[Wittrs] Re: Minds, Brains and What There Is

  • From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2009 15:55:58 +0100

swmaerske wrote:

"Cayuse" wrote:

The "what it is like" is not a /part of/ anything, and not
/apart from/ anything, but it is the /collective entirety/
of the contents of consciousness. There is nothing "special"
about a collection of contents summing to an entirety.


Then there's nothing to talk about. There is no "what-it-is-like"
and the best evidence for this is that there is no real word for it
in our language,


That "there is no real word for it in our language"
is not an argument that there is no "what it is like".
Few people have trouble understanding Nagel's paper.



The error is attempting to explain what is at the
limit of explanation, whether that attempt is made
by Chalmers, or Dennett, or anybody else.


There's no "what-it-is-like" to explain


If there is a "what it is like to be in pain"
then there is a "what it is like".



But it is not some mysterious "what-it-is-like".


There is nothing "mysterious" about a collection
of contents summing to an entirety.



"Nothing" cannot be comprised of contents. This is not
a mere assertion but an argument. If you consider the
argument to be invalid then present a refutation.

<snip>

You talk about "the whole" where before you spoke about
"the all" and "the microcosm". What are these things?


They are the collective entirety of the "contents of consciousness".



Well you've told us they aren't because there are no such
referents. But you want to say still we can conceive of them,
so in that sense there is a referent.


They are not a "something", but not a "nothing" either.



But I can conceive of a unicorn or a flying purple people eater without
there being such things.


Any such concepts would be just more of the "contents of consciousness".



A word can relate to some conceptual picture we hold or imagine
without that picture having any relation to any actual thing in the world.


Whether or not that picture has any relation to any actual thing
in the world, the word, the picture, and any relation to any actual
thing in the world are /all/ part of the "contents of consciousness".



We not only CAN conceive of a whole,
but we DO conceive of a whole.


We IMAGINE we do.


Can I IMAGINE that I have a concept? I don't think so.
But I can have a concept of something imaginary.
Sometimes such a concept has an application (like "the electron"),
but in the case of Nagel's "what it is like", there is no application. 
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