[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 18:55:51 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> swmaerske wrote:
> > "Cayuse" wrote:
> >> I pointed out that there is a use of the word 'consciousness' that is
> >> overlooked by any empirical investigation, and that is the subject of
> >> Chalmers' "hard problem". You could at any time have expressed your
> >> disinterest in that use, but instead you have continued to engage in
> >> conversation, and so I continue to indulge you.
> >
> > Hmmm, an interesting way of putting it.
> <snip>
>
> I have a suggestion. In his paper "On a confusion about the function
> of consciousness" (1995), Ned Block distinguishes between what
> he called "access consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness".
> Regardless of my conviction that this is too simplistic a distinction,
> we could agree that you're interested in a-consciousness and I'm
> interested in p-consciousness.
>

It would be nice to resolve it that way but I don't think we really can.

I am maintaining that phenomenal consciousness, the experience of being a 
subject (having experiences) is explainable in terms of brain dependence. That 
is, I am making the point that being a subject is a condition that occurs 
BECAUSE of certain things brains do, things that can theoretically be isolated 
and identified (even if that has not yet been successfully accomplished).

I think the distinction between our views has to do with what aspect of being a 
subject interests us.

You are interested in the relation of subjectness to its "contents" and want to 
contemplate the condition of being a subject in toto, as a way of envisioning 
or imagining "the all". This certainly is a way of looking at this and has 
resonance with religious, mystical and poetic insight. The fact that we have 
such insights it seems to me goes a long way to explaining the occurrence and 
power of things like religion in human experience.

On the other hand, I am interested in seeing how being a subject fits into the 
world we envision as entirely physical and, thus, independent of our 
subjecthood. I want to know how we can account for minds in terms of a physical 
universe that seems to stand apart from any instance of a mind since minds 
appear to be without the usual physical characteristics we expect to encounter 
in physical things.

My main interest, thus, is to determine if minds can be accounted for in 
physical terms. Can they be explained entirely in terms of the physical 
functions of brains. This is a different question than the one that asks about 
our place as subjects in the context of everything else.

>
> >>>>> If there is nothing to be said, don't say.
> >>>>> (Those things whereof we cannot know . . . .).
> >>>>
> >>>> Precisely!
> >>>
> >>> So why do you keep saying?
> >>
> >> Because this is where metaphysical speculation (materialism,
> >> idealism, dualism, etc.) enters in an attempt to explain the
> >> existence of what is at the limit of explanation.
> >
> > So what?
>
> So there's a misguided attempt at explanation that needs light shedding
> upon it. It's perfectly fine for you to express your uninterest.
>


I think it's right to have said "disinterest" the first time, as you did, but 
my response, as Neil correctly pointed out, should have been to speak of 
whether I found something interesting or uninteresting. To have said I was 
"disinterested" suggested something else because "disinterested" usually refers 
to one who has no stake in ae transaction, e.g., a disinterested party in a 
real estate sale stands to neither gain nor lose nor to end up with the assets 
transacted on either side of the exchange.

Being "uninterested" sounds clumsier but at least avoids the locution that 
suggests being a "disinterested" party as described above. On the other hand, 
what I meant was clear enough in context since Neil picked up the maladroit 
usage. I don't think there is anyway to speak of someone's "uninterest" but we 
could capture this by the somewhat longer "lack of interest" or "absence of 
interest" (where "interest" means inclination to pay attention as opposed to 
payment of a fee for the service provided by a lender who has given us a 
certain amount of money to use for a set period or within certain limited 
circumstances, conditions, etc.).


