes "what it is like to be in pain",
then it includes "what it is like".


And that is all about the contents.


The "contents" of WHAT?

<snip>

If you mean the contents of /consciousness/ (as you're using that
word in this case) then what is this "consciousness" over and
above the very /existence/ of those contents?


I have said before and will say again: I take "consciousness" to be
a term we use to refer to those features we recognize in ourselves
that make up our mental lives, our minds.


But when you say "And that is all about the /contents/ [of
consciousness]" the term 'consciousness' takes on a broader aspect.


You introduced the word "contents", not I.


I used a commonly adopted phrase that makes a
questionable distinction, and I question that distinction.
It's perfectly fine for you to express your uninterest.
Many thanks for your comments on the passages I quoted in my reply to Bruce. I will give them the consideration they deserve and reply in due course (sadly I don't get as much time for this as you do). 

WEB VIEW: http://tinyurl.com/ku7ga4
TODAY: http://alturl.com/whcf
3 DAYS: http://alturl.com/d9vz
1 WEEK: http://alturl.com/yeza
GOOGLE: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs
YAHOO: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/
FREELIST: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009

Other related posts:

  1. Home
  2. wittrs
  3. Archive
  4. 09-2009