[lit-ideas] Re: "Promissory Materialism" [was: the first lines are the argument referred by]
- From: "Adriano Palma" <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 10:17:26 +0200
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yes maybe physicalism is best
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ξε ν’, γγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀ ὅτι τ δε
κείμεθα, το ς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.
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>>> "Eric Yost" <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx> 11/10/2011 10:15 PM >>>
Isn’t it more precise to refer to the particular view of mind-brain
identity as “physicalism” rather than materialism? Materialism seems an
awkward term, especially given the electrical nature of neuronal
activity, but also considering that “matter” (ordinary matter and
energy) is only a small portion of the universe.
From:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John Wager
Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2011 9:15 AM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: "Promissory Materialism" [was: the first lines
are the argument referred by]
Donal McEvoy wrote:
. . . . Papineau doesn’t suppose that current science has yet
established any such identity; and while he can “see no reason to think
that such advances need to take us beyond physical theories of the same
general sort as we already have”, he does admit that “it is possible
that our access to such identities will require significant advances in
brain science.” In other words, we accept this materialism on the
promise that it will deliver the necessary advances, however
"significant". [It is also only a promise to claim that these advances
will not need to take us beyond physical theories of the same general
sort as we already have] While Popper makes it clear he does not assert
that “it is impossible that things may happen as the physicalist says
here” [TSAIB p.98], nevertheless “all the physicalist offers is, as it
were, a cheque drawn against his future prospects, and based on the hope
that a theory will be developed one day which solves his problems for
him; the hope, in short, that something will turn up.”
Here's one way to test this: If scientists succeed in creating a
non-phenomenal way to induce the theory of materialism into the brain
that does not require a logical analysis of an argument, then the theory
should hold true. "Theories" are phenomenal, after all, not material.
So "in theory" if materialism is true, its truth should be independent
of its phenomenal status; it should be possible to "cause" truth by
material changes in the structure of the brain independent of the
arguments proposed for that truth.
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