>
> >> The fact of the existence of the "contents of consciousness" is
> >> incontravertible.
> >
> > What has that to do with the point that "what it is like" refers to
> > nothing, absent some additional phrase connected to it like "being a
> > bat"? There is no "what it is like" because it doesn't name anything.
> > There is "what it is like to be this or that" but this only has
> > meaning when we add the this or the that.
>
> I find the "what it is like to be me" a little more interesting,
> since the "me" is just another part of the "what it is like".
> Kind of reminds me of a Klein Bottle:
> http://www.kleinbottle.com/whats_a_klein_bottle.htm
>

I also find the idea of subjectness (a less awkward way of saying this, I think 
(interesting). After all, how does subjectness arise in physical medial like 
ourselves? How can something that looks like just so much meat be animated and 
have a mental life? But these questions are scientific ones, not metaphysical 
ones. That there is being, that anything exists at all are different kinds of 
questions, the kind, in fact, that have no ready answers in any scientific form.

>
> >> I pointed out that there is a use of the word 'consciousness' that is
> >> overlooked by any empirical investigation, and that is the subject of
> >> Chalmers' "hard problem".
> >
> > Insofar as Chalmers thinks this renders the only explanation of
> > consciousness a dualist one, he is wrong on my view
>
> I agree -- he is attempting to explain what is at the limit of explanation.
>

My point's a little different. I am saying that we CAN explain consciousness 
adequately in physical terms, not that this is at or beyond the limit of 
explanation.

On the other hand, if we could not find a way to adequately explain 
consciousness in terms of a physical origin or basis, then I would think that 
that is at least a prima facie reason to consider questioning our default 
physicalist metaphysical stance which is what science is grounded in. This 
would mean that it is at least possible that some other metaphysical picture is 
needed, e.g., dualism or something else. But, on my view, there is no reason to 
argue for replacing our default picture with a  more complex one absent some 
reason to think the default position won't suffice.

In a sense, what I'm saying is that dualism COULD be an empirical question IF 
there were reason to think physicalism wasn't adequate (such as a failure to 
explain all phenomena, including minds, in physical terms or the existence of 
evidence of minds as stand-alone entities vis a vis brains [and equivalent 
physical platforms]).


>
> >>>>>> If your use of the word includes "what it is like to be in pain",
> >>>>>> then it includes "what it is like".
> >>>>>
> >>>>> And that is all about the contents.
> >>>>
> >>>> The "contents" of WHAT?
> >> <snip>
> >>>> If you mean the contents of /consciousness/ (as you're using that
> >>>> word in this case) then what is this "consciousness" over and
> >>>> above the very /existence/ of those contents?
> >>>
> >>> I have said before and will say again: I take "consciousness" to be
> >>> a term we use to refer to those features we recognize in ourselves
> >>> that make up our mental lives, our minds.
> >>
> >> But when you say "And that is all about the /contents/ [of
> >> consciousness]" the term 'consciousness' takes on a broader aspect.
> >
> > You introduced the word "contents", not I.
>
> I used a commonly adopted phrase that makes a
> questionable distinction, and I question that distinction.
> It's perfectly fine for you to express your uninterest.
>


My issue was to note that it is what you call "contents" that are of interest 
on my view, though I generally use different referring terms for them.

> Many thanks for your comments on the passages I quoted in my reply
> to Bruce. I will give them the consideration they deserve and reply
> in due course (sadly I don't get as much time for this as you do).
>

That's because I'm retired. But I really should be doing other things, too, 
including working on a project which has a deadline that I have now missed 
three times since undertaking it. Fortunately the folks waiting for it have 
been remarkably patient while I have been increasingly remiss because of my 
fascination with philosophical issues and my enjoyment of such discussions as 
these (even if I do become frustrated at times).

I'm rather enjoying YOUNG LUDWIG by McGuinness at the moment which is also 
proving a distraction. I see no one has so far commented on what I transcribed 
to this list. Maybe I'll try another passage or two and see if we get any 
takers then. It's fascinating to see Wittgenstein in action as a young man, 
wrestling with Russell and others at Cambridge and, of course, with himself. In 
many ways this book gives us a far more detailed picture of the philosopher as 
a young man than we get from Monk's The Duty of Genius.

SWM


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